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Abstract 
Peter Matthews Wright: Modern Qur’anic Hermeneutics 
(Under the direction of Carl W. Ernst) 
 
The following dissertation utilizes recent allusion theory to produce an 
intertextual reading of the Qur’an with Biblical materials and argues that the 
Arabic revelation’s use of such literary protocols as allusion, citation, and echo 
supported its claim to prophetic authenticity in the poly-confessional milieu of 
the Late Ancient Near East.  
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Introduction 
  
Greek are the Pythian oracles, and yet hard to understand.1 
 
 
The foregoing remark is taken from the mouth of the Chorus in Aeschylus’ 
tragedy Agamemnon. In the context of the drama, the Chorus is responding to 
the prophetess Cassandra who has just foretold Agamemnon’s murder. The 
Chorus confesses to being baffled by this oracle and Cassandra interprets this 
failure to comprehend as a complaint about her language skills. Defensively, she 
replies: “See now, I know the speech of Hellas, only too well.” But the problem is 
not with Cassandra’s Greek, the Chorus assures her; the problem is with the 
prophetic genre itself.2 Undeterred by this, Cassandra returns to her mantic 
discourse and, in the course of the ensuing colloquy, the Chorus helps to 
elucidate for the audience the sense of her prophetic utterances. 
Prophets, it appears, require Choruses; and those prophets who are 
favored by the preservation of their oracular performances eventually acquire 
them.3 Rarely does it happen in recorded history that a Chorus (or an interlocutor 
performing the same hermeneutical function as the Chorus in Agamemnon) is on 
                                                   
1 Aeschylus, “Agamemnon,” Greek Drama, edited by Moses Hadas, New York: Bantam Classics 
(1965), p. 45. 
 
2 I have used A. W. Verrall’s translation of Aeschylus’ Greek because it encapsulates in a single 
line a meaning that a reader or auditor of the original must piece together from the dialogue as it 
unfolds. See Aeschylus, “Agamenon,” Aeschyli: Septem Quae Supersunt Tragoedias, edited by 
Denys Page, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1972), p. 182.  
    
3 Zhang Longxi, The Tao and the Logos: Literary Hermeneutics, East and West, Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press (1992), pp. 13-17.  
hand to ask clarifying questions of a prophet at the moment she or he delivers the 
Word; and even in cases where there is such a “Chorus” present, the subsequent 
inscription of their colloquy is never free from ambiguity. The reasons for this 
state of affairs are multiple; I shall review a variety of them in the ensuing 
chapters as well as a family of attempts to address the scene of interpretation 
where it involves prophetic speech as it has been transmitted to the present in 
Near Eastern Scriptures.  
My task in this Introduction, however, is far more modest; here I wish only 
to provide the reader with a trio of provisions for the road ahead: (1) a resumé of 
the personal intellectual journey that informs my particular approach to the 
history of Near Eastern prophecy, (2) that journey’s relationship to the 
theoretical swerve I take in the history of modern hermeneutics, and (3) a very 
brief description of the organization of the work.4  
1. 
Thirty years ago, in the spring of 1977, I was wandering the stacks of my 
high school library, killing time before first period. I was raised in a family that 
honored reading for its own sake and my personal habits in that regard (then as 
now) could be best described as voracious and eclectic. In my mind’s eye, I can 
see myself on that particular spring morning, pulling books from the shelves, 
looking restlessly for something to catch my interest. Serendipitously, I noticed a 
book with the letters K-I-E-R-K-E-G-A-A-R-D spilling down its spine. Curious, I 
                                                   
4 The “swerve” is from the early steps of Romantic philosophy in Europe through the 20th century 
literary Renaissance in Egypt to the present moment where I inflect Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd’s 
recently published writings on the Qur’an with my own version of Rortian “Yankee” 
hermeneutics. On Richard Rorty’s brand of “Yankee hermeneutics,” see John D. Caputo, More 
Radical Hermeneutics, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (2000), pp. 84-124. 
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pulled this volume from the shelf and opened it at random. There, in the pages of 
Robert Bretall’s A Kierkegaard Anthology, I found another voracious and eclectic 
reader, but one unlike any other I had ever encountered. Kierkegaard seemed to 
me to be someone who had practically lived his life in books—so much so that he 
was moved to create and re-create himself through the various characters and 
authorial personae that appear in his work. I was immediately baffled by this 
most readerly of writers and yet, at the same time, fascinated by him. As I worked 
my way through Bretall’s Anthology, it became evident to me that S. K. not only 
read widely and thought deeply, but also possessed a unique combination of 
religious earnestness, ironic sensibility, and moral passion. Indeed, here was an 
individual (that individual, as he would say) at one and the same time literary, 
philosophical, religious and Socratic-skeptical.  
My attraction to Kierkegaard had much to do with my religious upbringing 
which, I must admit, is difficult to describe. My mother, originally an 
Episcopalian, always regular in her church attendance, is quietly pious. My father 
was another story. A research scientist and hard-nosed skeptic, he nevertheless 
served for many years as Superintendent of Sunday Schools at the local 
Presbyterian Church. He therefore oversaw a curriculum in religious education 
that he routinely disavowed. As he was (and remains) a powerful presence in my 
consciousness, my admiration for expressions of piety (like my mother’s) are 
always tempered by a critical eye. What I found in Kierkegaard was a way to 
reconcile the conflicting approaches to religion that I had absorbed from parental 
example; for he managed to honor in his own personality the contradictory 
claims of a passionate piety, on the one hand, with a rigorous, ironical 
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circumspection, on the other. How he had integrated these two poles within a 
single personality he never explained; nevertheless, after meditating upon his 
literary-philosophical project, I determined to do the same myself. Years would 
pass before I would even approach a degree of Kierkegaardian proficiency in this 
matter. In the meantime, I tended to lurch back and forth from one pole to the 
other, see-saw fashion, until I reached an approximation that Cornel West 
describes as a “critical alignment with an enabling tradition.”5  
At a relatively early stage in my life, then, Kierkegaard’s unconventional 
piety provided me with a paradigm for personal religiosity that has informed my 
thinking ever since. Indeed, though my reading has ranged far and wide from the 
solitary Dane, his shadow is forever cast upon my approach to matters religious. 
It is unquestionably a Kierkegaardian predilection that has drawn me to various 
other figures whose influence upon me has been as nearly profound: Spinoza, the 
excommunicated Jew who taught that the true end of all religion is piety and, as 
proof, founded the modern historico-critical approach to Scriptural studies; 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, the linguistic philosopher who baffled his admirers in the  
Vienna Circle with his devotion to Leo Tolstoy’s revisionary Gospel In Brief and 
the mystical poetry of Rabindranath Tagore; the revisionary Count Leo Tolstoy 
himself; the irascible 11th century Muslim jurist and polymath, Ibn Hazm; and the 
gentle 21st century Muslim literary critic, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, to name but a 
few. In my view, despite their many obvious differences, all of these thinkers 
share a common trait: the desire to achieve a form of religious faith that 
                                                   
5 Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism, Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press (1989), p. 233. 
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marginalizes credulity—or what world historian Marshall Hodgson termed 
“wishful thinking.”6  
No one, in my estimation, has moved farther along this path than the 
Kierkegaard of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. After reviewing the 
apologetic uses to which Christian theologians have put the “historical point of 
view,” Kierkegaard asks, “For whose sake is it that the proof is sought? Faith does 
not need it; aye, it must even regard the proof as its enemy.”7 As an historian and 
critic of religious literatures, I observe and attempt to describe the intricate 
interrelations of faith and belief that I find presented in the texts I study; but as a 
practitioner of a religious tradition, I struggle always to cultivate a faithfulness 
that seeks not for proofs on its own behalf, but to be the self-validating proof of 
my motivating convictions. Those convictions are not based on the embrace of 
creedal propositions but, rather, upon something akin to a Heideggerian “fore-
understanding” of my radically contingent being-in-the-world—perhaps what 
some pre-moderns termed “gnosis.”8 In this sense, gnosis refers to an 
experientially-informed intuition that supplies “con-fidence”—it supports and 
underwrites faith.9  
                                                   
6 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
(1974), pp. 158-162. 
 
7 Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, translated by David F. Swenson and 
Walter Lowrie, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1941), p. 31. 
   
8 See Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, translated by Joel 
Weinsheimer, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (1994), pp. 91-105. 
 
9 Hans Jonas, a student of Martin Heidegger, made the interesting connection between the 
Existentialism for which Heidegger was partly responsible and ancient Gnosticism in The Gnostic 
Religion, Boston: Beacon Press, 1991.  
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That sense of gnosis and sense of faith have really very little to do with the 
treatise that follows. I remark them in order to suggest to the reader that one 
need not look to history for reassurance that one’s religious identity is, in a 
meaningful sense, “enabling.”10 In my view, historical reflection is a form of 
timely meditation upon contexts alternative to those I know first-hand. My 
understanding of religious tradition and practice is enriched through such 
meditation, but my sense of “enabling” derives from my location within a 
“community and a tradition that corresponds to me and furthers me.”11 I would 
describe my relationship to that community and tradition as hopeful, Gnostic (in 
the limited sense alluded to), and largely purged of wishful thinking—hence my 
“critical alignment” with it. 
There is, however, a second sense of “gnosis” that is far more pertinent to 
the subject matter of this treatise than the one previously mentioned. This sense 
is likewise an “experientially-informed intuition that supplies confidence”—but it 
supports and underwrites textual interpretations rather than religious faith per 
se. The experiences that inform this intuition are both linguistic and literary in 
nature and have to do with an adept hermeneut’s life-long acquaintance with the 
ways of language in history. In Chapter Three (below), I discuss Classicist and 
Literary critic Joseph Pucci’s notion of the “full-knowing reader”—the individual 
who is empowered by her immersion in a particular literary genre to recognize 
allusions within that genre (in the instant case, the genre of Near Eastern 
                                                   
10 In this I am guided by Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, propositions 5.6 to 7. See 
also Frederick Sontag, Wittgenstein and the Mystical: Philosophy as an Ascetic Practice, Atlanta, 
GA: Scholars Press, 1995. 
 
11 Herman Hesse, Narcissus and Goldmund, translated by Ursule Molinaro, New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux (1968), p. 281.  
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prophecy). Such recognitions are instrumental to the construction of “deep” 
intertextual readings that defy the artificial boundaries imposed upon textual 
reception by tradition, canon, and sect. I argue that they help to articulate the 
“gnosis” encrypted within Harold Bloom’s definition of a literary critic as one 
who “knows the hidden roads that go from poem to poem.”12 An abbreviated 
account of my journey to Qur’anic studies will serve to illustrate my own 
initiation into this second sense of gnosis. The course of this journey was 
uncannily convoluted, but I can chart it with some accuracy. 
Unlike my encounters with Kierkegaard and his ilk, the Qur’an was not 
included among the intellectual adventures of my youth. In fact, I had given very 
little thought to Islam or its Scriptural traditions until I completed my second 
year in law school. It was then—early June, 1989—that Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini passed away. Prior to his death, Khomeini seldom crossed my radar; 
but when he died, scenes of his funeral procession were broadcast to television 
screens around the world. His death was therefore delivered to my living room 
and, to this day, I can still recall the intense drama that took place in the streets 
of Teheran as his casket bobbed like a cork over a heaving sea of shoulders, 
heads, and hands. Not surprisingly, many of those hands held small copies of the 
Qur’an.  
As the Imam’s body made its way to its final destination, I noticed how 
some in the crowd gestured emphatically with their Books in the direction of his 
bier. I registered these scenes as the instinctual choreography of inconsolable 
                                                   
12 Bloom is a “strong precursor” of both Pucci’s work and my own. See his The Anxiety of 
Influence, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1973), p. 96.          
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grief—one so ponderous that it had robbed some of those present of their power 
of speech. Those whose tongues failed them on that day appeared to turn to the 
Qur’an to “speak” for them—by means of a symbolic act—the emotions of 
gratitude and loss that flooded their hearts. Perhaps because of my own 
inveterate bibliophilia, I was intrigued by the passionate attachment the Imam’s 
mourners displayed for that iconic text. In the days to follow, I continued to 
reflect upon what I had seen. With a naiveté that still causes me to smile, I 
eventually decided to do what I had always done when I found a book interesting: 
I went to the library.  
I no longer recall which translation of the Qur’an I checked out; what I do 
remember is that it lacked any sort of scholarly apparatus. There were no 
explanatory notes discussing the history of the text, the felicities of the Arabic 
language, or the peculiarities of its classical expression. As a consequence, the 
words that I read seemed somehow “flat” to me; they lay listlessly, as it were, 
upon the page. Much later, I would speculate that this effect may not have been 
unintended; that it might have had something to do with the ideological pre-
commitments of the translator. In any event, I would also conclude that I, too, 
deserved some apportionment of the blame for this poor first impression. The 
expectations I brought to my reading of this text—expectations as to how a 
“sacred scripture” ought to read—had been formed by my experiences of reading 
the Bible. The Qur’an, I discovered, had little use for my Biblicism: its 
comparative lack of sustained historical narrative, the polemics with implied but 
largely unnamed interlocutors, the continual shifts of its “voice” among 
pronominal persons and number—aspects of Qur’anic discourse that are rich 
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with literary, historical, and theological implications—bewildered me.13 It was not 
long before I judged the book refractory and returned it to the library, largely 
unread. “Is it possible,” I wondered, “that this book is the same one I witnessed 
being flourished with such passion at Khomeini’s funeral?” So passed my initial 
encounter with Muslim Scripture; at the time, I did not anticipate ever returning 
to reconsider the Qur’an.   
In October 1992, still reading voraciously and eclectically, I came across 
Aileen Kelly’s review essay “Revealing Bakhtin” in the New York Review of Books. 
Until that moment, I had never heard of Mikhail Bakhtin; moreover, I had 
enjoyed about as much success reading the 19th century Russian novel as I had 
reading the Qur’an—this despite an interest in Russian literature piqued by 
Tolstoy’s impact upon Wittgenstein. Kelly’s essay prompted me to purchase the 
book that had occasioned it, and with that book—Morson and Emerson’s Mikhail 
Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics—I was able to gain entrance not only to Bakhtin 
and Russian literature but also to the novelistic genre more generally. 14  
At the time, I had completed law school and was engaged in private 
practice, a portion of which was dedicated to criminal defense work. Most of my 
criminal clients were poor, many of them African-American, and some of these 
were Black Muslims. On occasion, I would interview the latter in the prisons 
where many of them had converted—and there I witnessed for the second time, 
and in a completely new context, the power of the Qur’an to “give voice” to the 
                                                   
13 See Michael Sells, Approaching the Qur’an, Ashland, OR: White Cloud Press (1999), pp. 1-31. 
 
14 See Aileen Kelly, “Revealing Bakhtin,” The New York Review of Books (September 24, 1992), 
pp. 44-48. 
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otherwise voiceless. I was prompted by these experiences to pick up the Book 
again; this time, with Bakhtin’s treatment of polyphony under my belt, the 
Qur’an’s “many-voicedness” no longer confounded me. Though I scarcely 
recognized it then, I was on my way to developing a deep appreciation for a 
Scripture that had previously seemed utterly opaque. But, to be clear: my initial 
association of literary theory with the Qur’an was, in a word, accidental. I did not 
read Bakhtin in order to find a way to make sense of the Holy Book. Instead, I 
steeped myself in Bakhtinian literary theory for what insights it might generate 
when reading fiction. Later, when a heavily-annotated bilingual edition of the 
Qur’an fell into my hands, I read it with new eyes. 
Compared to the history of the Qur’an’s reception by both Muslims and 
non-Muslims the world over, my personal experience with Islamic Scripture is 
remarkably idiosyncratic. Through a unique and unrepeatable series of events, 
my early acquaintance with the Qur’an was largely innocent of its venerable 
traditions of insider interpretation as well as the legacies of outsider polemics. 
Though I should perhaps be embarrassed to admit to the unconventional way I 
learned to appreciate the Book, I stubbornly consider myself to be quite fortunate 
in this regard. I am living proof that someone raised on Biblical traditions can 
learn to value the Qur’an as a species of Near Eastern prophecy with only those 
figures from his personal intellectual history—who had taught him how to think—
“looking over his shoulder.” In my case, non-Muslim literary-philosophical 
figures led the way. Had they been Muslim theologians, apologists, polemicists, 
or even jurists, I doubt I would have come to regard the Qur’an with the sense of 
piety-inducing wonder that I did; and having subsequently read much in the way 
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of Islamic theology, apology, polemics, and law, I feel confident in the accuracy of 
that judgment.            
I undertook formal graduate study in the history of Islam and Islamicate 
civilization in August of 2001. At the time, my specific interests were largely 
shaped by my previous experience as a practicing attorney: I wanted to develop 
insights into the specific forms of Islamic religiosity that I had encountered while 
interviewing incarcerated Black Muslims. The tragic events of that September, 
however, set me on a different course. Counter-intuitively, perhaps, I did not dive 
into the study of geo-politics then, but journeyed back to those earlier periods in 
my intellectual development that I have briefly recited. I also took advantage of 
the opportunity graduate school afforded me to broaden and deepen my 
knowledge of the Bible and Biblical literatures. Indeed, it was in the spring of 
2003, while researching a paper on “Paul and the Law” for Professor Bart 
Ehrman’s graduate seminar on the New Testament, that the seeds of the present 
study were planted.  
My research on Paul’s relationship to law was an attempt to discover to 
what extent the traditional interpretation of this subject is supported by New 
Testament evidence and to what extent it reflects wishful thinking on the part of 
the later (predominantly Gentile) Christian community. According to the 
prevailing tradition, Paul’s visionary experience on the Damascus road radically 
altered his previous orientation towards Jewish halakha. This man, who boasts 
in his letter to the Philippians that he was “as touching the law, a Pharisee … 
touching the righteousness which is in the law, blameless,” is presumed to have 
abandoned the dietary restrictions and prayer rituals that he had strictly followed 
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throughout his life prior to his conversion.15 While such a clean and sudden volte-
face is not outside the realm of possibility, it seemed more likely to me—and 
more consistent with certain passages in the Pauline corpus—that a Pharisee such 
as Paul would have stopped short of a complete suspension of halakhic practices 
and, instead, learned to reinterpret for himself the meaning he attached to 
them.16  After all, in Paul’s day, “Christianity” had not yet achieved the status of a 
rival to the inherited streams of Judean religion.17 
With this revisionist thesis in mind, I began to educate myself about 
Jewish life in the Hellenized world of the ancient Near East. An important aspect 
of my study involved trying to make sense of Paul’s boast of Pharisaic identity in 
his letter to the church at Philippi. As I was researching this particular question, I 
came across one of the standard histories of the Pharisaic movement, Ellis 
Rivkin’s A Hidden Revolution. I read this book with much interest, impressed by 
Rivkin’s prudent employment of the textual evidence. When I arrived at the final 
two pages of the concluding chapter, however, I encountered an unexpected 
connection to my own field of Islamic Studies.  
Rivkin was explaining how the “Pharisaic Revolution” as he terms it, “is 
encapsulated in [the] Mishnah.” He then quoted at length a passage from that 
work which performs an exegesis upon the Cain and Abel story from the book of 
Genesis and includes the lines: “For this reason man was created a singular 
                                                   
15 Philippians 3:5-6, KJV.   
 
16 The book which helped to shape my thinking on this issue is Peter J. Tomson, Paul and the 
Jewish Law: halakha in the letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles, Minneapolis, MN: Fortress 
Press, 1990. 
 
17 On the complicated picture of religious affiliations and identities in the Late Ancient Near East 
see Daniel Boyarin, Border Lines, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
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individual: to teach you that anyone who destroys a single soul of humankind, 
Scripture reckons him as having destroyed the entire world. [Contrariwise] 
whoever preserves alive a single soul of humankind, Scripture reckons him as 
having preserved alive the entire world.”18 I recognized these lines immediately—
not from the Mishnah (which, to that point, I had never read)—but from the 5th 
Surah of the Qur’an. When I turned to that Surah in an effort to determine 
whether or not my mind was playing tricks on me, I discovered not only the lines 
that I had been reminded of in Rivkin, but also the fact that the Qur’an cites this 
Mishnaic passage in the context of a discussion of the Cain and Abel story from 
the book of Genesis.  
Further research revealed that a similar pairing of these lines with the 
Cain and Abel story also appears in the Babylonian Talmud. In order to make 
certain the chronology of the texts I now found myself synoptically considering, I 
compared the respective histories of their production. What I discovered was that 
if one adopts the latest possible dating of the redaction of the Talmud and the 
earliest accepted dating of the Prophet Muhammad’s recitation of the Qur’an, one 
could suggest—though few, if any, scholars would find the suggestion 
compelling—that the Talmud was alluding to the Qur’an. But when it came to the 
latest possible dating of the Mishnah with the earliest accepted date for the 
original recitation of the Qur’an, there can be little question: scholars have long 
dated the final redaction of the Mishnah to the turn of the 3rd century C.E. No one 
dates the life of Muhammad earlier than the late 6th century, C.E. And neither of 
these dates have ever been calculated with respect to one another—in other 
                                                   
18 Ellis Rivkin, A Hidden Revolution, Nashville: Abingdon (1978), pp. 310-311. 
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words, the scholarship which has determined a date for the final redaction of the 
Mishnah never took into consideration the scholarship which has determined a 
date for the earliest Prophetic performance of the Qur’an—and vice versa. 
Therefore, nefarious pre-dating or post-dating of these events is to be excluded as 
a possibility.  
There exists a widely-held tradition among Muslims that the Qur’an was 
revealed to an illiterate Prophet who could not have had first-hand knowledge of 
the exact wording of the Mishnah—or any other text, sacred or secular. If it 
happens that the Revelation evidences an awareness of the wording of texts that 
the Prophet, by definition, could not have read, this fact is taken by Muslims as 
proof of the Qur’an’s miraculous nature. I have no quarrel with the belief that the 
Qur’an (or any sacred text for that matter) is a miracle; indeed, I am happy to 
endorse this belief. I profoundly disagree, however, with those who couple it with 
the presumption that the miraculous resists all rational investigation and, at least 
partial, explanation. The analogy I like to use is to the twofold conviction shared 
by many adherents of the world’s religious traditions that (1) the very existence of 
the universe is a miracle and (2) there are valid scientific explanations for all 
manner of phenomena occurring within that miracle. I find it ironic that those 
adherents who embrace this twofold conviction often stubbornly refuse to 
entertain the possibility that the miracle of Divine Revelation in verbal form is 
also available for rational inspection.  
 14 
The Qur’an, most interestingly, refers to both natural phenomena and its 
own discourse as Divine “signs.”19 The implication that I draw from this parallel 
reference is that the miracle of the Qur’an, no less than the miracle of creation, 
may be submitted to semiotic inquiry. Unfortunately, this implication is 
burdened by dogmatic assertions that flatly contradict it. Those assertions were 
developed through the course of intramural Muslim polemics over a thousand 
years ago. Ancient as this dogma is, it is exceeded in antiquity by the Qur’an 
itself.  If I fail to accord these dogmatic considerations the weight that they 
clearly carry in the minds of the majority of Muslims, it is because I am unwilling 
to contradict what I consider to be the Qur’an’s own self-description. Knowing 
the political history of this particular dogma only serves to confirm my position.20  
My chance discovery of what I can only describe as a Qur’anic citation to a 
text of Rabbinic Judaism’s “oral Torah” occasioned a broader investigation over 
the last four years into aspects of Near Eastern Scriptural intertextuality. This 
research protocol disturbs the settled assumptions of many sincere believers 
(Christian, Jewish, and Muslim) about their sacred texts. My Kierkegaardian 
respect for the claims of a passionate piety prompts me to wish that this were not 
the case. On the other hand, my tendency towards a rigorous, ironical 
Kierkegaardian circumspection in such matters has made it virtually impossible 
for me to conduct my Qur’anic studies in any other way.  
Once I had become aware of what appeared to me to be Qur’anic evidence 
of a prophetic colloquy with the adherents of various convictional communities 
                                                   
19 E.g., Qur’an 2:252; 3:108; 33:34; 40:61-68; 45:6; 65:11. 
 
20 See the discussion of this controversy in Chapter Three infra. 
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conducted through allusive appeals to their own Scriptures, I felt that I had no 
choice but to engage that evidence. What I found is that the Qur’an is rife with 
such material; along the way, I also discovered that Biblical and Parabiblical 
literatures are as well.21 In other words, the Scriptures produced in the Near East 
over a period that spans the better part of two millennia (from say, the 12th 
century B.C.E. to the 7th century of our own era, and from the Iranian plateau in 
the East to the Nile Valley in the West) including, but not limited to, the Tanakh, 
Christo-centric literature, and the Qur’an, all contain evidence of intertextual 
engagements with materials that lie outside of their respective canonical 
boundaries.  
What the ordinary adherent of a Rabbinic Judaism, or a Catholic, 
Protestant, or Orthodox Christianity, or a Sunni or Shi’a Islam receives and 
perceives as distinct codices—books—may be better described, in my view, as the 
memorializations of intra- and inter-communal conversations. These 
conversations—as befits truly interesting ones—contain arguments, allusions, 
poetry, polemic, humor, asseveration, exaggeration, rhetoric—a full complement 
of the linguistic techniques and devices that enable human beings to gesture 
meaningfully towards one another and, for the believer, that enable the Divine to 
communicate with humankind. That this re-description of these sacred texts may 
not conform in all of its particulars to the traditional descriptions endorsed by 
sectarian elites will no doubt trigger profound anxieties in some readers. It is my 
earnest desire, however, that such anxieties will spur others to further 
investigation and open up new opportunities for inter-confessional dialogue—the 
                                                   
21 See Chapters Three, Four, and the Conclusion, infra. 
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robust sort of inter-confessional dialogue that, I have concluded, is modeled for 
all of us, believer and non-believer alike, in the surviving texts of Near Eastern 
prophetic discourse that we call, over-simply, the Bible and the Qur’an.  
2. 
The genealogy and proposed trajectory of hermeneutics that I chart in the 
chapters to follow is perhaps best described as a “swerve” from what most readers 
familiar with the history of hermeneutics would expect. This is due, in part, to the 
fact that the rise of hermeneutics as an intellectual discipline is closely allied in 
the European context with the history of Biblical interpretation. My focus is upon 
the Egyptian School of modern Qur’anic hermeneutics which, though it shares 
some of the same history with hermeneutical styles born in Europe, is more than 
a mere epigone of those styles. The inspiration for the Egyptian School is the 
Romantic mood that gripped Egyptian intellectual life in the early decades of the 
20th century. The ascendance of this mood was most pronounced in the poetry 
written by Egyptians in those years, but its effects are visible in the subsequent 
attempts to make critical sense of the new poetic fruit that ripened upon 
Romanticism’s transplanted vine.22 Unlike their European counterparts—many of 
whom had extensive theological training (e.g., Schleiermacher, Heidegger)—the 
Egyptian pioneers of Qur’anic hermeneutics tended to be, first and foremost, 
professional literary critics. This decidedly literary orientation has focused the 
efforts of the Egyptian School upon the practical side of textual interpretation 
                                                   
22 See M. M. Badawi, A Short History of Modern Arabic Literature, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993; Muhammad Abdul-Hai, Tradition and English and American Influence in Arabic 
Romantic Poetry, London: Ithaca Press, 1982; and Chapter Two, infra.  
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and left underdeveloped the more philosophical considerations that come to the 
fore whenever Hermeneutics is invoked in the European context.  
From my perspective, this philosophical underdevelopment presents 
something of an opportunity, if not a blessing; for the direction that the field has 
taken in Europe and North America subsequent to Martin Heidegger’s 
intervention tends to distract a reader’s attention away from the pragmatics of 
interpretation and invest it in a form of quasi-metaphysical speculation that I 
term theologico-poetics.23 Rather than simply pick up where Heidegger and his 
successors leave off, I have chosen to take advantage of the Egyptian School’s 
relative insulation from this trend and strike off in a different direction. In so 
doing, I do not intend to imply that the philosophical hermeneutics bequeathed 
us by its recent German practitioners and their intellectual progeny can be safely 
ignored. On the contrary, I hope the following pages will demonstrate the 
potential value of engaging in critical dialogue with hermeneutical schools the 
world over. It is my conviction, however, that at this stage in the development of 
modern Qur’anic hermeneutics, there is much more to be gained by exploring a 
pragmatic approach to the sacred text—whether in criticism or philosophy—than 
in assuming the burden of Heideggerian ontological vocabularies.24 
                                                   
23 The work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Heidegger’s most illustrious successor in the field, does 
offer something of a corrective in this regard—but does not, in my view, go far enough. Among 
other concerns, I agree with the assessment of Jürgen Habermas that Gadamer understates the 
degree to which tradition is a creature of “systems of labor and domination.” In a curious way, 
Gadamer’s version of historicism tends to “de-historicize” the past. See Habermas, “A Review of 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method,” in The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Ast to Ricoeur, edited by 
Gayle Ormiston and Alan Schrift, Albany, NY: SUNY Press (1990), pp. 213-244.    
   
24 See Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 124-144. 
 
 18 
Admittedly, this conviction privileges—yet again—figures from my 
personal intellectual history and, in particular, those who stimulated the 
development of my thinking in the wake of its early Kierkegaardian turn. These 
figures are also readers of Kierkegaard and, at the same time, associated in one 
way or another with Anglo-American trends in recent Romantic philosophy.25 It 
is perhaps fortuitous that my own intellectual development is congenial to 
English and American Romanticism since the writings of British Romantics were 
held in high esteem among members of the Egyptian Renaissance School. I would 
suggest, however, that this “happy accident” was the product of an unconscious 
process of self-selection: I recognized in the work of Egyptian literary historians 
and critics a kinship with my own way of thinking. That I would choose to 
contribute my own efforts to their labors was, in some sense, unavoidable.  
3. 
It remains only to offer a brief summary of what follows. The text is 
divided into two parts. The first part argues that, in the wake of what world 
historian Marshall G. S. Hodgson termed the Technicalistic Revolution, 
intellectuals in Europe and the Middle East developed reading strategies 
designed to account for a new “modern” or “contrapuntal” sense of time. This 
new sense of time psychologically underwrote their historicist conclusion that 
history has a history—or, as we would say today, that cultural memory is as much 
constructed as it is “found.”  
While I argue that this modern sensibility is peculiar to those who have 
experienced the effects of Technicalism, I do not argue that everyone who has 
                                                   
25 I have in mind Ludwig Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, and Stanley Cavell. 
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experienced these effects in one way or another necessarily responds to them in 
the same way. Empirically, I think, such an assertion would be impossible to 
verify. What I do contend is that no one before the Technicalistic Revolution gave 
evidence of historicist thinking. Therefore, no purportedly historical text 
produced before, say, 1500 C.E. performs history in the way that post-medieval 
historical texts perform history. To treat any pre-modern text as historically 
“reliable” in a modern sense involves the disregard (either naïve or willful) of a 
documented change in post-Technicalistic intellectual patterns.26 It is like doing 
geography, post-Magellan, and presuming that the earth is flat; or biology, post-
Darwin, without regard for the effects of natural selection; or mapping the solar 
system, post-Copernicus, and placing the earth at its center.  
The first chapter of Part One charts the development of this post-medieval 
way of reading among Europeans; the second chapter charts its development 
among Egyptians. This way of reading is described as Historicist and Romantic, 
for it is both.  
Part Two consists of two chapters as well. The first chapter (Chapter 
Three) picks up where Part One: Chapter Two leaves off and develops the 
implications of the Egyptian contribution to Romantic philosophy and its recent 
application to Qur’anic studies. The work of the Egyptian literary critic Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd receives particular attention, connecting it with recent trends in 
the critical study of sacred texts. Chapter Four consists largely of examples of 
applied Romantic criticism of the Qur’an.  
                                                   
26 I rely here upon the scholarship of Reinhart Koselleck. See Chapter One, infra.   
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The special burden of Part Two is to suggest a new way to understand the 
overall message or kerygma of the Qur’an. This new understanding may be 
characterized as “post-Islamic” (or, perhaps, “pre-Islamic”) in the sense that it 
does not presume that the interpretive trajectories of sectarian (i.e., Sunni and 
Shi‘i) tradition as historically realized place natural or inevitable limits upon the 
meanings which the Revelation makes available to those who study it. Put 
another way, contrary to the presumption of sectarian elites, Islamic tradition as 
developed to date does not exhaust the possibilities of what the Qur’an has to 
“say” to the present or to the future; nor, in my view, does it adequately account 
for what the Qur’an had to “say” to generations past.  
Of particular interest to me is what the Qur’an may have meant to its first 
hearers—not because I believe that therein lies its “true” and, therefore, exclusive 
meaning —I do not believe that. What I do believe is that it is possible, through 
the application of modern Qur’anic hermeneutics, to “recover” a lost meaning or 
meanings that allow us to read the Qur’an “outside the box” of the prevailing 
interpretations that compose received Islamic tradition. Read “pre-” or “post-” 
Islamically in this way, the Qur’an emerges as the inscribed record of a Late 
Ancient, Near Eastern da’wa or “invitation” to a post-Messianic prophetic 
Universalism. The implied invitees of this kerygma were the inhabitants of the 
eastern littoral of the Red Sea basin—an important (but historically overlooked) 
situs of diasporic Judaisms, Christianities, East African, Persian, peninsular 
Arabian, and possibly Indian religio-political identities and affiliations.27 The 
                                                   
27 See Gordon Newby, The Jews of Arabia, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press , 
1988; see also Boyarin, Border Lines. 
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Qur’an addressed these communities in order to create a new religious and 
political culture; it represented, for many in its audience, the last prophetic 
intervention in diasporic Perso-Judean religion prior to the rise of the 
interpretive traditions we now call Islam.28  
The literary device or technique empowering this Arabic da’wa was a 
recognizably prophetic portfolio of inter-Scriptural allusions in the form of 
citations, allusions proper, and echoes. Whenever this allusive portfolio triggered 
inter-textual recognitions among members of the Prophet Muhammad’s 
audience, it was capable of stimulating the “mystic chords” of Near Eastern 
cultural memory—“gnosis” in the second sense suggested above. I would argue 
that, over time, the accumulated repertoire of these allusive recognitions 
substantially contributed to the forging of a new nation e pluribus unum; I would 
also wager that it led to many instances of gnosis in the first sense suggested 
above. And since this nation was not to be a new Byzantium but, rather, Allah’s 
Commonwealth, I should substitute the Arabic min jahili ila ummatin for the 
Latin phrase e pluribus unum—from a diffuse state of unknowing to an informed 
state of communal solidarity.29      
In my Conclusion, I propose an itinerary to further the research program 
to which the present work is a prolegomenon.                                         
                          
        
          
                                                   
28 For what I consider to be a parallel or consonant view, see Fred M. Donner, “From Believers to  
Muslims,” Al-Abhath 50-51 (2002-3), pp. 9-53. 
 
29 “Allah’s Commonwealth” is the coinage of the historian F. E. Peters.  
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Chapter One:  
 
 
The Romantic Legacy: New Protocols for 
Reading After Vico 
 
 
Modern scholars, for their part, had failed to see that they must 
not expect an ancient historian to use the methods and meet the 
standards of a modern archivist, a systematic error which Vico 
named “the conceit of the learned.” The folie à deux of ancient 
writers and modern scholars had twisted the historical record 
into something as distorted as the image in a fun-house 
mirror.30 
 
   
The Task of Re-Thinking 
 
 
In an essay first published in 1966, Martin Heidegger identified 
philosophy with metaphysics and then declared its “end”—in the sense of its 
“achievement” but also in the sense of its transmutation. Philosophy (i.e., 
metaphysics) ends by turning  
 
… into the empirical science of man, of all that can become for 
man the experiential object of his technology, the technology by 
which he establishes himself in the world by working on it in the 
manifold modes of making and shaping…Philosophy is ending in 
the present age…The sciences are now taking over as their own 
task what philosophy in the course of its history tried to present 
in certain places, and even there only inadequately, that is, 
ontologies of the various regions of beings (nature, history, law, 
art)…The end of philosophy proves to be the triumph of the 
manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world and 
of the social order proper to this world. The end of philosophy 
                                                   
30 Anthony Grafton, “Introduction” to Giambattista Vico, New Science, translated by David 
Marsh, London: Penguin Classics (1999), p. xviii.  
 
  
means the beginning of the world civilization that is based upon 
Western European thinking.31   
 
This is a complicated historical claim. Putting aside for the moment his wholesale 
reduction of philosophy to metaphysics (and his implicit reduction of all of 
philosophy to a variety that has dominated Western European thought), it is 
interesting to note that Heidegger sketched a thesis regarding the role played by 
Western European philosophical thinking in the development and emergence of a 
“scientific-technological” world civilization.   
Heidegger’s sketch was mere preamble to his larger aim: to ask what 
comes next for thinking—a “thinking that can be neither metaphysics nor 
science.”32 He wanted to prepare future intellectuals for the “possibility that the 
world civilization that is just now beginning might one day overcome its 
technological-scientific-industrial character as the sole criterion of man’s world 
sojourn. This may happen,” he opined, “not of and through itself, but in virtue of 
the readiness of man for a determination which, whether heeded or not, always 
speaks in the destiny of man, which has not yet been decided.”33 In other words, 
Heidegger was struggling, late in life, to articulate a way out of the world 
civilization that he witnessed aborning. Although he acknowledged that the 
“destiny” of humankind was undecided, his pessimism was palpable. He was 
“uncertain whether world civilization will soon be abruptly destroyed or whether 
it will be stabilized for a long time.” He went on to remark that even if the 
                                                   
31 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Basic Writings, edited by 
David Farrell Krell, San Francisco, CA: HarperSanFrancisco (1993), pp. 434-435. 
 
32 Ibid, p. 436. 
 
33 Ibid, p. 437. 
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technological-scientific-industrial world order achieved stability, it would not 
“rest in something enduring, but establish itself in a sequence of changes, each 
presenting the latest novelty.”34 Martin Heidegger, the anti-metaphysician, still 
longed for solid ground. 
To find that ground, Heidegger advocated a return to the philosophical 
heritage of Western Europe—but not to the tradition of metaphysics that it 
spawned.35  He intimated that the task of thinking at the end of philosophy was 
present to philosophy “since its very beginning” and, yet, somehow managed to 
“conceal” itself from philosophy.36  Consequently, this task represents a 
philosophical road not taken: 
Because of this, the thinking in question here necessarily falls 
short of the greatness of the philosophers. It is less than 
philosophy…the thinking in question remains unassuming, 
because its task is only of a preparatory, not of a founding 
character. It is content with awakening a readiness in man for a 
possibility whose contour remains obscure, whose coming 
remains uncertain…The preparatory thinking in question does 
not wish and is not able to predict the future. It only attempts to 
say something to the present that was already said a long time 
ago, precisely at the beginning of philosophy and for that 
beginning, but has not been explicitly thought.37        
 
Though longing for solid ground, Heidegger resisted the temptation to offer his 
reader the security of a foundation. The kind of thinking that can be neither 
metaphysics nor science is not the kind of thinking that delivers sure footing. But 
                                                   
34 Ibid. 
 
35 My reading of Heidegger was greatly enhanced by J. Robert Cox’s deft weave of certain 
reflections on temporality found in Heidegger, Marcuse, Kierkegaard and others (J. Robert Cox, 
Cultural Memory and Public Moral Argument [The Van Zelst Lecture in Communication] 
Evanston: Northwestern University School of Speech, 1987). 
   
36 Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 436.  
 
37 Ibid, pp. 436-437. 
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neither is it something new; rather, it is something that “was already said a long 
time ago, precisely at the beginning of philosophy.” It belongs, therefore, to the 
philosophical heritage, but not to the discursive trajectories that are traced when 
the history of Western European philosophy is reviewed: “…every attempt to gain 
insight into the supposed task of thinking finds itself moved to review the whole 
history of philosophy. Not only that. It is even forced to think the historicity of 
that which grants a possible history to philosophy.”38 Heidegger is here 
suggesting that the way in which the philosophical conversation of Western 
Europe worked itself out in time was not an inevitability: the path he traces from 
the metaphysical speculations of Plato through their dissolutions in the 
specialized sciences is a matter of the historical record; as such, its contours were 
completely contingent upon specific events that took place in time. It is not itself 
a creature of metaphysical necessity. There is no denying that what happened in 
the history of Western European thinking happened; but for any number of 
possible alternative reasons, it might have happened differently. 
After positing this thesis, Heidegger proceeded to outline a new task for 
thinking that aspires to a Goethean contentment with “primal phenomena.”39 
Here Heidegger’s language waxes theologico-poetic. He speaks of the coming day 
when “we will not shun the question whether the clearing, free openness, may not 
be that within which alone pure space and ecstatic time and everything present 
and absent in them have the place that gathers and protects everything.”40 This, 
                                                   
38 Ibid, p. 436. 
 
39 Ibid, p. 442. 
 
40 Ibid, pp. 442-443. 
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again, is a complicated claim. Reading Heidegger, one finds that the more he 
elaborates his sense of the “opening” or “clearing,” the more difficult it becomes 
to render his discourse in any words other than those he himself has chosen. This 
is not an unfamiliar problem. Indeed, given his desire to think outside the box of 
the Western European philosophical tradition, the difficulty one encounters in 
Heidegger’s language ought to occasion little surprise. Such linguistic opacity is 
reminiscent of a great deal of religious and aesthetic discourse. I do not intend 
this observation as a criticism, necessarily; indeed, I am reminded of an anecdote 
George Steiner relates concerning the composer Robert Schumann: “Asked to 
explain a difficult étude, Schumann sat down and played it a second time.”41 
Having embraced Goethe’s admonition to “Look for nothing behind phenomena: 
they themselves are what is to be learned,” Heidegger abandoned analysis in 
favor of quasi-poetic production.42 
The difficulties one encounters reading the discourse of Heideggerian 
phenomenology only serve to underscore the reasons that the philosophical 
tradition of Western Europe followed the course that it did. To content oneself 
with “primal phenomena” requires an intellectual discipline that privileges 
wonder at the expense of curiosity. Curiosity—the desire to look for “something” 
behind phenomena—drove the Western European philosophical tradition first to 
metaphysical speculation and then to the specialized sciences. Through a kind of 
willed forgetfulness of scientific explanation—what later Phenomenologists 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
41 George Steiner, Real Presences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1989), p. 20. 
 
42 Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 442. 
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would call “bracketing”—Goethe hoped to reintroduce wonder into the 
philosophical conversation. Ultimately, his goal was to teach himself to see 
natural phenomena afresh. Goethe’s articulation of this desire set the tone for the 
rise of Romanticism in Europe’s literature, Organicism in its science, and 
Idealism in its philosophy.43 Heidegger’s desire was akin to Goethe’s: in an effort 
to reinvigorate his apprehensions of the world, Heidegger privileged wonder at 
the expense of curiosity. But there is a crucial difference to be remarked in the 
approaches of these two men:  in Goethe, one finds a pronounced longing to 
restore some balance to his apprehensions—to place wonder and curiosity in a 
rational relation to one another—i.e., to achieve a ratio between them. 
Heidegger’s distrust of the emerging world civilization appears to have left him 
less sanguine about scientific curiosity and, not surprisingly, many contemporary 
scholars who count themselves among Heidegger’s heirs express a similar 
ambivalence. Unlike Goethe, who would be puzzled by their apparent 
estrangement from natural science, these thinkers permit a laudable desire to 
avoid a narrow empiricism to approach hostility to the scientific enterprise.44 
Re-Thinking the Task  
Heidegger’s wholesale reduction of the philosophical tradition to 
metaphysics is a rhetorical move symptomatic of the depth of his pessimism 
about the world civilization that looks to Western Europe as its progenitor; it is 
not an accurate representation of the history of Western European philosophy, let 
                                                   
43 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of 
Goethe, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.  
 
44 See Richard Rorty’s essay “Nineteenth-Century Idealism and Twentieth-Century Textualism” in 
Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980, Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press (1982), pp. 139-159.  
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alone the history of those philosophical traditions that have emerged in other 
cultural matrices. It is true, as Heidegger wrote, that “all metaphysics, including 
its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato.”45 But what does this say 
about the philosophical tradition as a whole? The metaphysically-minded Plato 
may have secured his reputation as the most successful disciple of Socrates, but 
he was not the only disciple of Socrates. Moreover, positivism is not the only 
alternative to metaphysics that the European philosophical tradition has put on 
offer: other philosophical schools and wisdom traditions that could not be 
described as positivistic—some of which even looked to Socrates as their 
founding figure (Cynics and Stoics, for example)—had little taste for metaphysical 
speculation.46  
By resisting Heidegger’s identification of philosophy with metaphysics, the 
intellectual heritage upon which one may draw to insure the continuing vitality of 
philosophical reflection is generously expanded.  One recent philosopher who has 
taken advantage of Heidegger’s insights—without resorting to his theologico-
poetics—is Richard Rorty. Rather than reduce all of philosophy to metaphysics 
and its scientific progeny, Rorty speaks of a “split” within the Western European 
philosophical tradition itself: 
Some philosophers have remained faithful to the Enlightenment 
and have continued to identify themselves with the cause of 
science. They see the old struggle between science and religion, 
reason and unreason, as still going on, having now taken the 
form of a struggle between reason and all those forces within 
culture which think of truth as made rather than found. These 
                                                   
45 Heidegger, Basic Writings,  p. 444. 
 
46 On the Cynics see Donald R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century 
A.D., London: Methuen, 1937;  on the Stoics see John Sellars, Stoicism, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006. 
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philosophers take science as the paradigmatic human activity, 
and they insist that natural science discovers truth rather than 
makes it. They regard “making truth” as a merely metaphorical, 
and thoroughly misleading, phrase. They think of politics and art 
as spheres in which the notion of “truth” is out of place. Other 
philosophers, realizing that the world as it is described by the 
physical sciences teaches no moral lesson, offers no spiritual 
comfort, have concluded that science is no more than the 
handmaiden of technology. These philosophers have ranged 
themselves alongside the political utopian and the innovative 
artist.47 
 
A self-styled Heideggerian reading this passage might be quick to assert that, but 
for the Master’s attempt to think beyond the “end” of philosophy, no such split 
would now exist. Not so, claims Rorty; the fork in the road preceded Heidegger 
by a century: 
Had the first sort of philosopher, the sort whose hero is the 
natural scientist, always been the only sort, we should probably 
never have had an autonomous discipline called “philosophy”—a 
discipline as distinct from the sciences as it is from theology or 
from the arts. As such a discipline, philosophy is no more than 
two hundred years old. It owes its existence to attempts by the 
German idealists to put the sciences in their place and to give a 
clear sense to the vague idea that human beings make truth 
rather than find it.48              
 
Rorty’s characterization of the difference between the two branches of recent 
Western European philosophy comes down to a disagreement among 
intellectuals about what metaphor is most appropriate to the philosophic project 
where the ascertainment of “truth” is concerned. As is suitable for the progenitors 
of the specialized sciences, metaphysicians regard truth as something external to 
the human being—something “out there” in the world—the sort of “thing” that 
may be “found.” On the other hand, the German Idealists—following Gottlieb 
                                                   
47 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
(1989) pp. 3-4.  
  
48 Ibid, p. 4.  
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Fichte’s appropriations of Kant—insisted upon the human subject’s contributions 
to the development of what a given community regards as “true.”49  To clarify his 
point, Rorty offers a useful distinction between “the claim that the world is out 
there and the claim that the truth is out there.” The distinction runs as follows: 
To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to 
say, with common sense, that most things in space and time are 
the effects of causes which do not include human mental states. 
To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there 
are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of 
human languages, and that human languages are human 
creations.50            
  
The conclusion that Rorty draws from this distinction is that “Truth cannot be 
out there—cannot exist independently of the human mind—because sentences 
cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the 
world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The world on its 
own—unaided by the describing activities of human beings—cannot.”51 The 
distinction between word and world that Rorty rehearses is a difficult one for 
many people to contemplate. It strikes one as counter-intuitive. “Can I not now 
name the object in my hands as a book?” one asks. Yes, of course. The critical 
question for philosophy is not “How is this particular object designated in a given 
language?”—that is simply a matter of translation. The critical philosophical 
question is “How does a particular object acquire the designation that it has in a 
                                                   
49 These distinctions are also succinctly summarized in Gary Handwerk, “Romantic Irony,” The 
Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 5: Romanticism, edited by Marshall Brown, 
Cambridge: Cambrdige University Press (2000), pp. 203-225. 
 
50 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, pp. 4-5. 
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given language?” Ancillary to this question is another: “Do such designations ever 
change over time?” Rorty answers: 
The world does not speak. Only we do. The world can, once we 
have programmed ourselves with a language, cause us to hold 
beliefs. But it cannot propose a language for us to speak. Only 
other human beings can do that.  The realization that the world 
does not tell us what language games to play should not, 
however, lead us to say that a decision about which to play is 
arbitrary, nor to say that it is the expression of something deep 
within us. The moral is not that objective criteria for choice of 
vocabulary are to be replaced with subjective criteria, reason 
with will or feeling. It is rather that the notions of criteria and 
choice (including that of “arbitrary” choice) are no longer in 
point when it comes to changes from one language game to 
another. Europe did not decide to accept the idiom of Romantic 
poetry, or of socialist politics, or of Galilean mechanics. That sort 
of shift was no more an act of will than it was a result of 
argument. Rather, Europe gradually lost the habit of using 
certain words and gradually acquired the habit of using 
others.52   
 
Here we find Rorty linking two recent traditions in philosophical method. First, 
he confirms his allegiance to the “linguistic turn” that he made famous with his 
eponymous book of 1967.53 Truth is a property associated with language use and 
does not exist independently of it. Second, he reiterates the pragmatic approach 
to philosophical problems that he openly embraced in his 1982 collection of 
essays, Consequences of Pragmatism.54 This linkage permits Rorty to offer a 
rather novel theory of ideational change as a reflection of linguistic habits. When 
the habit of speaking in a certain way about particular aspects of the world is lost 
or broken, the ability to conceive of the world in that certain way is also forfeit. 
                                                   
52 Ibid, p. 6. Emphasis added. 
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University of Chicago Press, 1967.  
 
54 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972-1980, Minneapolis, MN: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1982.  
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One may find evidentiary support for Rorty’s theory in the work of the historian 
of science Thomas S. Kuhn and more broadly in that of the German historian 
Reinhart Koselleck. I will review Koselleck’s work shortly but, before I do, I want 
to return to Rorty’s conclusions about what his theory of ideational change means 
for the practice of philosophy.55 
The Romantic Alternative to Technicalistic Thinking 
As noted previously, Rorty’s resistance to Heidegger’s identification of 
philosophy with metaphysics generously expands the intellectual heritage upon 
which one may draw to insure the continuing vitality of philosophical reflection. 
In his own rehearsal of the recent history of Western European philosophical 
thought, Rorty focuses upon Fichte’s appropriations of Kant (as previously 
mentioned) but also upon Hegel’s subsequent “romantic description of how 
thought works.”56 Indeed, Romanticism is a key descriptor in Rorty’s brief history 
of ideational transmission and change. He credits Hegel with elaborating the 
Romantic thesis that “what is most important for human life is not what 
propositions we believe but what vocabulary we use.”57 According to Rorty, Hegel 
elaborated this thesis by endowing it with “the historical sense of the relativity of 
principles and vocabularies to a [specific] place and time” and with “the romantic 
sense that everything can be changed by talking in new terms.”58 Rorty spells out 
what he thinks this means for the practice of philosophy through his advocacy of 
                                                   
55 For Kuhn see Thomas S. Kuhn, The  Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, Chicago: 
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56 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 149. 
  
57 Ibid, pp. 139-159. 
 
58 Ibid, p. 149. 
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interesting philosophy. I will explicate Rorty’s understanding of “interesting” 
philosophy under the more historically accurate (and rhetorically neutral) rubric 
Romantic philosophy. Rorty opposes Romantic philosophy to what I term 
Technicalistic philosophy or thinking—the form of philosophizing that survives 
the displacement of metaphysics by the specialized sciences and which acts in an 
auxiliary capacity to those sciences.59   Unlike Technicalistic philosophy, 
Romantic philosophy rarely involves “…  an examination of the pros and cons of a 
thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched 
vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary 
which vaguely promises great things.”60 What constitutes an “entrenched 
vocabulary” and how it may become a “nuisance” is something that I shall have 
occasion to consider in the context of religious discourse; for the moment, my 
immediate focus will be upon the development of promising new vocabularies. 
With this intriguing formula, Rorty has gestured towards the method by which 
Romantic philosophy proceeds; he has defined this method further as a practice 
of redescription: 
The method is to redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, 
until you have created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will 
tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to 
look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior, for 
example, the adoption of new scientific equipment or new social 
institutions. This sort of philosophy does not work piece by piece, 
analyzing concept after concept, or testing thesis after thesis. 
Rather, it works holistically and pragmatically. It says things like 
“try thinking of it this way”—or more specifically, “try to ignore 
the apparently futile traditional questions by substituting the 
following new and possibly interesting questions.” It does not 
pretend to have a better candidate for doing the same old things 
which we did when we spoke in the old way. Rather, it suggests 
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that we might want to stop doing those things and do something 
else. But it does not argue for this suggestion on the basis of 
antecedent criteria common to the old and the new language 
games. For just insofar as the new language really is new, there 
will be no such criteria.61       
 
Rorty maintains that, through the production of new vocabularies, Romantic 
philosophical redescription makes possible the consideration of things not 
previously considered—it makes possible the saying of things previously left 
unsaid, or, perhaps, once said but now forgotten or ignored. However, no claim is 
advanced that what is now capable of being spoken about is necessarily superior 
to what had previously dominated the conversation. Eschewing the old trump 
card of metaphysics, Romantic philosophy must make its way honestly by 
offering alternatives to hegemonic traditions of interpretation. By means of the 
practice of redescription, Romantic philosophers deliberately and methodically 
attempt to instigate ideational change—a process that, as we have seen, Rorty 
believes to occur unbidden at the whim of linguistic habituation and its 
obsolescence. For the Romantic, philosophy is a form of linguistic (and, 
therefore, ideational) intervention and it is for this reason that the practitioners 
of Romantic philosophy “range themselves,” as Rorty put it, “alongside the 
political utopian and the innovative artist” rather than the natural scientist.62 As 
we shall see, Romantic philosophers have also ranged themselves alongside the 
interpreters of sacred texts.  
Rorty claims that Hegel made his Romantic philosophical project 
historical by coupling the linguistic habits that mark ideational formation and 
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change with the spatio-temporal contexts where and when such events occur. He 
does not venture to guess what made Hegel’s historicism—best defined as the 
notion that history itself has a history—possible. To Heidegger’s imagined 
chagrin, I am prepared to suggest that Hegel’s historicism is a consequence of 
“the triumph of the manipulable arrangement of a scientific-technological world 
and of the social order proper to this world.”63  In other words, I claim that the 
bête noire of Heidegger’s pessimism is, ironically, the condition precedent to the 
sort of “preparatory thinking” that Heidegger hoped, in his later years, to foster.64 
Indeed, absent this condition precedent, Heidegger himself could never have 
conceived the desire to think the end of philosophy.  
The Historicist Turn in Romantic Philosophy 
The Romantics embraced the notion that history (like “truth”) is conjured 
through linguistic practices. The past is something that has happened and is no 
more; nevertheless, it “lives on” insofar as there is someone who remembers it. 
That memory has no reality independent of the discourse that perpetuates it. The 
ways in which human beings conceive of the past and talk about it have 
themselves a past (or, more accurately, pasts). In the 20th century of the Common 
Era, some historians in Western Europe and North America began to trace the 
histories of the ways in which human beings have conceived of the past (and 
spoken and written about it) through time. This historical practice—sometimes 
referred to as the practice of “conceptual history” or the history of the concept of 
history itself—represents a unique moment in the development of Romantic 
                                                   
63 Heidegger, Basic Writings, p. 435.  
 
64 See ibid, pp. 436-449. 
 
 37 
philosophy since Hegel. 65  At the heart of this development is the emergence of a 
felt distinction between natural temporality and historical temporality. This 
feeling has been traced to the unprecedented experiences engendered by the 
world-historical changes that accompanied the rise of European technicalism and 
its global exportation or, what world historian Marshall G. S. Hodgson called, 
more grandly, the “Great Western Transmutation.”66  
The “felt distinction between natural temporality and historical 
temporality” is a good way to define the Romantic historical sense. It is 
unfortunate, however, that the word typically used to designate this sense is 
“historicism.” Few words in the English language have been subject to so much 
abuse. Depending upon speaker and context, historicism in English can have 
opposite and contradictory meanings. When, for example, Karl Popper used the 
term, he intended a conflation of history with traditional metaphysics. That 
conflation produced certain “iron laws” which, once understood, were counted 
upon to endow with scientific accuracy prognostications concerning the course of 
future events.67 This variety of historicism is presently out of fashion (thanks, in 
part, to Popper’s devastating critique of it) and, it is hoped, will not find its way 
back into the work of serious historians. In the work of Reinhart Koselleck, on the 
                                                   
65 Genealogies of this practice abound in the literature and the well of its past may be expected to 
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other hand, historicism points to a change in the way in which Europeans—
sometime in the century between 1750 and 1850—conceived of themselves as 
historical actors.68 These dates are no doubt rough estimates on Koselleck’s part, 
and it is perhaps not too adventurous to suggest that Giambattista Vico, who 
published the final revision of his Scienza Nuova in 1744, may have been the first 
human being to consciously articulate an experience of this distinction.69 
Whether Vico was the first to articulate this experience or not, his argument that 
human beings occupy a unique position with respect to their own history—that 
they have “privileged access” to it because they are its “authors”—signaled the sea 
change in sensibility that was to follow.70  
With the technicalistic revolution, Western Europe—which had played a 
very minor role in world affairs for a thousand years—suddenly found itself in 
possession of previously unimagined powers. Hodgson summarized the situation 
with admirable economy:  
The same generation that saw the Industrial and French 
revolutions saw a third and almost equally unprecedented event: 
the establishment of European world hegemony… It was not 
merely, or perhaps even primarily, that the Europeans and their 
overseas settlers found themselves in a position to defeat 
militarily any powers they came in contact with. Their merchants 
were able to out-produce, out-travel, and out-sell anyone, their 
                                                   
68 Koselleck’s magnum opus is Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, translated by 
Keith Tribe, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. His notion of “conceptual history” is 
ably summarized in Hayden White’s “Forward” to Koselleck’s collection of essays, The Practice of 
Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, translated by Todd Samuel Presner, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press (2002), pp. ix-xiv. 
  
69 Giambattista Vico, New Science, translated by David Marsh, London: Penguin, 1999. It is 
tempting to regard Hamlet’s cri de coeur that “the time is out of joint” as a prescient intimation of 
this experience, but I doubt that’s what the Bard had in mind. Shakespeare may have written the 
play around 1600. See Harold Bloom, Hamlet: Poem Unlimited, New York: Riverhead Books, 
(2003), p. 1. 
  
70 Vico, New Science, pp. 119-120.  
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physicians were able to heal better than others, their scientists 
were able to put all others to shame.71 
 
According to Hodgson, new technologies of communication (e.g., movable type), 
new patterns of capital investment, and the beginnings of “rationalized” forms of 
social organization contributed to the creation of what he termed “technicalistic 
expectations.” In line with these new expectations, time and distance appeared to 
be increasingly malleable and under human control. If Vico had taught his fellow 
Europeans that they were the “authors” of their own history, the Great Western 
Transmutation convinced them that they were the authors of their own destiny as 
well.72  
 When Vico proposed it, the notion that one’s ancestors were somehow 
uncannily “other” than oneself was novel and the idea that one could apprehend 
that “otherness” was more novel still; nevertheless, Koselleck’s work 
demonstrates that the “otherness” of the historical subject was apprehended by 
Europeans and the unique integrity of that apprehended “otherness” was 
preserved as an unprecedented kind of historical sense. 73 This unprecedented 
sense was (and is) expressed in a variety of ways. One way is the belief already 
alluded to that “historical process is marked by a distinctive kind of temporality 
different from that found in nature.” Koselleck elaborates that “this temporality is 
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73 Vico insisted that the “privileged access” attending “authorship” comes with ethical strings 
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multileveled, is subject to differential rates of acceleration and deceleration, and 
functions not only as a matrix within which historical events happen but also as a 
causal force in the determination of social reality in its own right.”74 Koselleck 
contended that one of the most revolutionary consequences of the advent of 
technicalism is the European “discovery” that “history could be ‘made’ as well as 
‘suffered.’”75 From that discovery two crucial and properly historicist conclusions 
were drawn: (1) “that history is an open-ended process rather than a closed 
science and a fatality”—the latter alternative being the version of “historicism” 
criticized by Popper—and (2) that there exists “a gap between historical events 
and the language used to represent them—both by the agents involved in these 
events and by historians retrospectively trying to reconstruct them.” 76 Over time, 
a broad spectrum of Europeans embraced these properly historicist conclusions 
and began to re-shape their social reality to better conform it to them. As the past 
became available for reconsideration and reconstruction, new linguistic habits 
emerged to accomplish the task.     
Hodgson showed that the phrase “modern times” is a marker for the 
technical revolution that made a distinction between “natural” and “cultural” 
time palpable—alerting Vico and other newly post-medieval scholars to 
qualitative differences in temporality. These differences were never reported by 
historical actors who lived during the pre-modern epochs in which natural time 
and cultural time were not distinguished. The reason for this “oversight” is 
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simple: those who studied cultural materials produced by such actors—and were 
themselves such actors—had not yet experienced the contrapuntal rhythms of the 
technicalistic age. Therefore, it never occurred to them to try to tease out from 
the material survivals in their possession the temporal texture of the “real time” 
in which those materials were produced. Time, for pre-moderns the world over, 
was uniform: no one made temporal distinctions of the sort that Koselleck has 
identified among moderns because no one was aware that there were any such 
distinctions to be made.77 The past was something finalized, fixed—though it 
“lived on” insofar as it was preserved in cultural memory as a potent source of 
present authority. In other words, the past was presumed to be “eternally 
present” for some purposes, but irretrievably lost for others. The present—though 
believed to be continuous in some way with the past—was always worked out in 
its shadow; it occupied a subordinate position. Though in “dialogue,” as the 
Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin would have it, past and present were by no 
means conceived as equal partners.78  
                                                   
77 It is worth noting that, while Hegel deserves credit for the historicization of Romantic 
philosophy, what underwrites this argument of temporal difference is not a Hegelian theory of the 
“world-spirit” or even a Marxist mechanism of society; Koselleck has researched and documented 
changes in functioning historical vocabularies—the ways in which people have talked to one 
another and written about the passage of time and their relationship to it—before and after the 
advent of technicalism. His work conforms perfectly to philosopher Robert Brandom’s Hegelian 
notion that “to understand the nature of an object is only to be able to recapitulate the history of 
the concept of that object.” No claim is being advanced that there is (or ever was) an underlying 
“substance” out there that necessarily determines the reported impressions of post-medievals 
that, as Hamlet put it, “the time is out of joint.” See Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo, The 
Future of Religion, edited by Santiago Zabala, New York: Columbia University Press (2004), pp. 
56-57.  
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Althusser termed the “opacity of the immediate”; accordingly, no one before Spinoza suspected 
that intimations (“evidence” is perhaps too strong a word) of a temporality distinguishable from 
the present were embedded within the various incidents and accoutrements of life in the past. See 
Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster, London: Verso 
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The post-Medieval sense of history is a reflection of the dislocations 
(social, cultural, political, and economic) that Europeans suffered as a result of 
rapid technological innovations and the science that made these innovations 
possible. Acknowledging the likely provenance of this felt disparity between and 
among temporal textures does not explain it away, nor does it invalidate the 
techniques for historical inquiry that have been developed in its wake: “philology, 
paleography, diplomatic, heuristics, and hermeneutics in general.”79 These 
techniques have demonstrated their utility time and again as methods for re-
describing the heritage of the past. Consequently, the Romantic philosopher  
cannot seriously entertain the notion that investigating that past is a simple act of 
retrieval—like stooping to pick up an apple that has fallen from one’s apron. At 
bottom, the past is a scholarly construction and the historian—whether a 
professional or amateur—is implicated in that construction, by virtue of her 
practice, as a kind of participant-observer.80  
 Romantic Philosophy Discovers its Vocation 
     Romantic philosophy was born in the throes of felt disparities: the 
apprehension of a cleavage between the words we use and the world we intend 
those words to describe; the sense that the time is somehow “out of joint”; and 
the feeling that there is some inchoate connection between these two phenomena.   
Marshall Hodgson did not explore this issue, but his study of the Great Western 
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Transmutation suggests that the Romantics’s intuitive grasp of their predicament 
was entirely sound. European perceptions of time were altered as a consequence 
of the new technicalism. We can identify this change anecdotally: in the 5th 
century C.E., St. Augustine complained that he knew what time was until he tried 
to explain it to someone else. He found it an elusive concept to grasp, eventually 
concluding that the perception of time is a peculiarity of human psychology.81 
Such a conclusion has often been credited as strikingly “ahead of its time.” I 
would argue, on the contrary, that it is quite consistent with its Medieval 
provenance because, in the course of his ruminations, it becomes clear that 
Augustine embarked upon this train of thought in an effort to put an end to 
speculations as to what relationship God bears to time. As for those who indulge 
in such “vain talk,” Augustine prays that they will come to “understand thee the 
eternal Creator of all times, to have been before all times; and that no times be 
co-eternal with thee: no, nor any other creature, even if there be any creature 
before all times.”82 It is the defense of God’s honor in the face of impious 
questions that motivates St. Augustine’s concerns. By reducing time to a function 
of human cognition, Augustine had an opportunity to get God “off the hook” as it 
were and to declare human beings the masters of time. He seized the former 
opportunity but passed by the latter in silence. When we arrive in the 18th 
century, we find that God’s honor is not what is at stake for Giambattista Vico. 
                                                   
81 Although not a European himself, Augustine was educated as one and lived within Europe’s 
cultural orbit. See his Confessions: Books IX-XIII, translated by William Watts, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press (1912), p. 239. See also John F. Callahan, “Basil of Caesarea a New 
Source for St. Augustine’s Theory of Time,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. 63 (1958), 
pp. 437-454. 
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For Vico, the question of time has become a matter of human agency: human 
beings have privileged access to their own past because they are its authors. This 
position is quite different from Augustine’s. Vico makes the argument that St. 
Augustine could have made had he experienced temporality in the same way that 
Vico and the generations of Europeans born in the midst of the Great Western 
Transmutation had experienced it. Vico’s thought is representative of the new 
relationship to time that Europeans acquired with the collapse of hegemonic 
Medievalism.83 
The new technicalism caused linguistic obsolescence to occur at increasing 
rates of speed; with this altered relationship to time came a demand for new 
vocabularies that would permit its articulation. What distinguished the 
Romantics from other Europeans was their attempt to rise to the occasion with 
programmatic solutions for coping with the novel conditions. The solutions they 
chose were literary, political, and religious. The Romantics deemed literature to 
be particularly important for a post-Medieval age, privileging it as a site for 
linguistic experiment. This is one of the motivating factors behind the Romantic 
preoccupation with literary projects. But belletristic literature was not the only 
aspect of culture that now occupied the Romantic imaginary. With their post-
Medieval relationship to time, the Romantics also reconsidered the past as such 
through a critical re-evaluation of past treatments of the past (i.e., historicism). 
One conclusion that they reached was that no past treatment of the past ought to 
be accorded continuing authority in the present absent careful scrutiny. The 
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Romantics reached this conclusion on the fair assumption that no past treatment 
of the past could adequately reflect the post-Medieval apprehension of history as 
essentially “open.” Furthermore, no past treatment of the past had been 
conducted with the critical tools lately forged in the smithy of this post-Medieval 
apprehension—for the obvious reason that such tools had yet to be invented. The 
task to which Romantic philosophy first turned, then, was revisionary history. 
The immediate impetus for this turn came, however, from an unexpected 
quarter: recent developments in 18th century Biblical criticism. 
 Romantic Philosophy’s Relationship with Religion 
The links between Romanticism and religion have been long remarked. In 
1971, literary critic Harold Bloom declared that the “religious background” of “all 
the English Romantic poets” was in the “tradition of Protestant dissent, the kind 
of nonconformist vision that descended from the Left Wing of England’s Puritan 
movement.” As such, Romanticism is best understood as a “displaced 
Protestantism … the poetry of the English Romantics is a kind of religious poetry, 
and the religion is in the Protestant line, though Calvin or Luther would have 
been horrified to contemplate it.”84 In the same year, M. H. Abrams published his 
famous thesis that Romanticism effected “the secularization of inherited 
theological ideas and ways of thinking.” For Abrams, the term “secularization” 
captured the Romantic quest “to reconstitute the grounds of hope … of a rebirth 
in which a renewed mankind will inhabit a renovated earth where he will find 
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himself thoroughly at home.”85 The obvious (if implicit) eschatology of Abrams’s 
wording exemplifies his thesis. Nevertheless, we may find here a clue as to what 
might have horrified Calvin and Luther in this quasi-religious literary and 
political movement: a shifting of mood from resignation towards life lived in a 
fallen world, to a mood of active embrace of a world no longer burdened by 
dogmatic assertions of Original Sin.86 The Romantics’s decision to make peace 
with the world as it exists here and now exemplifies the gift with which they 
bequeathed post-Medieval Europe: a genius for belonging to imperfection; to 
regard this life not as trial and tribulation but as an opportunity to effect moral 
improvement among peoples and, most significantly, in time. Romantic 
“secularity” is exactly what the word (when unencumbered by political usage) 
implies: a reconciliation with temporality. Romantic philosophy generously 
temporalizes everything. The basic presumption is that whatever falls within the 
reach of human experience is subject—no less than human experience itself—to 
history. This presumption is all inclusive. For the Romantics, even apparently 
timeless Nature or materials dogmatically construed as timeless (i.e., Scripture) 
have always—despite both dogma and appearances—belonged to time. 87  
A “secular” approach to things deemed sacred appears at first glance to be 
something of an oxymoron and Romantic attempts to articulate this perspective 
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have often provoked scandal. Nevertheless, the Romantics were preceded in their 
secularizing project by intellectuals steeped in religious and theological training:  
The higher critical movement stemming from Spinoza (and 
gathering strength from J. S. Semler and J. G. Eichhorn to D. F. 
Strauss’s Life of Jesus (1835)) asserted the appropriateness of 
applying secular historical scholarship to the sacred books, and 
sifted the biblical texts, their authorship and dating, the process 
of canon-making, the relationship of the canon to the apocrypha 
and the roots of both in myths, legends, and literary traditions of 
the societies in which they were first produced.88  
 
There is no small amount of irony in the fact that the Romantics and some of 
their precursors—figures identified with the European Enlightenment—regarded 
themselves as forming “counter-movements” to what they (and many other 
religiously-inclined individuals) considered to be the more corrosive effects of 
“higher criticism.” What they offered the religiously-inclined was not a refutation 
of higher critical findings but, rather, new ways to appreciate sacred literatures as 
such by means of critical insights:    
A characteristic countering technique was to found an 
apologetics on the basis of the newly won Enlightenment ground, 
that is, to employ its means with an opposite valuation. Perhaps 
the most successful such counter-movement turned on the 
positive valuation placed on the mythology that had been 
dismissed with mockery as mere superstition by the 
Enlightenment. Robert Lowth’s Lectures on the Sacred Poetry of 
the Hebrews (1749) suggested that religious belief was grounded 
in the folk poetry and myth of a particular people, and treated 
the Old Testament as literature, Oriental literature; moreover, 
his influential commentary on the Book of Isaiah (1778) as the 
type of prophetic utterance, the irrational, ecstatic, disordered 
language of Biblical prophecy, offered a new stylistic model.89   
 
Many thinkers associated with the European Enlightenment had regarded the 
“close relations between religion and literature in most societies” as sufficient 
justification to downgrade the status of sacred literature to mere literature—i.e., 
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to divest it of the prophetic value and authority accorded it by convictional 
communities.90 Robert Lowth, Oxford’s Praelector of Poetry in the 1740’s, 
challenged the notion that the “literariness” of Scripture could sensibly be 
accounted as devaluation. On the contrary, evidence of verbal “artistry” provides 
Scripture with “aesthetic validation” of the high esteem with which it is held.91 
Moreover, with the suggestion that “religious belief was grounded in the folk 
poetry and myth of a particular people,” Lowth—reasoning in a manner quite 
similar to Vico’s—opened a door to Romantic historicism in Biblical study.92 
Consistent with this reasoning, Lowth maintained that readers of the Hebrew 
Bible must “endeavor as much as possible to read Hebrew as the Hebrews would 
have read it.”93 In order to arrive at a competent understanding and appreciation 
of the prophetic word as it was received by those to whom it was directed in the 
past, one must try to enter a foreign and ancient mind-set. To accomplish this 
task, one must acquire not only the linguistic tools made available by grammar 
and philology, but also a grounding in the components of the prevailing world-
view of the particular prophetic audience concerned. Folk poetry and myth reflect 
that world-view and, therefore, their presence in Scripture ought not to detract in 
any way from its value. Later Romantics would deem the absence of such 
elements from a sacred text—or, at any rate, from an ancient one—cause for 
suspicion as to the authenticity of the text in question; but it was Robert Lowth’s 
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treatment of the Hebrew Bible as an artifact of literary history and an appropriate 
subject of rhetorical criticism that set their hermeneutical agenda. As one recent 
scholar of Romanticism has noted, Lowth’s lectures on Isaiah did “more than any 
other single work to make the biblical tradition, rather than the classical one, the 
central poetic tradition of the Romantics.”94  
Lowth’s treatment of the Bible as not only literature but Oriental (or 
Asian) literature was embraced in the following generation in Germany by 
Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803).95 As with Lowth before him, Herder 
was a theologian whose studies of sacred texts ranged beyond the traditional 
parameters of theology, forming “a vast project of cultural and anthropological 
hermeneutics, much of it marked by a deep concern with the origins and 
development of societies.”96 Scripture was not a thing to be placed upon a 
pedestal and venerated for it contained a vast treasure trove of information about 
the Asian societies it purports to chronicle. To access this information, however, 
one must learn to read it in a distinctive manner. In a guide written for 
theological candidates in his diocese, Herder admonished those preparing for 
holy orders to  
… read the Bible in a human [menschlich] way: For it is a book 
written through human agency for human beings; human is the 
language; human were the external means whereby it was 
written and preserved; human, finally, is the sense with which it 
must be grasped and every aid that elucidates it, as well as the 
entire purpose and use to which it should be applied.97  
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Not every Romantic was quite ready for this degree of “humanization” of the 
Biblical text. In England, the poet and Romantic philosopher Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge was scandalized—scribbling his protests in the margins of his copy of 
the guide: “In other words the Bible or Word of God is not the Word of God”—an 
emotional response that does not do justice to Herder’s position.98 To be fair, 
Herder never expressed any doubt as to the Divine provenance of Scripture; 
neither did he doubt the human agencies which vouchsafed it to mankind. He 
simply saw “no problem in recognizing the Bible as simultaneously the word of 
God and the work of human hands.”99  Indeed, the Bible itself makes no contrary 
claim. In the Hebrew Bible, the prophets and other holy personages are depicted 
as human (sometimes all too human); its implied audience is no less human. The 
claim made by many Christians that the New Testament’s Christ is endowed with 
an ontological status that somehow exceeds the merely human is not extended to 
those who actually chronicled his life or commented on its significance; the 
implied audience is, again, no less human than, say, Paul or the gospel writers are 
thought to have been.100 Like Robert Lowth, Herder was born in the post-
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sense of humanity” actually entails is left open to interpretation. To try to construe Herder as an 
adherent of Fundamentalist or Evangelical dogmas of Biblical inerrancy and the like would be to 
engage in a species of anachronism unbecoming a religious historian. This I decline to do. 
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Medieval age; he was therefore struck by what Ian Balfour terms the “temporality 
of prophetic rhetoric.”101 Accordingly, he sought to shift the emphasis of Biblical 
study from the timelessness of theological truths to a more humble historicism 
that traces the development of ancient Asian civilizations. Pace Coleridge, it was 
not perversity on Herder’s part that drove him to ask of the Bible different 
questions than his theologian predecessors had asked; rather, it was a curiosity 
about the past that Herder believed the Bible was uniquely capable of satisfying if 
its readership developed an appropriately secular arsenal of interpretive 
techniques. For example: Herder regarded Moses as “the archetypal prophet, the 
standard by whom all others are to be measured.”102 He therefore regarded the 
“visions of Moses” to be  
the foundation of the whole “economy” of prophecy in the Old 
Testament; the earliest post-Mosaic prophets cite and revise the 
“writings” of their great predecessor. But the prophets retain 
individual visions commensurate with their historical situations 
and not only that: Each has a distinctive mode of writing, a 
characteristic style. Isaiah is a “royal” prophet, and therefore his 
vision of God is colored by the splendor of the earthly king he 
sees before him. God becomes what the prophet beholds, because 
God himself cannot be seen.103  
 
Here Herder arrives upon a new conceptual threshold, contemplating Near 
Eastern prophecy as a “post-Mosaic” discursive genre that, despite timeless or 
archetypal elements, never loses touch with the historical situation into which the 
prophetic word is always spoken. Indeed, as intimated above, Herder’s proto-
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Romantic hermeneutics saw no conflict with placing secular history side by side 
with timeless conceptual categories; as illustrated by the case of Isaiah, he 
allowed prophetic speech to be further divided into sub-genres that foreground 
particular aspects of the prophet’s historical situation—drawing literary and 
historical analysis of sacred texts into ever closer relations. This increased 
intimacy of literature and history in Biblical scholarship would find 
consummation in the work of Herder’s contemporary, Johann Gottfried Eichhorn 
(1752-1827). 
In his most influential work, Einleitung in das alte Testament, Eichhorn 
refers to his project as “Literär-Geschichte”—literary history—a term that, 
Balfour informs us, was quite uncommon at the time: 
Under that rubric Eichhorn understands a kind of formalist 
philology inherited from the study of classical antiquity, but a 
formalism not at all at odds with the emergence of what could 
then have been called a “new historicism.” For Eichhorn, the 
Bible has to first be thought of as one Oriental text among others 
and understood in the light of the historical moments of its 
“human” production, to use Herder’s term that Eichhorn will 
echo. Eichhorn’s researches led him to conclude that Hebrew 
prophecy was much like the oracular discourses of other 
cultures, although he would not hesitate to exalt it above, for 
example, the Greek oracle in terms of its philosophical truth.104    
 
For Eichhorn, as for Lowth and Herder, the Bible belonged to a time and place 
that was considered by many Europeans to be not only ancient and foreign but 
also alien, exotic, and threatening: the “Orient.” This may account, in part, for the 
fact that their characterization of the founding text of European religion did not 
become a byword in the working vocabulary of most Biblical scholars—despite 
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the revolutionary and continuing impact of some of their other views.105 An 
argument can be made as well that this aspect of their scholarly legacies was too 
closely tied to the fortunes of an intellectual fashion that saw the end of its 
popularity among European intellectuals in the late 19th century. That fashion, 
termed the “Oriental Renaissance” by the French historian Raymond Schwab, 
had pretty much run its course by 1880. Nevertheless, as Schwab and others have 
shown, the “rediscovery” of India and the “East” by European intellectuals in the 
two centuries between 1680 and 1880 was decidedly influential among the 
exponents of Romantic philosophy—who occupied roughly the third quarter of 
that period (1780-1830).106  Eichhorn and Herder published some of their major 
works during that period, and their historicized embrace of the Bible as “one 
Oriental text among others” may be regarded as an instance of the method by 
which Romantic philosophy proceeds: the practice of redescription—i.e., the 
construction of (hopefully) compelling counter-narratives to the selective cultural 
memory that characterizes hegemonic tradition. 
As exemplified by the scholarship we have reviewed thus far, Romantic 
philosophy’s relationship with religion is perhaps best described by Cornel West’s 
notion of a “critical alignment with an enabling tradition.”107 Unlike many self-
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conscious heirs of the European Enlightenment, Romantic thinkers have been 
unwilling to regard religion as a useless survival from pre-Modern times—much 
less wrong-headed or dangerous. Instead, they consistently engage human 
religiosity as a creative process—“spilled poetry” as some have called it108—and 
have worked to unseat entrenched vocabularies that they deem no longer capable 
of carrying the semantic freight they once did. It is the Romantic “secularization” 
of religious language that makes such evaluations possible—and here 
secularization means an acute sensitivity to historical context. This sensitivity to 
historical context—the apprehension that history itself has a history—has not 
always been present to the human nervous system: it is a new thing in the world, 
brought about by the rise of technicalism in Europe beginning in the 16th century 
C.E. As we shall see in the next chapter, those who do not share this temporal 
sensitivity are frequently suspicious of Romantic interventions in religious 
discourse—regarding such interventions as evidence of cultural betrayal or 
unbelief rather than what they authentically are: the genius for belonging to the 
contrapuntal flow of post-medieval time.                            
  
                                                   
                                                   
108 See Harold Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism, New York: Seabury Press (1975), p. 52.  
Chapter Two: 
 
 
The Egyptian Literary Renaissance: From Romantic Orientalism to 
“Oriental” Romanticism 
 
 
Malraux asks why, how, one painter learns from another, of 
whom he makes copies (Van Gogh of Millet)—to be himself, 
learn himself in the other, with and against him.109 
 
   
The Great Western Transmutation Revisited 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I re-described Romantic historicism as the 
expression of a new sense of time induced by the rise of technicalistic 
expectations among Europeans after 1500. To my knowledge, the connection I 
have drawn between Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual history and Marshall 
Hodgson’s world historiography is novel. Quoting Hodgson, I alluded to the 
various means by which European technicalism was exported to the rest of the 
world: 
The same generation that saw the Industrial and French 
revolutions saw a third and almost equally unprecedented event: 
the establishment of European world hegemony… It was not 
merely, or perhaps even primarily, that the Europeans and their 
overseas settlers found themselves in a position to defeat 
militarily any powers they came in contact with. Their merchants 
were able to out-produce, out-travel, and out-sell anyone, their 
physicians were able to heal better than others, their scientists 
were able to put all others to shame.110 
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 I consider this is to be an accurate and necessary description of the establishment 
of European world hegemony, but not a sufficient description. In the grand 
scheme of things, one may accept at face value Hodgson’s assertion that “it was 
not merely, or perhaps even primarily, that the Europeans and their overseas 
settlers found themselves in a position to defeat militarily any powers they came 
in contact with.” The inherent problem with such “grand schemes”—or the view 
of history sub specie aeternatis—is that they represent, in effect, a luxury 
available to only a very few. In the minds and sensibilities of those peoples 
around the world who found themselves on the receiving end of military conquest 
and colonial occupation, European hegemony was—and for many continues to 
be—associated in the first instance with the barrel of a gun and, in the second 
instance, with the sense of shame and humiliation that accompanies violent 
subjugation. The fact that European merchants were able to “out-produce, out-
travel, and out-sell anyone,” and that European physicians were able to “heal 
better than others,” and European scientists were able to “put all others to 
shame,” has historically provided little comfort to the colonized—to whose benefit 
these positive effects of the Great Western Transmutation rarely accrued.  
 The first Muslim majority country to succumb to Europe’s unprecedented 
military advantage was Egypt, home to one of the world’s most ancient and 
influential river-valley civilizations. From the moment that Napoleon invaded 
(1798) until the latter half of the 20th century, Egypt occupied the front lines of 
Europe’s colonial ambitions in the Middle East. To be sure, it was an unenviable 
position to be in, but it also placed Egyptian intellectuals at the forefront of 
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Muslim responses to the spread of technicalism and the expectations that it 
spawns. As among European intellectuals, Egyptian thinkers reacted to the 
trappings of modernity in a variety of ways: some with enthusiastic embrace, 
others more cautious—adopting a wait-and-see attitude—and still others with 
Heidegger-like pessimism and a determined disinterest or disdain. One view that 
was expressed early on and which has spread among Muslims far beyond the 
borders of Egypt, gaining currency not only among elites but also on the popular 
level, is that of Rashid Rida’ (1865-1935). Acknowledging the provenance of the 
technicalistic revolution, Rida’ referred to its appearance among Muslims as a 
form of “Westernization”—the encroachment of an alien and (especially 
significant for Rida’) non-Muslim mode of enculturation. Rather than reject this 
subtle manner of “alienation” outright, Rida’ believed that it was something that 
could be used to advantage by Muslims without untoward effects if—and this is a 
crucial qualification—Muslim exposure to the technicalistic revolution was 
limited to the acquisition of its material products and the means necessary to 
reproduce them. “All that we need to acquire from Europe,” he wrote, “is its 
scientific achievements, technical skill, and advanced industries. The acquisition 
of these aspects does not require [much from Muslims in the way of] 
Westernization.”111   
 For the reasons rehearsed above, Rashid Rida’—like so many of his 
countrymen and co-religionists—had valid reasons to be chary about 
“Westernization.” Ironically, his argument—designed to minimize the power and 
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influence of overseas imperialists—actually had the opposite effect. By 
propagating the notion that Europeans had gained nothing more from the 
technicalistic revolution than the sum of social, economic, and military 
efficiencies it produced, Muslims who thought like Rida’ overlooked the 
intangible dividends that Europe had accrued: new ways of thinking about the 
world and how it works. Chief among these new ways of thinking was the 
discovery that time is neither a monolithic entity nor immune to human 
manipulation—a discovery that dramatically expanded European expectations of 
human agency and paved the way for modern historicism as well. By overlooking 
the intangible benefits of technicalism, Rida’ and likeminded Muslims became 
subject to what I term the “Trojan Horse effect” that the acquisition of the 
tangible products of technicalism entails. For once these products were “inside 
the gates,” as it were, their intangible effects began to be felt among the populace. 
It was not long before philosophically inclined Muslim intellectuals emerged in 
Egypt who, like their European counterparts, reflected upon the ways in which 
the new tempos of technicalistic urban life affected their perceptions of time. 
Under such conditions, it is reasonable to expect that, sooner or later, an 
Egyptian intellectual would draw Vico-like inferences from these new tempos and 
apply their lessons to the study of the past. And this is, in fact, what happened in 
Egypt. As technical Westernization increased, so did the number of Egyptian 
intellectuals—including members of Rida’s own generation—who were willing to 
think philosophically about it.  An impressive number of those individuals 
explored the writings of the European Romantics. Many who did so became 
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associated with what scholars have since termed the “Egyptian Literary 
Renaissance.” 
The Literary Renaissance: Poetic Beginnings 
It is important to make clear from the outset that this period in Modern 
Arabic literature was not the result of an organized intellectual movement; it was, 
rather, “a diffuse phenomenon of cultural revival” associated by some observers 
with the shock of  “l’agression française” itself and by others with subsequent 
political after-shocks: 
The significance of the [Napoleonic invasion resides] … in the 
fact that it opened the way to the rule of the Turco-Albanian 
condottiere Muhammad ‘Ali. The Mamluke defeat at the 
Pyramids gave him the opportunity to seize power after the 
departure of the French troops in 1803 and, even more 
importantly, to murder the leading Mamluke beys a few years 
later. Consequently, the expedition had an indirect, chiefly 
political effect … [“Renaissance” in this instance] means not so 
much “rebirth” or a related notion, as “rising up.” This makes it 
clear that to modern Arabs the activation of cultural life has been 
its main characteristic.112    
 
Whatever its precise origins, the Renaissance is scholarly shorthand for the 
variety of novel cultural expressions characteristic of Egyptian intellectual life in 
the turbulent post-Napoleonic period. The first act of this drama began around 
the middle of the 19th century when Egyptian poets of the al-Barudi school began 
to take inspiration for their work from such classical predecessors as Bashshar b. 
Burd, Abu Nuwas, and al-Mutanabbi. The al-Barudi poets were attracted to these 
figures from the Arabic literary past on account of their individualism and their 
concern for acknowledging in their verse life as they experienced it. These 
renewed emphases represented a marked change from the refined products of 
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post-classical Arabic poetry in which the cultivation of form “often led to 
mannerism” and an artificial style. 113  
The neoclassicists Ahmad Shawqi (1868-1932) and Muhammad Hafiz 
Ibrahim (known as “Hafiz,” 1872-1932) are “often mentioned in one breath … 
together these two poets are considered the most brilliant representatives of the 
[neo-classical] school of al-Barudi.”114 Shawqi’s poetry was distinguished by the 
manner in which it engaged the political situation in Egypt. At one point, he 
composed an ode to Khedive ‘Abbas the Second upon the latter’s deposition by 
the British at the outbreak of the First World War. This act was rewarded by the 
British with a period of exile in Spain.115 Hafiz also wrote in response to political 
events, expressing “unease about the British occupation and the growing Western 
influence in Egypt.”116  Both of these men broke with the post-classical tradition 
by acknowledging, each in his way, life as he experienced it; however, neither did 
so to an extent that would satisfy the literary tastes of a new generation of poets 
that rose to prominence in the early decades of the 20th century. The new poets—
most notably ‘Abd al-Rahman Shukri (1886-1958), ‘Abbas Mahmud al-‘Aqqad 
(1889-1964) and Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Mazini (1890-1949)—objected to the 
“time-worn language” of their predecessors and their “excessive use of metaphors 
and figures of speech.” But they did not limit their criticism to matters of form. 
Al-‘Aqqad considered the topicality of the neo-classicists to be merely superficial. 
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Shukri voiced a similar complaint: the writings of the neo-classicists amounted to 
a “poetry of daily events” (what he called shi‘r ijtima‘i). What was needed instead 
was a poetry of life (al-hayah) and the present moment (al-‘asr); this could only 
be achieved by means of an unfettered expression of feeling (al-wijdan). Shukri 
prefaced his first collection of poetry (1909) with the words: Ala ya ta’ir al-
firdawsi  inna’ l-shi‘ra wijdanu (“O Bird of Paradise, poetry is feeling”).117  
In a modern European context, such sentiments would be accounted 
unmistakably Romantic; not surprisingly, “the young Egyptian literary 
revolutionaries of around 1910 derived their main inspiration … [from] 
Wordsworth, Keats, and Shelley—the latter perhaps taking pride of place—and 
among the critics Hazlitt…”118 To those who objected that such writers were the 
“ancestors” (by nationality if not through literal genealogy) of the British invaders 
and occupiers of Egypt, Shukri was unapologetic: “If the Arabic poets read the 
literature of other nations,” he wrote, “they will profit by the novelty of their 
themes (jiddat al-ma‘ani) and the gates of creativity (abwab al-tawlid) will be 
opened to them.” Besides, he reminded his readers, “classical poets like al-
Mutanabbi, al-Radi, and al-Ma ‘arri had also been influenced by the (non-Arabic) 
‘learning’ of their day.”119  
Shukri’s response to his critics was clever, but it did not quite account for 
the true burden of the objection—why the learning of these foreigners at this 
particular period of Egyptian history? The relationship of the classical poets to 
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the non-Arabs whose poetry they imbibed was qualitatively different than the 
relationship of 20th century Egyptians to their colonial overlords. The neo-
classicists had appreciated that difference. What happened to the new generation 
to change their perceptions so radically? One plausible answer to this question 
may be found in the system of education that prevailed under British rule:  
The great influence of English on the Egyptian literary revival 
was probably largely due to the fact that English was used at the 
Teachers’ College (Madrasat al-mu‘allimin), a school established 
in 1889, where some of the writers of the new movement were 
trained. This was, as far as we can see now, one of the best 
schools in Egypt, offering a widely varied programme. It had an 
English department which was closed in 1904, but re-opened in 
1906, the year in which the poet Shukri registered. It was one of 
the few schools of higher education in Egypt and of greater 
importance than one would expect a teachers’ training college to 
be. The teaching of English was probably of a high standard and 
the students were introduced to English literature, most 
probably with a strong emphasis on the romanticists. Shukri 
himself has described how impressed he was by one of the 
teachers at this school, who kindled his enthusiasm for English 
literature.120                                              
 
The generation after the neo-classicists received an English education; or, rather, 
it received the English education that the colonial government provided. 
Naturally, such an education would be designed to portray British culture and 
literature in a positive light. In so doing, however, it also acquainted the rising 
generation of Egyptian poets with some remarkable instances of 19th century 
Europe’s fascination with the “Orient.”  
I touched upon this phenomenon—albeit briefly—in the previous chapter; 
there I focused particularly upon the effect that Europe’s fascination with the 
“Orient” had upon proto-Romantic and Romantic treatments of the Bible as “one 
Oriental text among others.” Writing as I do in an intellectual climate that has 
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been profoundly influenced by Edward Said’s controversial Orientalism, it is 
important to emphasize that this Romantic characterization of Scripture was an 
affirmation of the high esteem in which these intellectuals held both the Bible 
and Asia. In my view, it is an unfortunate irony that Said’s scholarly intervention 
on behalf of Arabs and Muslims has produced an unintended effect among 
contemporary thinkers whereby the tendency which Said attacked—the 
imagination on the part of many European Orientalists of a monolithic and 
reified “East”—has been generalized and deemed applicable to all European 
approaches to matters Asian.121 A more nuanced assessment takes notice of the 
fact that Europe produced Orientalisms: a fact attested to by Said himself in the 
“Forward” he contributed to the English translation of Schwab’s The Oriental 
Renaissance. As Said acknowledged in his “Forward,” Schwab’s book provided an 
intimate as well as a panoramic vision of reorientations in the 
work of scholars, scientists, critics, philosophers, and historians 
… [in which he] multiplies the complexity of Orientalism as a 
phenomenon of reception and transmission ... the Oriental 
Renaissance was fundamentally a phenomenon of difference, 
generating comparative techniques, whereas the first [i.e., 15th-
16th century] Renaissance was essentially assimilative in that it 
flattered Europe without disturbing Europe’s self-affirming 
cultural centrality.122                   
 
It is unlikely that a young Egyptian intellectual such as ‘Abd al-Rahman Shukri 
was unaware that his schooling was at the hands of his country’s foreign 
occupiers; indeed, when one considers the list of Romantic writers that Shukri 
and his compatriots found particularly compelling, a case can be made that their 
consciousness of occupation informed their literary tastes: “It was at the 
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Teachers’ College that al-Mazini met Shukri, who, as he later said, ‘opened his 
eyes to Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Shelley, Burns, Milton, Hazlitt, Carlyle, Lee 
Hunt and Macauley.’”123 It bears noting here that Wordsworth glorified the 
French revolution in his early work, Shelley authored a radical political poem 
entitled “The Revolt of Islam,” Milton’s Puritanism was radically republican, and 
Carlyle, a curmudgeonly critic of 19th century European culture, wrote a relatively 
admiring life of the Prophet Muhammad.124 Romantic fascination with the “East” 
was often intertwined with Jacobinic politics; part of Asia’s allure for the 
Romantics was the way in which it disturbed, in Said’s words, “Europe’s self-
affirming cultural centrality.” It would seem to me to be a mistake, therefore, to 
proceed under the assumption that the generation of Egyptian intellectuals who 
steered the Literary Renaissance in a Romantic direction did so with the 
intention of furthering the objectives of British colonialism. It would also strike 
me as something of a stretch to argue that—whether intended or not—such was 
the effect of their Romantic inclinations because one could just as easily argue 
that Romanticism played a key role in developing the Nationalistic sentiments 
that, by the middle of the 20th century, set the stage for the Free Officers’ 
Rebellion, initiating Egypt’s post-colonial period. The personalities and the 
phenomena with which we have to deal in historical work are complicated and 
often self-contradictory. Human life and human thought rarely achieve syllogistic 
perfection. The scholar who enters upon historical investigation without the 
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benefit of a keen sense of irony may hope to develop one in the course of her 
labors; to the extent that she should fail to do so, her grasp of the material will 
suffer proportionately.  
The Literary Renaissance: Early Literary History and Criticism  
As one might expect, the introduction of innovations in poetic subject and 
technique called for the formulation of new literary theories; consequently, 
Egyptian intellectuals who were close to these developments began discussing 
“historical, nationalist, and even philosophical” approaches to literature.125 One 
early center for these discussions was Cairo’s Dar al- ‘Ulum. Founded in 1870 or 
1871 by the influential historian and educationalist ‘Ali Mubarak Pasha (d. 1893), 
Dar al- ‘Ulum quickly became “one of the first modern Egyptian educational 
institutions of academic stature” and “a centre of cultural innovation.”126 What 
distinguished the new school from its venerable competitor, al-Azhar, was the 
emphasis placed in its curriculum upon secular literature—a subject the Azharis 
deemed too “frivolous” to merit serious study.127 Closely associated with Dar al- 
‘Ulum was another project of ‘Ali Mubarak’s, Rawdat al-madaris, a magazine 
originally intended for primary and secondary school teachers but which evolved 
into “one of the first semi-literary magazines in Egypt.”128 It is in the pages of this 
magazine that one can identify foreshadowings of the modern historicist 
sensibility in Egypt: “…the attitude towards the classical poets began to change; 
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they were admired but at the same time came to be regarded as figures from a 
remote past, distinctly separate from the present. The notion of a literary past, 
which had been practically absent with the post-classicists, proved to be 
important for the development of neoclassicism.”129 Its importance would only 
expand with succeeding generations until the arrival, in the early 20th century, of 
Egypt’s Romantics—for whom not only literature had a past, but history itself.  
The incipient historicism of Egypt’s late 19th century literary critics cannot 
be accounted for by the influence of Western models: 
The contributors to Rawdat al-madaris on the whole knew no 
European languages, or only imperfectly, and were hardly 
interested in foreign literatures. For some time Western literary 
criticism was only sporadically influential; it was not until well 
into the twentieth century that Egyptian critics discovered 
Western criticism. In 1887, it is true, Ya‘qub Sarruf, the editor of 
… al-Muqtataf, published a general article about literary 
criticism in his magazine in which he did refer to Western 
models, quoting an impressive series of names of Western critics 
starting with Aristotle. But this … is an isolated example which 
seems to have failed to inspire others.130  
 
This state of affairs is wholly consistent with my claim in the previous chapter 
that Romantic philosophy emerges with the rise of technicalism and the felt 
distinction between natural and historical temporality that surfaces in its wake. 
Eventually, Western models of literary history would be introduced to Egypt—
but, even then, the earliest examples appear to have been provided by 
Orientalists whose use of periodization remained heavily dependent upon 
medieval Arab prototypes.131 Given the “brusque, hasty, unfriendly” introduction 
of post-Medieval European ideas by Napoleon, Egyptian culture needed time to 
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absorb and embrace them; the effective reception of Western notions of literary 
history depended upon the development of an indigenous sensibility congenial to 
them.132  The cultivation of this sensibility was accomplished by means of the 
“Trojan Horse effect” alluded to in the previous discussion of Rashid Rida’. Once 
the requisite sensibility had taken root among her literati, the rise of Egyptian 
historicism was rendered certain; indeed, it actually made the later acceptance of 
Western models somewhat redundant. For once the requisite sensibility 
developed, Egypt was quite capable of producing her own Vico—which she did—
in the unlikely person of an Azhar-trained author and critic by the name of Taha 
Husayn.  
Taha Husayn 
As late as 1927, Taha Husayn (1889-1973) complained that “‘the time for 
an Arab literary history had not yet come,’ thus indicating that he did not 
consider the surveys published till then as up to standard.”133  His opinion is not 
one to be taken lightly; for if the Egyptian Literary Renaissance produced a 
thinker of world-historical stature, it was undoubtedly Taha Husayn.  His stated 
recognition of the need for an Arab literary history reflects his Vico-like 
apprehension that historical process is a kind of temporality distinct from that 
found in nature. Having achieved this crucial realization, he drew from it the 
proper historicist conclusions that history is an open-ended process and that a 
gap exists between historical events and the language used to represent them. He 
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was now in a position to engage European historians and critics of literature on 
their own ground—a task he enthusiastically embraced.134 
Taha Husayn gave evidence of this historicist turn early in his career. In 
the doctoral dissertation which he defended in 1914, Dhikra Abi’ l- ‘Ala (a study 
of the 11th century poet al-Ma ‘arri), Husayn allotted considerable space to  
a discussion of the source materials, to the times in which al- 
Ma‘arri lived and to his political and cultural background, 
followed by an extensive biography. A great deal of attention is 
also paid to the philosophical and social ideas of al-Ma‘arri, his 
literary work proper being relegated to a rather subordinate 
position … The book obviously applies the methods of the 
positivist French literary critics, like Taine, Brunetière and Sainte 
Beuve: al-Ma‘arri’s work is regarded as a product of his time and, 
to a lesser extent, as the outcome of his personality.135  
 
Here we see Taha Husayn actively contextualizing (and, thereby, historicizing) a 
literary subject. He does so with reference to three 19th century French critics—
one of whom, Sainte-Beuve, had been intimately associated with the poet and 
novelist Victor Hugo and, through Hugo, with French Romanticism.136 Despite J. 
Brugman’s classification of Sainte-Beuve as a “positivist” critic, a study of his 
work as a whole reveals that he lived several critical “lives.” With respect to his 
views on literary history, however, he appears to have been fairly consistent. For 
Sainte-Beuve, history provides a “framework” for literary study, “but only a 
permissive, never a determinative one.” Rather than simply insert Sainte-Beuve 
into the “positivist” camp as Brugman has done, I would argue that he inflected a 
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materialistic approach to literature’s historical frame with a Romantic insistence 
upon individual initiative: “… singular aptitudes and marvelous inborn faculties 
always sooner or later blend with the age they are born into and undergo lasting 
inflexions,” Sainte-Beuve wrote. “But even here human initiative is to the fore 
and less subject to general causes; individual energies modify and assimilate 
things, as it were …”137 This is a variety of “materialistic” literary history proffered 
with a light hand—the kind espoused by 19th century French Romantics and by 
the 20th century Egyptian heir to the Romantics, Taha Husayn.138   
 Brugman speculated that Husayn’s acquaintance with the aforementioned 
French critics was “indirect” because he wrote and defended this dissertation 
prior to his first sojourn in France and  
it was only there that he learnt French properly. It seems more 
likely that [two of his professors at Egypt’s National University, 
where he received his first doctorate, the Orientalists] Nallino 
and Wiet led him into this direction, the more so as, certainly at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, most Orientalists had an 
objectivist approach towards literature.”139  
 
 
Taking into consideration the fact that Taha Husayn was blind from childhood, 
and his acquaintance with literature and criticism was always mediated by his 
personal secretary who read to him in several languages, it is difficult to know 
what would constitute for Brugman a “direct” acquaintance with literature and 
criticism by Taha Husayn.140 In any event, it is reasonably certain from the 
treatment that Husayn accorded the theories of Taine, Brunetière and Sainte-
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Beuve in his 1927 book, al-Adab al-Jahili (Literature of the Pre-Islamic Period), 
that his acquaintance with those theories was, by then, more than passing—
however he came by it.141  
The first edition of al-Adab al-Jahili (published a year earlier under the 
slightly different title al-Shi‘r al-Jahili—or Poetry of the Pre-Islamic Period) is of 
particular interest in the context of the present study because it was in that book 
(i.e., the first edition) that Taha Husayn made his most significant contribution to 
the nascence of modern Qur’anic hermeneutics. It is also a work that helped to 
establish Taha Husayn’s reputation as a kind of intellectual provocateur.  Indeed, 
the fire-storm of hostility that erupted in Egypt following the appearance of the 
first edition of his book is what prompted him to make revisions to it, resulting in 
its republication the following year.  
An Accidental Revolutionary 
Regardless of the way in which the Egyptian public received al-Shi‘r al-
Jahili, Taha Husayn was not interested in overthrowing Islamic tradition. His 
purpose in publishing the results of his investigations into pre-Islamic poetry was 
to establish the post-Medieval practice of literary history in Egyptian letters. In 
order to accomplish this goal, he felt it necessary to find a way to illustrate for the 
reading public compelling reasons to prefer a non-theological approach to this 
subject over the theological one that had characterized its treatment in the pre-
Modern period.142 The means that he chose—calling into question the early dating 
of Arabic poetry’s “classical tradition”—may seem to be a fairly innocuous route 
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to take but, as previously noted, it created wide-spread offense. Part of what 
offended Taha Husayn’s readers was that he not only questioned the authenticity 
of Arabic poetry’s alleged pagan provenance, but also argued the alternative 
thesis that this poetry was composed by early Muslims to “promote political 
designs, to gratify national rivalries, to serve the purposes of narrators, story-
tellers, grammarians, tradition-collectors, theologians, and commentators on the 
Kur’an [sic].”143 Broaching the possibility that early Muslim intellectuals might 
have allowed political schemes or ethnic rivalries to influence the way in which 
they thought about aesthetic, linguistic, or—most troubling of all—religious 
matters, generated stiff critical resistance. 144 But it is my guess that an even more 
disturbing issue—unvoiced by both Taha Husayn and his detractors—crouched 
anxiously at the psychological margins of the debate over his book. For, by 
casting doubt upon a centuries-old historical judgment, Taha Husayn was, in 
effect, declaring “unsettled” a foundation stone of the Islamic self-image long 
presumed settled. According to the religious tradition’s master narrative, the 
Arabs—prior to the coming of Islam—had been a people mired in the darkness of 
ancient superstitions and polytheistic practices.145 Making no attempt to deny this 
traditional view, Taha Husayn simply asserted that what pre-Islamic literature 
had survived to the present day was too meager to support “a correct picture of 
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the culture of that period.”146 All the same, the door to questioning the “salvation 
history” that had become an integral part of traditional Islamic discourse now 
appeared to have been pushed slightly ajar.147 Was this to be the start of a 
skeptical re-appraisal of the tradition as a whole? Husayn made no such far-
reaching claim; again, his purpose was to demonstrate the unique and never-
before-possible contribution that literary history could make to the study of the 
Egyptian and Arabo-Muslim past. Unfortunately, at a time when Egypt was under 
renewed colonial pressures by the British, many of his co-religionists and 
countrymen were in no mood to question one of their time-honored historical 
presumptions. 148     
Taha Husayn mounted his critique of one of the heretofore unchallenged 
sources of Islamic tradition on the basis of a very sophisticated literary-historical 
argument—one that took into account (a) linguistic differences known to have 
prevailed in Arabia prior to the time of the Prophet and (b) aspects of the Arabian 
social and cultural milieu that he found presented in the Qur’an. “Pre-Islamic” 
poetry, he observed, ought to reflect the grammar, vocabulary, and syntax of the 
Arabic language before the Qur’an set new standards for all of these. Moreover, it 
should provide the Muslim reader with the sense that she has come into contact 
with an alien world—one where the social and cultural expectations of the poet 
differ palpably from those with which the Qur’an had invested the generations of 
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Arabs who subsequently rose under its influence.  When he found purportedly 
pre-Islamic poetry disappointing on both counts, he argued that it had been 
fabricated for the reasons cited above. 149   
Such considerations are Vician in tenor and decidedly untraditional. Taha 
Husayn, however, did not stop there. Noting that the patriarchal figures of 
Ibrahim (Abraham) and Isma’el (Ishmael) appear in both the Torah and the 
Qur’an, Husayn argued that their mere mention (presumably in either text) was 
“not sufficient to establish their historical existence.”150 He went on to speculate 
that their Qur’anic appearance represents an Arab appropriation of an earlier 
story.151 These suggestions were more than Taha Husayn’s readership could bear 
and, in response to the pressure of the ensuing public controversy, he agreed to 
excise the paragraph in which these statements occurred from the second edition 
of his book. According to Pierre Cachia—a scholar who personally interviewed 
him in the 1950’s—Taha Husayn denied that this excision represented any 
adjustment of the views he originally expressed.152 As an historian with a post-
Medieval sense of time, he had merely resigned himself to the notion that Egypt 
was not yet ready for a genuine exploration of Arab literary history. 
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Amin al-Khuli (Part One) 
    Despite his retention of these views, Taha Husayn did not work through 
their implications for the study of the Qur’an in a systematic fashion. His role in 
the development of modern Qur’anic hermeneutics was, therefore, more symbolic 
than substantive. With his critique of the dating of classical Arabic poetry and his 
open skepticism regarding the historical reliability of selected Scriptural 
references, Husayn was among the first to step forward and set a precedent for 
the practice of Romantic re-description in Qur’anic studies. However, the task of 
embarking upon a more thorough foray into literary-historical waters fell to 
others such as his contemporary and colleague at the state-run Egyptian 
University, Amin al-Khuli (1895-1966). 
Al-Khuli’s biography provides an indication of the degree to which 
Romantic thinking had become “indigenized” in early 20th century Egyptian 
intellectual life. Unlike Taha Husayn, al-Khuli did not study formally with 
Orientalists nor did he cultivate extensive contacts with Europe; a graduate of the 
Egyptian University’s Madrasat al-Qada’ al-Shar ‘i (School for Muslim clerics), 
his first-hand exposure to Europe was limited to a brief “stint as imam in 
Egyptian embassies.” He did read widely, however, and was exposed to 
Orientalist approaches to Islamic materials after he obtained a faculty position at 
the University. 153 Even so, he set himself apart from his more “Europeanized” 
colleagues among the professoriate by dressing in the traditional “shaykhly” garb 
appropriate to his clerical training.  In his scholarship, he “drew on Orientalist 
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techniques, yet he criticized the articles of his Cairo colleagues Joseph Schacht 
and Paul Kraus [two eminent Orientalists] in the [Arabic edition of the] 
Encyclopedia of Islam.”154  In sum, Amin al-Khuli did not fit the profile of a rabid 
“Europaphile.” And yet, he developed an historicist approach to the Qur’an that 
went far beyond Taha Husayn’s occasional criticisms and speculation. 
Al-Khuli divided Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir) into two general categories: (a) 
historical background studies (ma hawl al-Qur’an) and (b) the interpretation of 
the text itself in light of these preliminary studies (dirasat al-Qur’an nafsih).155 
By means of this exegetical division of labor, al-Khuli created a protocol f
approaching the Qur’an that made intra-Qur’anic explanation dependent upon 
extra-Qur’anic investigations. On the surface, such a protocol is relatively 
unremarkable. After all, Muslim exegetes (mufassirun) had included extra-
Qur’anic materials in their repertoire of interpretive tools from an early date. 
Marshall Hodgson has observed that “a significant part of the population that 
accepted Islam in its formative centuries was composed of Jews, whose narrative 
traditions, called Isra’iliyat, dominated the popular legendry of early Islam. It 
would appear that much of the spirit that formed Muslim expectations of what a 
religion should be was inspired by Jewish example.”
or 
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their efforts to provide their readers with background information regarding 
persons and events mentioned in the sacred text. Employed in this way, the 
Isra’iliyat merits recognition as a pre-modern variety of ma hawl al-Qur’an.157  
Despite its frequent use in early exegesis, the Isra’iliyat became, over time, a 
source of controversy. In order to make sense of this development and deepen 
our understanding of al-Khuli’s project, it is necessary to take a brief excursus 
into Islamic intellectual history.  
A Brief Excursus  
The late 7th century witnessed the expansion of the Islamic community 
well beyond its purported origins in the Red Sea basin; by the first few decades of 
the 8th century, the community had been twice transformed: first into a polity, 
and then into an empire which stretched from the Iberian Peninsula in the west 
to Transoxania in the east. This rapid expansion, while phenomenally successful 
in military terms, was subject to severe growing pains on the societal level as 
diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious groupings struggled to find their place in 
the new world order. Around 750 CE, social unrest in Syria and the Iraq 
culminated in the overthrow of the Damascene elite and, with it, a ruling class 
dominated by individuals with North Arabian tribal affiliations.  In its place was a 
new dynastic party, the ‘Abbasid. The ‘Abbasids seized power with the help of 
factions affiliated with, and sympathetic to, South Arabian tribes. These tribes 
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had historical and political ties to both Judean religion and Persianate culture.158 
After reconstituting the Imperial court in Baghdad, the ‘Abbasid party secured its 
position by purging many of those with South Arabian connections from its 
ranks.159 What occasioned this betrayal of the Southern Arabs is not altogether 
clear, but it is conceivable that their Judean and Persian connections may have 
contributed to their loss of standing once their political usefulness had come to 
an end.160  
In light of this history, Professor Gordon Newby has suggested that the 
‘Abbasid revolution awakened many Muslims to the precariousness of their 
position atop a variegated and often volatile social and cultural mélange. Muslim 
intellectual dependence upon those sectors of the population that insisted on 
maintaining an independent religious identity—something that Jews and 
Christians were entitled to do under Islamic law—would have appeared 
particularly incongruous to an increasing number of mufassirun at a time when 
social stability was being re-established.161  
Newby’s explanation for the decline in the use of Isra’iliyat by Qur’an 
scholars is complemented by Robert G. Hoyland’s recent observation that the 
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first century of ‘Abassid rule witnessed the construction of a “pure” Arab identity 
with respect to all things Islamic: 
The Muslim Arabs now had their capital at Baghdad, which 
exposed them to the challenge of the strong and well-articulated 
identity of Iran, whereas before, at Damascus, they had only to 
contend with the numerous parochial and etiolated identities of 
the Levant. Moreover Iraq was a very cosmopolitan land with a 
large cultural elite, whose members now set about debating the 
cultural orientation of the Muslim empire (Arab or multi-
ethnic?), the foundations of the Islamic sciences (traditional 
Arabian lore or more [Greek and/or Persian] rationality-based?), 
and the respective merits of the world’s great peoples and 
religions…Inevitably the fact that the Holy Book was in Arabic 
and that the Prophet was an Arab born in Arabia meant that 
many a good Muslim, even if not of Arab ancestry, would 
acknowledge the link between matters Arab and Islam and even 
seek to strengthen that link.162  
 
Hoyland refers to this effort to identify Islam with “pure” ‘arabiyya as part of a 
larger trend towards “Arabhood and Arabization”—a moment when the history of 
Islam and the history of Arab ideologies of Islam began to converge in the 
discursive practices of Sunni traditionalism. 163 Although this project could not 
help but be suspect from an historical point of view—such constructions must 
always overlook the fact that no human culture or community arises or flourishes 
in a vacuum—the task of building an identity that masses of people might adopt 
for themselves despite the niceties of modern historical reflection may only 
proceed successfully if it discovers a way to remain innocent of them. Obviously, 
as pre-moderns, the intellectuals who elaborated Arab-Islamic identification 
were peculiarly blessed in this regard and their efforts enjoyed considerable 
success on a number of fronts. In the field of Qur’anic exegesis, Arabization took 
                                                   
162 Hoyland, Arabia and the Arabs, pp. 246-247. 
  
163 Ibid, pp. 229-247. Recall that Taha Husayn went so far as to read the process of Arabization 
back into the Qur’an itself (supra, p. 74)!  
 
 79 
the form of displacing the Isra’iliyat with scholarly recourse to Bedouin poetry 
(i.e., the “Classical” tradition of the nomadic poets of the Arabian Peninsula 
which dates to no earlier than 500 CE) and with an increased focus upon 
traditions relating the sayings and life circumstances of the Arab Prophet.164  
The process of exegetical Arabization did not represent an outright 
rejection of the use of extra-Qur’anic background material when interpreting the 
sacred text. What this process did entail was a shift away from a prior reliance 
upon legendry that Muslims shared in common with non-Muslims. Increasingly, 
the mufassirun promoted what might be referred to as “proprietary” background 
to the Qur’an: purportedly oral traditions collected and preserved in the form of 
narrative segments supported by an isnad—i.e., a chain of transmission that 
traces a given story or saying from auditor to auditor until its authorization—and 
uncontested Arabian provenance—is located upon the lips of the Prophet 
Muhammad himself. Although we lack the documentary evidence to prove it, it 
would be surprising if this kind of material did not circulate in at least anecdotal 
form during Muhammad’s lifetime. It is therefore somewhat perplexing to note 
that the volume of material that has a direct bearing upon particular portions of 
the Qur’an is relatively slim when compared to the massive body of sayings 
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(ahadith) contained in the canonical collections—i.e., little of it depicts the 
Prophet’s Sitz im Leben at the moment when a particular line or passage of the 
Qur’an was first recited by him. Moreover, it was not until the 11th century that a 
few Muslim scholars made the effort to select out and segregate such material 
from the voluminous hadith collections for the convenience of those who might 
wish to make use of it in Qur’anic exegesis. 165 One can only speculate as to why 
there is comparatively little of this material extant (did the Prophet typically 
receive a revelation out of the presence of his wives or other companions?) or why 
Muslim exegetes have placed little emphasis upon its use. As to the latter issue, 
one reasonable explanation is that the mufassirun had alternative materials 
available to them (including the Isra’iliyat) in the centuries preceding the 
ideological Arabization of their discursive practices.  
Amin al-Khuli (Part Two) 
Al-Khuli’s advocacy of ma hawl al-Qur’an was both blessed and burdened 
by the history of Qur’anic exegesis recited above. He was blessed by the fact that 
historical background studies enjoyed a long association with scholarly 
approaches to the sacred text because this association relieved him of the 
necessity of having to justify in principle the importance of such studies to his 
colleagues. But the burden of this history clearly weighed heavily upon the 
manner in which he articulated his historical approach. Previous periods of 
intellectual Arabization by Muslims had already limited to the “proprietary” the 
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range of materials that would be deemed acceptable when interpreting the 
Qur’an; having started his career “during the contentious period of European 
colonization,” al-Khuli reached scholarly maturity at a moment when “Arab 
intellectuals were pressed to decolonize, to produce indigenous traditions rooted 
in their cultural heritage and relevant to their immediate concerns.”166 He 
therefore felt constrained to acknowledge the claim of the past upon his critical 
practice, and did so through his articulation of the protocols of tajdid (renewal).  
According to Amin al-Khuli, the first step towards tajdid always involves 
the critic in a thorough analysis of tradition; absent such a foundation, the critic 
will produce not renewal but the squandering (tabdid) of his or her cultural 
inheritance.167 For al-Khuli, acknowledging the claim of the past upon a critic’s 
work went beyond historicism: he wished to acknowledge the claim of past 
Muslim scholarship upon his work. This was a significant concession to tradition 
on his part; one that would place him in compliance with the Arabizing trend by 
which Muslim exegetes had eventually limited historical study of Scripture to 
extra-Qur’anic (but proprietary) narratives, e.g., the asbab an-nuzul (“occasions 
of revelation”) literature. Al-Khuli’s “Traditionalist” desire, however, chafed 
against his estimation of the task of criticism that lay before him. He was not 
content to anchor his literary history of the Qur’an in the asbab an-nuzul because 
it did not reflect the exacting standards developed since the medieval period for 
historical research. In order to introduce his students to historical methods that 
                                                   
166 Wen-Chin Ouyang, Literary Criticism in Medieval Arabic-Islamic Culture: The Making of a 
Tradition, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1997), pp. 5-6. 
 
167 See Nasr Abu Zayd, “The Dilemma of the Literary Approach to the Qur’an,” Alif 23 (2003), p. 
22. 
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did reflect modern standards, al-Khuli was forced to transgress the preference for 
proprietary materials and recommend the German Orientalist Theodor Nöldeke’s 
Geschichte des Qorans [History of the Qur’an] as “indispensable reading” 
(dirasat daruria).168  
In turning to the work of a non-Arab and non-Muslim for a model of 
Qur’anic research, Amin al-Khuli risked—and received—the censure of his 
colleagues. Given the fact that he is often remembered fondly as a man of mild 
manners and moderate opinions, it is somewhat curious that he would take such 
risks on behalf of what he had to know would be an unpopular approach to 
Qur’anic study.169 It is therefore appropriate to pause and consider why this 
outwardly old-fashioned and “shaykhly” professor adopted what was regarded by 
some as a contentious critical stance.  
 Tradition in a New Key  
I would suggest that al-Khuli’s critical approach was dictated, in part, by 
the Qur’an itself. As a collection of inscribed prophetic utterances, the Qur’an 
presents its readers with the peculiarities endemic to this ancient Near Eastern 
literary genre (i.e., prophecy). Therefore, those who read the Qur’an with the 
                                                   
168 Al-Khuli, Manahij Tajdid, pp. 234-235. Published in the 19th century, Nöldeke’s study employs 
what is generally known among Biblicists as “tradition history”: a method that attempts to make 
historical sense of sacred texts, not on the basis of internal literary evidence alone, but on the 
basis of such evidence read in the light of information adduced from sources external to it. 
Nöldeke’s rigorous application of this method yielded a hypothetical chronology for various 
portions of the canonical collection of the Qur’an—an order not explicitly reflected in the codex 
itself. While not all Qur’an scholars find the results of Nöldeke’s research entirely convincing, it 
was the method itself that appealed to al-Khuli, whose own two-pronged approach (combining 
ma hawl al-Qur’an with dirasat al-Qur’an nafsih) suggests Nöldekean inspiration. See also 
Theodor Nöldeke, Geschichte des Qorans, Göttingen: Verlag der Dieterichschen Buchhandlung, 
1860; J. J. G. Jansen, The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt, Leiden: Brill (1974), pp. 
65-67. 
 
169 Amin al-Khuli’s personality and career are profiled in Reid, Cairo University and the Making of 
Modern Egypt, pp. 139-156, 169-173. 
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expectation of following a linear narrative sequence (such as one finds in the 
Genesis-through-Kings saga of the Hebrew Bible) will only be disappointed. That 
saga represents an early example of another ancient literary genre—the genre 
referred to by scholars as “universal history”—and it happens to be the aspect of 
the Bible that seems to come to mind most often when many people think of it. 
But the Bible contains a wide variety of literary materials and, therefore, ought 
not to be reduced to this pre-modern historical genre.170 If a reader familiar with 
the Bible picks up the Qur’an and cannot seem to find her footing with this 
portion of Muslim Scripture—for the Qur’an is regarded by Muslims as one facet 
of a much larger body of holy writ—she should turn to the books of Biblical 
prophecy in order to find more familiar terrain.171 If she does so, she will return to 
the Qur’an able to make significant points of comparison between the two sacred 
texts. The similarities are so striking that Klaus Koch’s remarks on the prophetic 
books of the Hebrew Bible apply with equal force to the Qur’an. Koch explained 
the lack of linear narrative in the writings attributed to the Hebrew prophets “… 
by the fact that the prophets…committed to writing what they delivered orally. 
And the orally delivered saying was formulated tersely and poetically, so that the 
listener could easily commit it to memory.”172 This discovery was achieved, by the 
                                                   
170 A wonderfully readable account of the literary history of the Bible that helps to clarify some of 
the generic distinctions that obtain within the Bible itself is Donald Harman Akenson’s 
Surpassing Wonder: The Invention of the Bible and Talmuds, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1998.     
 
171 On the relationship of the Qur’an to other literatures held sacred by Muslims, see Fazlur 
Rahman, Islam, 2nd edition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1979), pp. 11-67.  
 
172 One famous reader of the Bible, Martin Luther, complained that the prophetic books were 
“unedifying, if read continuously, ‘since they maintain no kind of order but leap from one matter 
to another so that a man can neither understand nor endure it.’” See Klaus Koch, The Prophets, 
vol. 1, translated by Margaret Kohl, Philadelphia: Fortress Press (1982), p. 165. In “The Hero as 
Prophet,” Thomas Carlyle expressed a similar frustration with the Qur’an—though Carlyle, 
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way, through the application of modern literary critical tools (in this instance 
“form criticism”) to the Biblical text.173   
Those individuals who collected and compiled the inscriptions produced 
by Muhammad’s prophetic activity into what became, within a few decades after 
the Prophet’s death, the canonical codex of the Qur’an, were not modern 
archivists.174 Consequently, the book does not “wear upon its sleeve” the historical 
incidents it impliedly addresses. When later generations began to formulate 
questions regarding the “occasions” of Qur’anic revelation, Muslim scholars 
replied to their inquiries by supplying extra-Qur’anic narratives (the asbab an-
nuzul literature). These narratives are, like the Qur’an itself, the redacted 
precipitate of oral performances; they are helpful insofar as they provide a linear 
scaffolding for a relatively small portion of the Qur’an. But even if they covered a 
broader sweep of the sacred text, they would still be subject to criticism because 
they do not satisfy the requirements of the modern historian.175  
As a basic rule of procedure, the modern historian seeks to establish a 
chronological ordering of the various parts of a textual witness regardless of 
whether or not this order confirms or denies a legal principle previously derived 
                                                                                                                                                       
anxious to affirm the superiority of Christianity to Islam, was less delicate in his criticisms of the 
Muslim Scripture than Luther felt obliged to be towards the Bible. See Thomas Carlyle, Sartor 
Resartus, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History, London: J. M. Dent and Co. 
(1908), pp. 277, 298-311.   
   
173 Koch, ibid. 
 
174 See John Burton, The Collection of the Qur’an, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.  
 
175 See Andrew Rippin’s reflections in his essay “Muhammad in the Qur’an: Reading Scripture in 
the 21st Century,” The Biography of Muhammad: The Issue of the Sources, edited by Harald 
Motzki, Leiden: Brill (2000), pp. 298-309. See also G. H. A. Juynboll, The Authenticity of the 
Tradition Literature: Discussions in Modern Egypt, Leiden: Brill, 1969; and Hadith, edited by 
Harald Motzki, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2004. 
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from the text by jurists or a doctrinal point argued for by theologians. Pre-
modern Muslim scholarship never aspired to this level of juridical or theological 
disinterestedness where sacred Scripture was concerned; indeed, it would have 
regarded such an approach to be unworthy of its subject.176 Although the modern 
historian may be said to proceed blind to such scruples, she does not proceed 
blind to all scruples. Instead, she substitutes for those which were characteristic 
of the pre-modern period a different and, at times, competing set: for the ethics 
of a modern historian constrain her to insulate her narrative as much as possible 
from considerations that bear the marks of special pleading. Pre-modern 
treatments of the past were, by contrast, very often the product of special 
pleading. After all, appeals to the past were typically placed in the service of a 
particular juridical or theological position—typically one advanced by the 
historian’s patron.177  
Amin al-Khuli recognized in Nöldeke’s approach to the Qur’an a method of 
doing literary history with sacred texts that was not beholden to theologian or 
jurist; rather, it was one that stood on its own two feet, operating in accordance 
with an “artistic standard, free from the constraints imposed by any other point 
                                                   
176 Chase F. Robinson, Islamic Historiography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
177 See ibid. and G. R. Elton, The Practice of History, New York: Crowell, 1967.  It is important to 
stress at this point that this practice was not peculiar to Muslims; it was characteristic of pre-
modern historical writing more generally and, indeed, has survived among Muslims and non-
Muslims to the present day. As argued in Chapter One, the rise of European technicalism made 
possible a new approach to historiography because the new temporal rhythms experienced in 
technicalism’s wake made the past intrinsically interesting to scholars for the first time. This new 
appreciation of the past did not eliminate the older approach; rather, it competes with it for the 
allegiance of all who traffic in the writing of history.               
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of view, even the religious.…”178 The constraints that this method was not free 
from, however, were those imposed by the text itself. In light of al-Khuli’s 
emphasis upon the importance of historical background studies (ma hawl al-
Qur’an), such a caveat may appear, at first blush, to be inconsistent with the 
general tenor of his endorsement of Nöldekean “tradition history.” But modern 
tradition history appeals to a text’s historical background in such a way that the 
text itself remains present to the historian as the lens through which he or she 
must peer. Therefore, one “looks away” from the text by “looking through” it.179  
One way to distinguish modern “tradition history” from pre-modern 
methods of appealing to the past (e.g., the asbab an-nuzul literature) is to 
consider the modern historian’s attitude towards the sacred text. In her hands, 
the sacred text is regarded as an historical artifact that linguistically “encodes” 
aspects of the extra-textual environment in which it was produced; the text 
therefore serves as a kind of “palimpsest” that must be carefully scrutinized in 
order to reveal the data of interest it potentially conceals. Such encoding is not 
unusual; indeed it occurs whenever language is employed for any means. This is 
because a linguistic utterance, like any product of human activity, emerges from 
within a “specific socio-cultural reality” which it “embodie[s] within a specific 
linguistic system.”180  For example, the page before the present reader contains a 
wide variety of clues that could provide a future reader with enough information 
                                                   
178 Amin al-Khuli, Manahij Tajdid, p. 230 (my translation). In the next chapter, we will consider 
al-Khuli’s “artistic standard” in greater depth under the rubric of modern hermeneutics.    
  
179 Bart D. Ehrman, “The Text as Window: New Testament Manuscripts and the Social History of 
Early Christianity,” The Text of the New Testament in Contemporary Research: Essays on the 
Status Quaestionis, edited by Bart D. Ehrman and Michael W. Holmes, Grand Rapids, MI: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company (1995), pp. 361-379.  
 
180 Nasr Abu Zayd, “The Dilemma of the Literary Approach…” p. 38.  
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to suggest the approximate time and place of its composition, the author’s 
purposes in writing, and the potential audience for the work—even if it were torn 
from its manuscript. This information is contained in the language that appears 
on the page: a North American scholarly English that linguistic research would 
show was in use by the late 20th century and was still spoken (or at least written) 
in the first decade of the 21st century. This linguistic research would be supported 
by the dates of the referenced publications that appear in the footnotes at the 
bottom of the page. From these broad brush strokes, more specific information 
may be adduced: the author’s level of education and intellectual interests, the 
level of education and intellectual interests of the author’s implied audience, and 
even insights regarding the presumptions that author and audience may share 
about a variety of matters germane to the materials under discussion. Moreover, 
by attending to what is not discussed—or what may in fact be excluded from the 
discussion—the reader is in a position to develop further clues with which to 
profile the characteristics of author and implied audience.181 Naturally, to 
generate any of this information involves educated guesswork, requiring a great 
deal of extra-textual research to support it in the eyes of the scholarly 
community. It is precisely for this reason that Amin al-Khuli was careful to 
combine ma hawl al-Qur’an with dirasat al-Qur’an nafsih in a two-pronged 
                                                   
181 Tradition history’s sensitivity to encoded context includes intensive concern with rhetorical 
occasion and audience and is fruitfully read alongside rhetorical criticism and theory produced in 
the United States since the 1960’s. Examples include: Lloyd F. Bitzer, “The Rhetorical Situation,” 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (1968), pp. 1-14; Edwin Black, “The Second Persona,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, 56 (1970); Kathleen M. Jamieson, “Antecedent Genre as Rhetorical 
Constraint,” Quarterly Journal of Speech, 61 (1975), pp. 406-415; and Philip Wander, “The Third 
Persona: An Ideological Turn in Rhetorical Theory,” Central States Speech Journal, 35 (1984), pp. 
197-216. 
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approach. Text and context may be examined separately, but the resulting data 
must be weighed in a balance constructed from both.182  
Pre-modern approaches to the past regarded the sacred text as exempt 
from acting as an historical artifact in this manner; moreover, they were largely 
innocent of the ways in which context is linguistically encoded as a matter of 
course in textual production. As a result, pre-modern approaches did not seek to 
disembed the sacred text from theological presumptions designed to insulate it 
from its historical context. For the pre-modern theologian, the sacred text is like 
a child delivered by Caesarian section: it does not acquire the usual markings 
(flattened facial features, elongated shape of the head, etc.) that identify one who 
has passed into this world through the birth canal. Pre-modern theological 
treatments deem the sacred text to be part of history, to be sure, but it has no 
history itself—at least not a secular one accessible to the tools developed by 
modern literary historians. To offer yet another metaphor, pre-modern theology 
posits a “vertical” context within which to make sense of a sacred text; God has 
miraculously vouchsafed the sacred text to history in such a way that connects the 
history-bound reader with an “a-historical” reality. It is this vertical context alone 
that activates any significant meaning to be made from the text.183  
                                                   
182 Despite my employment in this discussion of terminology that was in vogue among 
Structuralists in the 1970’s and 1980’s, I am not committed to Structuralism as a science of 
language. My use of the metaphor of encoding is, to my mind, just that (a metaphor) and follows 
the usage of my mentor in modern Qur’anic hermeneutics, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (see, e.g., Abu 
Zayd, “The Dilemma of the Literary Approach to the Qur’an,” Alif 23, 2003, pp. 34-39). As the 
reader will soon discover, I draw upon a wide variety of metaphorical speech in an effort to 
articulate my sense of what goes on when readers make meaning of texts.        
 
183 See Fazlur Rahman’s discussion in his Islam, 2nd edition, pp. 30-33.  
  
 89 
From the perspective of the modern literary historian, scholars who 
exempt sacred texts from the rules which they would presumably apply to all 
others are engaged in a form of special pleading. Nevertheless, there is an added 
complexity to the distinction between modern and pre-modern approaches to the 
past that metaphors such as those employed above do not adequately capture. 
Many modern literary historians have been unwilling to deny a “vertical” context 
to the sacred texts that they study. In other words, they do not believe that 
carving an independent intellectual space for historical scholarship on sacred 
texts necessitates the abandonment of religion; nor do they believe that, by 
assigning a secular history to a sacred text, they have undermined the validity of 
the text’s connection to something which stands “outside” history. Modern 
religious literary historians such as Taha Husayn and Amin al-Khuli typically 
locate the sacred text at the intersection of vertical and “horizontal” axes—where 
the horizontal axis signifies the text’s “secular” or time-bound contexts—and 
assert that the two contexts may co-exist.  
Asserting the co-existence of these two contexts is one thing; explaining 
how this co-existence may be effected is another. More often than not, such 
explanations are a vexed affair. One of Amin al-Khuli’s intellectual heirs, Nasr 
Hamid Abu Zayd, has suggested that this problem has deep roots in Muslim 
intellectual history, and he traces those roots to the 8th century CE. During this 
period, the problem appeared under a slightly different guise as questions raised 
by Ummayad political theology caused it to be framed in terms of the Qur’an’s 
“createdness.” In that debate, those individuals who affirmed the proposition that 
the Qur’an was created impliedly affirmed as well that it, like all creatures, has a 
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history. On the other side of the ensuing controversy were those intellectuals who 
denied the Qur’an’s “createdness,” arguing instead that its existence is from 
eternity. It is interesting to note that the “resolution” of this debate in Muslim 
intellectual history was not achieved through the construction, by one side or the 
other, of an irrefutable argument; rather, the decision was handed down by 
Caliphal fiat in the 9th century.184 
Possibly because of the adversarial context in which it was formulated, the 
Caliph’s decision favored the notion of an eternal Qur’an construed as a 
theologically defined “verticality” that makes no room for the horizontal axis of 
secular time. The uncompromising nature of this decision has had a chilling 
effect upon subsequent Muslim debate of the issue of the Qur’an’s historicity—
despite the fact that the Caliph who made the decision appears to have done so 
not on the merits but as a matter of political expediency. 185 Abu Zayd believes 
that a question of such importance to the Islamic intellectual tradition deserves a 
better fate than to be decided for all time on political grounds that have long since 
                                                   
184 Abu Zayd, “The Dilemma of the Literary Approach…” pp. 34-36. 
  
185 It is worth noting that, in rendering this decision as he did, the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mutawakkil 
(822-861 CE) placed the royal stamp of approval upon the position advocated by Sunni 
traditionalists who represented an Arabizing tendency over against the Hellenized rationalism of 
a group of maverick theologians. See J. R. T. M. Peters, God’s Created Speech, Leiden: Brill, 1976, 
for a thorough review of the history of this particular controversy. A similar intervention took 
place in Roman Christianity when the Emperor Constantine intervened on behalf of the 
Athanasian party of Bishops at the Council of Nicea; the Church’s Christological doctrine took its 
present shape in Constantine’s imperial shadow. See, e.g., H. A. Drake, Constantine and the 
Bishops: The Politics of Intolerance, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press (2000), pp. 251-
258. 
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been rendered moot.186 Nevertheless, this is the situation today: for many Muslim 
intellectuals in the 21st century, the matter remains closed to further discussion.187  
In an effort to re-start the conversation, Abu Zayd proposes that careful 
attention be directed to the respective theories underwriting the position of the 
proponents of pre-modern theological “verticalism” and of those who advocate 
the use of modern literary history. The theories of greatest interest are those that 
pertain to “the origin of language and the relation between languages and reality, 
on the one hand, and the significance of such theories to the issue concerning the 
nature of the Qur’an, on the other.” According to Abu Zayd, both parties to this 
proposed debate make certain assumptions regarding these matters that merit 
scrutiny in a systematic manner. 188 
Following Abu Zayd’s suggestion, I would recommend that the 
conversation begin with the pre-modern theological assumption that the Qur’an’s 
status as prophetic speech is necessarily compromised by any concession to 
linguistic history. For if this is indeed the case, it is difficult to understand how 
the classical commentators on the Qur’an (mufassirun) could have countenanced 
the study of pre-Islamic poetry in an effort to shed light on the definitions of 
certain words found in the Qur’an.189 Such a scholarly enterprise is itself an 
admission that the Qur’an was revealed in a language that was in use among 
                                                   
186 Indeed, this Caliphal decision has outlived the institution of the Caliphate itself! 
 
187 Abu Zayd, “The Dilemma of the Literary Approach…” pp. 34-40.  
 
188 Ibid, p. 36. 
 
189 It is ironic to recall that the one scholar to question the pre-Islamic provenance of such poetry 
was the tradition historian Taha Husayn—who, subsequent to questioning the historicity of this 
material, experienced the ire of the Traditionists!  
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human beings prior to the prophetic career of Muhammad—i.e., a language of 
human origin. Moreover, many of these same classical commentators were 
outspoken in their endorsement of the doctrine that the Qur’an is self-evidently 
God’s Word (i ‘jaz).190 Internal consistency with their own practices, then, would 
seem to require the proponents of a pre-modern theological approach to grant 
the cogency of Abu Zayd’s argument that the literary historian “… does not by any 
means intend to damage the Qur’an or even to question its divine and holy 
nature. [Her] position is that religious texts, though divine and revealed by God, 
are historically determined and culturally constructed.”191  
Just as Amin al-Khuli chafed at the limitations imposed upon his critical 
practice by Arabizing Traditionists, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd—as the foregoing 
remarks suggest—chafes at the limitations imposed upon his own critical practice 
by an exclusivist, verticalizing theology of the text. In its stead, Abu Zayd 
proposes a hermeneutics that attends to Muslim Scripture’s location in both 
social space and cultural time. The resulting “horizontal” secularization of the 
text represents a synthesis of Taha Husayn’s linguistic historicism (i.e., the close 
attention he paid to linguistic differences over time and the evidence of oral 
transmission embedded in written texts) and Amin al-Khuli’s insistence that such 
                                                   
190 Abu Zayd rehearses the history of this doctrine in “The Dilemma of the Literary Approach…” 
pp. 10-18. Among the early studies to compare the Qur’an and pre-Islamic literature were: Abu 
‘Ubayda (728-825 CE) Majaz al-Qur’an; al-Farra’ (d. 822 CE) Ma ‘ani al-Qur’an; Ibn Qutayba 
(828-889 CE) Mushkil al-Qur’an; the redoubtable al-Jahiz (d. circa 869 CE); al-Rummani (908-
994 CE) al-Nukat fi I‘ jaz al-Qur’an; al-Khattabi (d. 998) Bayan I ‘jaz al-Qur’an. The work of al-
Baqillani (d. 1013) attempts to distance the Qur’an from poetry (pre-Islamic or otherwise) and 
reflects his promotion of an emerging theological consensus that confirms the nature of the 
Qur’an as Divine speech of Arabian provenance. See R. J. McCarthy, “Al-Bakillani,” The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, vol. I, edited by H. A. R. Gibb et al. (1960), pp. 958-959.   
 
191 Ibid, pp. 34-35. See also Abu Zayd, Mafhum al-Nass: Dirasa fi ‘Ulum al-Qur’an, Cairo: GEBO, 
1990. 
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literary-historical decoding of Qur’anic discourse positions the Revelation as its 
own best witness to the circumstances of its prophetic declamation. By pairing  
the ways of language and history—or text and context—pioneered by his 
intellectual precursors, Nasr Abu Zayd has assured Qur’anic hermeneutics a seat 
at the transnational table of contemporary literary criticism.192  
 
    
 
 
                                                   
192 See Ouyang’s “Introduction” to his Literary Criticism in Medieval Arabic-Islamic Culture, p. 1-
21.  
PART TWO 
 
 
The Qur’an’s post-messianic universalism represents the last 
prophetic intervention in diasporic Perso-Judean religion prior 
to the rise of Islam…  
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Chapter Three: 
 
Modern Qur’anic Hermeneutics: 
Transgressive Reading in the Romantic Grain 
 
 
One of the remarkable characteristics of  sacred texts (and one 
that they share with a very small body of secular literary 
compositions) is that, read either in a community of faith or in 
another admiring respectful context, they can prompt the 
reader to seek almost endlessly what Shils calls “a better 
disclosure of what was already there.” But it is difficult to 
disclose what was already there if one concentrates on what 
was not.193  
 
We must unlearn the constellations to see the stars.194 
 
 
 
The Romantic Grain 
 
In the first chapter of this study, I explored the rise of Romantic 
philosophy in Western European culture as the elaboration of four propositions: 
(1) truth belongs to language, (2) language belongs to history, (3) history belongs 
to humankind, and (4) to humankind belong both the familiar and the alien. The 
chapter closed with a brief sketch of the approach to the study of sacred texts that 
evolved from this propositional quartet.  
In the second chapter, I reviewed the manner in which—and the 
circumstances under which—a specific group of Egyptian intellectuals 
                                                   
193 Marilyn Robinson Waldman, “New Approaches to ‘Biblical’ Materials in the Qur’an,” The 
Muslim World, vol. LXXV (January 1985), p. 13. 
 
194 Jack Gilbert, “Tear It Down,” The Great Fires: Poems, 1982-1992, New York: A. A. Knopf  
(1994), p. 9. 
  
appropriated Romantic philosophy in the 20th century, translating its concerns 
into a foreign context and applying its insights to the study of the Qur’an. I closed 
the second chapter with the observation that, through the relation of Qur’anic 
text and context, the Egyptian Romantics had historicized their study of the ways 
of language. In the event, they achieved an indigenous Egyptian and Muslim 
practice of hermeneutics: an interpretive method (manhaj) that has developed as 
a meditation upon time and temporality through textual study.195  
The task for the present chapter is (1) to discuss the propositional quartet 
outlined above in light of the peculiar concern that orients and animates every 
intellectual project meriting inclusion under the rubric of Romanticism: the 
desire for connection; (2) to consider the recent interventions of Nasr Hamid Abu 
Zayd, the current standard-bearer of the Egyptian Renaissance School (madhab 
tajdid misriyya), and to remark the ways in which he is shepherding modern 
Qur’anic hermeneutics into the 21st century; and (3) by relating Abu Zayd’s work 
to the Romantic project as it has evolved since its alleged demise in the 19th 
century, to suggest directions for new development. The final chapter will then 
illustrate what is possible for Qur’anic hermeneutics if those suggestions are 
taken seriously.196 
                                                   
195 A similar effect was achieved in the Western European philosophical tradition through the 
early Heidegger’s intervention (most notably Part Two of Being and Time)—his later misgivings 
about the course of technicalistic civilization notwithstanding. See Martin Heidegger, Being and 
Time, translated by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, London: SCM Press, 1962; see also 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by Garrett Barden and William Glen-
Doepel, New York: Seabury Press, 1975.  
 
196 I suppose that this is as good a place as any to acknowledge the received wisdom that 
Romanticism has run its course and that we are all now “post-Romantic”—so Terry Eagleton, 
Literary Theory: An Introduction, 2nd edition, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1996),  
p. 16. Eagleton, however, admits that “we” are all post-Romantic “in the sense of being products 
of that epoch rather than confidently posterior to it…” (ibid). In a similar vein, Duncan Heath has 
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In Chapter One, I argued that “Romantic philosophy was born in the 
throes of felt disparities: the apprehension of a cleavage between the words we 
use and the world we intend those words to describe; the sense that the time is 
somehow ‘out of joint’; and the feeling that there is some inchoate connection 
between these two phenomena.”197 I characterized the Romantic preoccupation 
with language (embodied in the practice of re-description) as a response to this 
“predicament.” But this preoccupation is also emblematic of a basic conviction 
common among Romantic thinkers: the belief that language—as an irreducibly 
social phenomenon that we live “inside” and which, at the same time, somehow 
“lives” inside us—may hold the key to making an elusive, desired connection 
between the selves we posit and the world we inhabit.198 This conviction takes on 
a tragic dimension when viewed in light of the apprehension of a cleavage 
between the world and our words. Accordingly, Romantics often see themselves 
as tragic figures. However, because they do not surrender their perennially 
hopeful quest that the connection they desire is capable of being made, they are 
tragic figures who participate in a cosmic (if not always divine) comedy. This is 
                                                                                                                                                       
recently observed that “Romanticism may have expired on the barricades of the 1848 revolution, 
but its spirit continues to haunt us.” He adds that it is also important to recognize “the influence 
of Romanticism as much in the movements that reacted against it as in those that were directly 
inspired by it.” Duncan Heath and Judy Boreham, Introducing Romanticism, Cambridge, UK: 
Icon Books (2005), p. 172. It is my position that Richard Rorty’s body of work as well as that of 
the philosophers Stanley Cavell (e.g., In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and 
Romanticism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) and Richard Eldridge (Leading a 
Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism, Chicago: University of Chicago 
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why, as the philosopher Russell Goodman puts it, for the Romantic, “the process 
of weighing words never ends.”199  
It is also important to remark that the nature of the Romantics’ desired 
connection reflects the proposition that to humankind belong both the familiar 
and the alien. Romantic connection seeks to preserve this difference. The desired 
union is the object of a quest, not a conquest, and not an obliteration of the 
Other. On the contrary, for the Romantic, intimacy is contemplated as a way to 
affirm alterity.200 Were this not an integral element of the Romantic program, 
European Romanticism would not have proved as attractive as it did to the 
Egyptian intellectuals who embraced it. As we have seen, Romantic Orientalism 
reconstituted itself in the Arab East as “Oriental” Romanticism. 201 
This, then, is the Romantic grain within which the Egyptian thinkers of the 
Renaissance School and their heirs have worked out their individual and 
collective expressions of literary intelligence: a tragi-comedy of language that 
produces a certain kind of reader of sacred texts—a Romantic reader. Such a 
reader is one who attends to language for the promise it holds of securing a 
connection between the reading self and the world beyond—in time. The 
Romantic reader’s meditations are always focused upon the temporal aspects of 
the text and the language that composes it; they are, therefore, irremediably 
history-conscious and worldly. This is a distinctive trait of Romanticism and it is 
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one that truly works against the currents of much linguistic and literary study as 
it was conducted during the 20th century.  
Whether one considers the Russian Formalists, the American New Critics, 
or the proponents of Structuralism, all understood close attention to language 
and its textualization to preclude temporal or historical considerations. This a-
historical presumption strikes at the very heart of Romantic philosophy’s 
propositional quartet: in effect, it disconnects the first proposition (truth belongs 
to language) from the fourth (to humankind belong both the familiar and the 
alien) by omitting the middle terms (language belongs to history and history 
belongs to humankind). Formalists, New Critics, and Structuralists all agreed 
that truth, to whatever extent it makes sense to speak of it, is something that 
subsists in language; they also tended to affirm that the familiar and the strange 
are both significant aspects of literate and linguistic experience. But the passage 
of time was deemed irrelevant to their linguistic investigations. The Structuralists 
found historical reflection so uncongenial that they developed a jaundiced 
opinion of human participation in linguistic affairs. The notion that someone (an 
historical human figure) might be identified as the “author” of a given text came 
under severe criticism until writers (I will not be so indelicate as to refer to them 
as “authors”) like Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault pronounced such figures 
“dead.” Their elaboration of this theme has been understood by many as a mortal 
blow to the 19th century Romantic obsession with authorial personality and 
voice.202   
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And, in many ways, it was. Romantic veneration of the author as demi-god 
or hero has had to give way to more modest and nuanced appreciations of literate 
and linguistic “authority.” Indeed, Romantic thinking has had to adjust itself to a 
host of other 20th century innovations in the way that language and literature are 
conceived. Those adjustments have been slowly surfacing as individual thinkers 
absorb the impact of new theory (recall that, as I noted at the close of the 
previous chapter, the field of contemporary literary criticism came into its own as 
an independent, transnational, specialized discipline of intellectual inquiry only 
in the latter half of the 20th century).203 There have been important figures on the 
periphery of these developments (like Taha Husayn and Amin al-Khuli) who were 
not in a position to fully assess their nature and extent.  
As with any newly established field, questions as to precisely what this 
specialized discipline of intellectual inquiry entails became hot topics of debate—
both within the field and without. The controversy over literary criticism’s 
“proper” subject reflects, in part, the aggressive expansion by literary critics into 
areas of inquiry that would have been considered completely outside their scope 
less than a century ago. The late 20th century transgression of those bounds was 
made possible by the theory-driven “discovery” that there is no “literature” in the 
sense of a “stable, well-definable entity” that one might study in the same way 
that an entomologist studies insects.204 The British critic Terry Eagleton argues 
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that “anything can be literature, and anything which is regarded as unalterably 
and unquestionably literature—Shakespeare, for example—can cease to be 
literature.”205  This is because literature is not constituted by words on a page; 
rather, what constitutes literature are “historically-variable value-judgments” 
which bear a “close relation to social ideologies.” These value-judgments “refer in 
the end not simply to private taste, but to assumptions by which certain social 
groups exercise and maintain power over others.”206   
Eagleton’s thesis has important ramifications for our study, for it 
problematizes the Muslim Traditionalist argument that the application of 
modern literary critical tools and techniques to the Qur’anic corpus reduces the 
sacred text to “mere literature.”207 If, as Eagleton asserts, “there is no ‘essence’ of 
literature whatsoever,” then there is nothing that the application of such tools 
and techniques can possibly reduce the Qur’an to.208 This supports the contention 
of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd that the literary historian “…does not by any means 
intend to damage the Qur’an or even to question its divine and holy nature.” 
Moreover, it puts teeth into his associated claim that “religious texts, though 
divine and revealed by God, are historically determined and culturally 
constructed.”209 Eagleton has sought to disclose the ideologically-charged nature 
                                                                                                                                                       
  
205 Ibid. 
 
206 Ibid, p. 14. 
 
207 See Mustansir Mir, “The Qur’an as Literature,” Religion & Literature 20.1 (1988), pp. 49-64.  
 
208 Eagleton, Literary Theory, p. 8. See also Nasr Abu Zayd, “The Dilemma of the Literary 
Approach to the Qur’an,” Alif 23, 2003, pp. 8-47. 
   
209 Abu Zayd, “Dilemma,” pp. 34-35. 
  
 102 
of those very historical determinations and cultural constructions. Indeed, 
following his argument, one may assign responsibility for the “reduction” of the 
Qur’an to “mere literature” to the parties who accuse others of doing so—for the 
literary “reduction” of the Qur’an, to whatever extent it may occur, is produced by 
virtue of the accusation itself and not the application of analytical tools and 
techniques to Qur’anic discourse.  
Rather than reduce the Qur’an to a “literary essence,” Romantic readers of 
the sacred text (like Abu Zayd) have translated a post-Medieval consciousness of 
time into a sense of history that opens the past to re-description. The re-
description of the past of a given text issues in fresh readings of that text; as 
Eagleton has provocatively phrased this phenomenon: “…there is no reading of a 
work which is not also a ‘re-writing.’”210 Islamic traditions, developed in the 
medieval period, “authored” a version of the Qur’an that bore a relation to the 
past significantly different from the version “authored” by the heirs to the 
Romantics. The former project is well established in Sunni traditionalism and 
Shi’ism; the latter, still under way, is in the process of producing the Qur’an of 
Romantic re-description. 
Eagleton’s intervention is important for yet another reason: it supports the 
Romantic thesis that, where one encounters the “smoke” of language, there one 
can expect to find the “fire” of the human subject. Granted, Eagleton’s human 
subjects are engaged in power struggles through their privileging of certain texts 
over others; therefore, they do not look much like what one expects to find where 
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the Romantic imagination is involved. Be that as it may, they are active and 
interested figures, capable of fogging a mirror—unlike Barthes’s dead author. 
In the wake of Barthes and others, Poststructuralists have had to 
“resuscitate” human agency, interest, intentionality, and time. It is important to 
stress, however, that their interventions ought not to be mistaken for wholesale 
capitulations to Romantic values. They have been more like an offer of amnesty 
to those unreconstructed Romantics who managed to survive the ideological 
purges of the 20th century with their longing for worldly connection still intact. 
That longing restores the middle terms of the Romantic schema (language and 
history) connecting truth to humankind (both familiar and alien) and calls to 
mind the Kierkegaardian mantra “truth is subjectivity.”211  But what sort of 
subjectivity might this be? Surely not one that would accept, without 
modification, Kierkegaard’s uncompromising stress upon the individual: for, 
despite Romanticism’s persistent identification with individualism and 
particularity, the Romantic desire to make contact beyond the self has been 
equally persistent. Restoring the linguistic and historical connections between 
truth and humankind encourages, therefore, a new invocation of truth as inter-
subjectivity. And, given the critical communications role that Romantics accord 
to language and the passage of time, inter-subjectivity is often best understood as 
a function of intertextuality. Truth as inter-subjectivity mediated by 
intertextuality begins to emerge within the theoretical apparatus of the Egyptian 
School in the recent work of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd. 
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Abu Zayd’s Contributions 
In reviewing the scholarly activities of the Egyptian Renaissance critics, we 
witnessed a practice of reading that focuses upon text-in-context. Their work has 
prepared the ground for Nasr Abu Zayd’s recent studies of the ways of language-
in-history. I characterize these critical practices as “transgressive reading”—
transgressive in the sense that they do violence, not to the materials under 
scrutiny but, rather, to what Richard Rorty would term the “entrenched 
vocabularies” by which sectarian elites have construed those materials. As we 
have noted: whatever their virtues, such vocabularies privilege theological 
verticality at the expense of the horizon of historicity—a “defect” one may 
appreciate only in retrospect—i.e., from the vantage point of a post-Medieval 
sense of time (as found among the Romantics). 212   
Building upon the work of his Egyptian predecessors and also mindful of 
trends in the newly transnational field of literary criticism, Nasr Abu Zayd has 
had to keep pace with the accelerated movement of cultural time. Heeding the 
Red Queen’s advice to Alice in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass (“Now, 
here you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If you 
want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!”),213 Abu 
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Zayd has embraced a hermeneutical protocol “whereby the study of language, 
literature, and cultural forms becomes irrevocably obligated to attend to the 
semiotic operations involved in the production of meanings”—meanings that can 
no longer be assumed to be natural” or “substantial” or “inevitable” but 
historically constituted.214 In addition, Abu Zayd appears to accept the findings of 
those scholars who have determined, along with the Romantic critic M. H. 
Abrams, that “...the communicative efficacy of language rests on no other or 
better ground than that both writers and readers tacitly accept and apply the 
regularities and limits of an inherited social and linguistic contract.”215 In his 
most recent publications, Abu Zayd has placed ever greater stress upon the 
human relationships (evoked here by Abrams’ contractual metaphor) which 
constitute texts. The result is an anti-essentialism whereby Qur’anic textuality is 
re-configured as a theatre of discursivity. This is a fairly radical turn on Abu 
Zayd’s part and one that merits careful consideration.  
Abu Zayd’s “Discursive Turn” 
In the final pages of Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical 
Analysis, Abu Zayd traces the evolution of his thinking since the publication of 
his book Mafhum al-Nass (The Concept of the Text) in 1990.216  His focus in the 
latter work had been, as the title suggests, on understanding what it means to 
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regard the Qur’an as a “text.” He addressed this question by reviewing “the 
historical and linguistic dimensions of the Qur’an” through “critical re-readings” 
of the classical sciences of exegesis (‘ulum al-Qur’an). In a manner reminiscent of 
the controversial work of Taha Husayn, Abu Zayd teased out of the language of 
the canonical codex (mushaf) encoded elements of the pre-Islamic Arab culture. 
He argued that while no one can or should ignore the fact that the Qur’an was the 
“producer of a new culture,” that new culture was by no means discontinuous 
with the culture that had preceded the arrival of the sacred text in time. He 
concluded that an historical construction of the context of the Revelation would 
serve as a means of controlling its ideological appropriation at the hands of its 
interpreters—Modern and pre-Modern.217  
In 2000, Abu Zayd “attempted an elaboration” of his earlier re-reading 
(re-“authoring”) of the ‘ulum al-Qur’an with the aid of a varied complement of 
interpretive and analytical methods (including semantics, semiotics, historical 
criticism and hermeneutics). This display of critical pluralism and virtuosity 
yielded a Qur’an located at the intersection of the “vertical” and “horizontal” axes 
discussed in the previous chapter. The sacred text emerged from this approach as 
“a space of Divine and Human communication”—creating a conceptual opening 
by means of which he began to re-think the notion of the Qur’an as  
“text.” 218 
Abu Zayd argues that, even if one uncritically accepts the information 
provided by the Classical Muslim sources about the revelation of the Qur’an, it is 
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difficult to escape the sense that the mushaf represents a redaction of surviving 
inscriptions that memorialize what was an interactive process involving, at 
minimum, God, the Prophet, and his historical context (including his audience). 
This process unfolded over the course of Muhammad’s prophetic career. Close 
study of the “specific language structure” found in the canonical codex confirms 
this sense. Unfortunately, Abu Zayd contends, both Traditionalist and Modernist 
interpreters of the Qur’an read and argue over the Revelation with little 
appreciation for the “text” as itself the “outcome of dialogue, debate, argument, 
acceptance and rejection, both with pre-Islamic norms, practices, and culture, 
and with its own previous assessments, presuppositions and assertions.”219 He 
attributes this hermeneutical myopia to the deference Muslims routinely give to 
the “vertical” dimension of the interpretive equation over the “horizontal.” Abu 
Zayd defines the latter as “the dimension that is embedded in the structure of the 
Qur’an and which was manifest during the actual process of communication. 
Realization of this horizontal dimension is only feasible if we shift our conceptual 
framework from the Qur’an as ‘text’ to the Qur’an as ‘discourse.’”220 
This discursive turn bears a family resemblance to Michel Foucault’s call 
to suspend the “ready-made syntheses” and “unities of discourse” that arbitrarily 
privilege continuity over discontinuity and rupture.221  For Foucault, such unities 
create illusory essences (like “literature”) which (as we have seen Eagleton argue 
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in a Foucaultian vein) disguise the “historically-variable value-judgments” tied to 
“assumptions by which certain social groups exercise and maintain power over 
others.”222 Indeed, Abu Zayd’s notion of “text” appears to fall into the category of 
those unities that, for Foucault, “must be suspended above all” because they 
“emerge in the most immediate way: those of the book and the oeuvre.”223 
Foucault argued that, despite appearances, “the frontiers of a book are 
never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its 
internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of 
references to other books, other texts, other sentences: it is a node within a 
network.”224 Writing in France in the early 1970’s, Foucault drew upon the 
scientized vocabulary of Structuralism in order to articulate a project that 
reflected his desire to move beyond the arbitrary boundaries which the material 
structures of text or codex impose upon the ways of language. But by 
incorporating the language of Structuralism, he fell prey to the familiar 
Structuralist tendency to overlook “certain crucial connotations of words which 
one could recognize only by moving outside the text itself to the cultural and 
social codes on which it draws.” He therefore tended to “seize the text 
synchronically, as an object in space rather than a movement in time”—a misstep 
that Abu Zayd’s historicism avoids.225 As we have observed, movement beyond 
the confines of the text in search of “crucial connotations” has been a consistent 
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critical value within the Egyptian School since at least Taha Husayn. Abu Zayd’s 
project attempts to assure the continuing relevance of this value to his own 
hermeneutical practice. 
Kindred Developments 
Having rightly remarked these technical differences in approach, we ought 
not to permit them to obscure the motivating gesture that they share: a desire to 
break the spell of the solitary, “vertically” activated text or codex—to move 
outside the textual artifact as tradition has delivered it to us—in order to make 
connections with other voices from the “heritage.” Those voices include rhetorical 
personae and possibilities that, through encoding, remain present to the history 
of the inscribed artifact even if absent from its discursive surface.226  
The Romantic desire to make these connections can find fulfillment by 
moving outside the text which “holds us captive.”227 That said, it also bears 
remarking that the only way out of such captivity is through the text before us. 
This may be accomplished by means of a process that the Romantic philosopher, 
Stanley Cavell, calls “deep reading”: 
Words come to us from a distance; they were there before we 
were; we are born into them. Meaning them is accepting that fact 
of their condition. To discover what is being said to us, as to 
discover what we are saying, is to discover the precise location 
from which it is said; to understand why it is said from just there, 
and at that time…To read [a] text accurately is to assess its 
computations, to check its sentences against our convictions, to 
prove the derivation of its words. Since every mark counts, the 
task is to arrive in turn at each of them, as at conclusions. A deep 
reading is not one in which you sink away from the surface of the 
words. Words already engulf us. It is one in which you depart 
from a given word as from a point of origin; you go deep as into 
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woods. Understanding is a matter of orientation, of bearings, of 
the ability to keep to a course and to move in natural paths from 
any point to any other. The depths of the book are nothing apart 
from its surfaces. Figurations of language can be thought of as 
ways of reflecting the surfaces and depths of a word onto one 
another.228                  
 
As a Romantic, Cavell feels deeply the troubling sense that, as he puts it, “words 
come to us from a distance.” In order to find his way about a text, Cavell must 
forge connections not only with the text itself but with the subjectivities it 
implies. This is because something “is being said to us” and we, too, are 
“speaking.” Presumably, “we” are aware of the location from which we speak—
though this is not clear—because, in order “to discover what is being said to us, as 
to discover what we [ourselves] are saying, is to discover the precise location 
from which” something has been, or is being, said. It is critical that we come to 
some understanding as to “why it is said from just there, and at that time,” 
because context (spatial and temporal) plays a key role in the meaning-making 
process. Consequently, the transgressive impulse towards exodus or hijra from 
the constrictions of exclusivist theological verticality and into the open Medina of 
horizontal connection ought never to blind us to our own point of departure. All 
leave-taking commences with the expectation of an eventual return to 
circumambulate the ka’aba of the canonical codex. Invoking discursiveness or an 
oral substrate to a written text does not wave a magic wand over that text causing 
it to dissolve into thin air. The difficulties of the textus receptus always remain. 
There is a powerful sense in which its virtual “unbundling” into historically 
identifiable conversations (dialogue, debate, argument) changes nothing. After 
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hermeneutical deep reading, the Qur’an is still the Qur’an—only moreso. But it is 
that “moreso” that makes all the difference.  
The path of modern Qur’anic hermeneutics traced out by Nasr Abu Zayd 
and the Egyptian School is unquestionably a road less traveled, but it is not by 
any means a road un-traveled. The desire to make connections through language 
may be a Romantic one but, as we have seen, the un- (perhaps even anti-) 
Romantic Foucault felt compelled to speak of a book as “a node within a 
network.” Foucault’s notion that we are always already immersed in connections 
resonates with Cavell’s observation that “words already engulf us.” Abu Zayd’s 
position is quite similar: he argues that, before language can refer to the world, 
the referent must be “conceived, conceptualized, and then symbolized.” The 
result is that the referent of most locutions is yet another locution: linguistic signs 
refer to other linguistic signs in a never ending game of chase. 229 For these 
thinkers the problem with linguistic connectivity is not how to find it; the 
problem is how to keep from drowning in it. Initially, Foucault took the position 
that drowning may not be, in the end, such a bad fate—and he embraced the 
Structuralist decision to do away with the “author.”230 He found, however, that on 
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this view (the Saussurean model of language) literature became a closed 
system.231 Inter-connectivity was affirmed, but only intra-systemically. Looking 
back on the Structuralist movement, Foucault mused,  
… but it seems to me that this was still only a stage. For, by 
keeping analysis at this level, one runs the risk of not unraveling 
the totality of sacralizations of which literature has been the 
object. On the contrary, one runs the risk of sacralizing even 
more.232  
 
The process Foucault terms “sacralization” corresponds in interesting ways to 
Abu Zayd’s notion of “verticality.” Proclaiming the “death of the author” produces 
an effect in the field of secular literature that parallels the effect created in the 
field of sacred literature when the applicability of the “horizontal” dimension in 
exegesis is either severely restricted or denied: each move severs an important 
link between its respective “literature” and the world.233  
The point I wish to emphasize here is that the Romantic desire to establish 
connections through the medium of language is predicated upon the common-
place that language is referential.234 Stated differently, all language is semiotic or 
“sign” language—i.e., it contains “signage” that points or refers to something else. 
It is upon this very aspect of language that many Romantics pin their hopes for 
making connections with the world. The difficulty with this solution is that the 
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nature of linguistic reference is necessarily indirect; its relationship to the world 
is oblique. Abu Zayd illustrates this point with the Arabic word “‘anqa’ 
(comparable with the English ‘phoenix’).” This word has meaning without 
referring to any existing thing except language.235 His insight is reminiscent of 
Wittgenstein’s remark that “When we say: ‘Every word in language signifies 
something’ we have so far said nothing whatever…”236 Wittgenstein (who shows 
himself Cavell’s strong precursor) then directs his interlocutor to dig deep into 
the “language game” (Sprachspiel) she happens to be playing.237  
Such exercises never take us completely outside of language to the world 
beyond; instead, they permit us to clarify the use of our words by means of more 
words. According to Wittgenstein, however, there is an experience that grows out 
of this very exercise: a dawning impression that our efforts at disambiguation of 
the signified world show us our own embeddedness in something beyond 
ourselves.238 Paradoxically, it would seem, intra-linguistic reference is itself a 
pointing to something beyond: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world… That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the 
language (the language which I understand) mean the limits of my world.”239  Our 
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Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (2000), pp. 55-56. 
   
239 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by C. K. Ogden, London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul (1922), pp. 149-151.   
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“sign” language points out to us its own limitation and implies, through this 
limitation, that there may be something beyond itself. Therefore, by attending to 
the ways of language in history one may arrive at a peculiar feeling of the world—
a feeling, according to Wittgenstein, that escapes words: “…The feeling of the 
world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling…There is indeed the 
inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.”240  
It is difficult to understand exactly what Wittgenstein intended by his use 
of the phrase “the mystical”—especially since he discouraged its direct 
investigation.241 I would suggest that, by means of this instance of apophasis, he 
was attempting to resolve his own Romantic desire to connect with the world. 
This resolution took the form of a species of linguistic practice. Wittgenstein 
would later write that “…To understand a sentence means to understand a 
language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.”242 The 
question that such a conclusion leaves unanswered, however, is precisely what 
kind of linguistic practice will do? Attending to the Wittgensteinian roots of 
Cavell’s metaphor of the wood, I suggest one that discriminates between a 
normative approach to the ways of language in history (i.e., grammar) and a 
descriptive one—privileging the latter whenever and wherever possible. The path 
of Rortian Romantic re-description is cut by means of such Wittgensteinian 
linguistic description.   
                                                   
240 Ibid, p. 187. 
 
241 “Whereof one cannot speak [i.e., the inexpressible], thereof one must be silent.” Ibid, p. 189. 
 
242 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 81 (remark 199). 
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Perhaps the final destination of our wanderings with the Austrian 
philosopher is the conviction that knowledge or understanding is best 
appreciated as a kind of “know-how” that involves one’s facility with words. What 
is more, one’s “doings” in this regard occur during the ordinary course of 
everyday linguistic business. Though the study of hermeneutics may be an 
occupation for a scholarly few, its practice is inevitable and, indeed, unavoidable 
in some form for all. This is because (as Wittgenstein would say) the “language 
games” we play are inextricably inter-related with the “forms of life” 
(Lebensform) we inhabit.243 Though the form of the linguistic signage we employ 
involves intra-linguistic reference, its effect is world-disclosing. Therefore, by 
mastering the techniques of linguistic interconnectivity, we show the ways of 
language in history.244 In the next section, I will examine these ways descriptively. 
Describing the Ways of Language  
 The empirical fact of intra-linguistic reference is partly responsible for the 
vogue that Structuralism enjoyed across the humanistic disciplines from the late 
1960’s into the early 1980’s. As we have seen, however, this same empirical fact 
threatens to undermine the promise of connecting with the world beyond 
language by means of language—and it takes an extraordinary amount of effort, 
                                                   
243 Ibid, p. 8 (remark 19). 
 
244 There is an analogue, if not a deep affinity, between the Romantic preoccupation with the ways 
of language in time and the speculative insights it produces, on the one hand, and Shihab al-Din 
Yahya ibn Habash ibn Amirak al-Suhrawardi’s procedure in the Hikmat al-Ishraq, on the other. 
Stanley Cavell’s insistence that “figurations of language can be thought of as ways of reflecting the 
surfaces and depths of a word onto one another” (supra., p. 111) offers a suggestive link. If one 
wishes to establish a classical Muslim precursor for the procedural aspects of modern Qur’anic 
hermeneutics, Suhrawardi may prove to be the “hidden imam” (so to speak). See Suhrawardi, 
Yahya ibn Habash, The Philosophy of Illumination: A New Critical Edition of the text of Hikmat 
al-ishraq, edited with an English translation by John Walbridge and Hossein Ziai, Provo, UT: 
Brigham Young University Press, 1999.         
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culminating (for Wittgenstein at least) in a “mystical” feeling, to keep that 
promise alive. Nevertheless, heirs of the Romantics like Nasr Abu Zayd make the 
study of linguistic semiosis a standard part of the protocol for hermeneutics. In 
Wittgensteinian fashion, they choose to emphasize the semiotic openness of 
language and practice a version of Romantic Rortian pragmatism rather than 
allow metaphysical questions of solipsism to impede their progress.245  
Yet, even if one accepts Wittgenstein’s solution to the problem of the 
relationship between words and world (or simply “brackets” it), one is not yet out 
of the woods—a comforting thought to Cavell. As we move forward into the 
linguistic thicket, our footing is never free from slippage. A crucial implication of 
the semiotic “openness” of language is that it shifts the burden of meaning-
making from the “sender” of a given communication and distributes it across the 
various parties to the communicative transaction. I have already mentioned one 
consequence of this shift: the weakening (if not severance) of the linguistic ties 
that bind the sender of a communication to the receiver.  
For surviving Romantics—as for post-Structuralist thinking generally—the 
author or sender of a communication is forced to endure the indignity of losing 
control over the process of meaning-making and to witness that control change 
hands. Now the “receiver” of a given communication, and the context in which 
the communication takes place, are disproportionately semantically empowered 
relative to the sender’s previously imputed level of control. The sender is like a 
monarch who, after a revolution, has had to take her place among other ordinary 
                                                   
245 As one of Rorty’s strong precursors, Wittgenstein was a Romantic Rortian Pragmatist avant la 
lettre.  
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citizens in a republic; her crown has been removed, but unlike many of her non-
metaphorical counterparts, her neck has been spared.  
Starting in the early 1960’s—a few years ahead of the Structuralist curve—
the Italian semiotician Umberto Eco began to develop a model of an “egalitarian” 
semiotics to re-describe the ways of language in history. He appreciated the shift 
of semantic empowerment implicit in the Structuralists’ paradigm but, unlike 
them, saw no need to engage in authorial regicide. The ultimate result of his 
ruminations upon the subject was A Theory of Semiotics; but prior to the 
publication of that book, Eco developed a “poetics of the open work” in which he 
set out the terms and conditions under which meaning is made.246 Here we can 
begin to see the emerging outlines of the role of sender (often the author) of a 
communication and that of its receiver(s)-in-context that will survive the 
Structuralist moment in literary theory:  
 
…the author presents a finished product with the intention that 
this particular composition should be appreciated and received 
in the same form as he devised it. As he reacts to the play of 
stimuli and his own response to their patterning, the individual 
addressee is bound to supply his own existential credentials, the 
sense conditioning which is peculiarly his own, a defined culture, 
a set of tastes, personal inclinations, and prejudices. Thus, his 
comprehension of the original artifact is always modified by his 
particular and individual perspective...These give it a wealth of 
different resonances and echoes without impairing its original 
essence…[The artifact], therefore, is a complete and closed form 
in its uniqueness as a balanced organic whole, while at the same 
time constituting an open product on account of its susceptibility 
to countless different interpretations which do not impinge on its 
unadulterable specificity. Hence every reception of [an artifact] is 
both an interpretation and a performance of it, because in every 
reception the work takes on a fresh perspective for itself.247  
   
                                                   
246 Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976. 
   
247 Umberto Eco, The Open Work, translated by Anna Cancogni, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press (1989), p. 3.  
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At first blush, Eco’s author appears to wear the same imperious expression as the 
demiurge of 19th century Romantic theory—or the Allah of verticalist Islamic 
theology. Upon closer inspection, however, his account is more nuanced than 
either of those alternatives. In effect, Eco attempts to broker a creative 
compromise that permits the material communicated an integrity attested by the 
stamp of authorial design while, at the same moment, acknowledging the 
distribution of the burden of meaning-making to addressee(s)-in-context. 
Implying that this shift is an intended part of the design, Eco’s “author” or sender 
participates in her own disempowerment for the sake of the receiver(s): 
…the author offers the interpreter, the performer, the addressee 
a work to be completed. He does not know the exact fashion in 
which his work will be concluded, but he is aware that once 
completed the work in question will still be his own. It will not be 
a different work, and, at the end of the interpretive dialogue, a 
form which is his form will have been organized, even though it 
may have been assembled by an outside party in a particular way 
that he could not have foreseen. The author is the one who 
proposed a number of possibilities which had already been 
rationally organized, oriented, and endowed with specifications 
for proper development.248 
        
From the Romantic perspective, Eco’s move is felicitous: for if, included within 
the configuring intentions of the artifact-as-sent, there reposes a desire to see 
that artifact “completed” through interpretation, then Abu Zayd’s insistence upon 
the horizontal dimension of sacred texts is no longer optional but prescribed—by 
the author/sender of the interpreted text itself. In other words, the self-
sufficiency of theological verticality (or Structuralist langue) is made illusory by 
                                                   
248 Ibid, p. 19. Any reader familiar with the work of the Russian critic Mikhail Bakhtin cannot help 
but wonder if this passage reflects a familiarity on Eco’s part with Bakhtin’s notion of 
“unfinalizability.” See Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a 
Prosaics, Stanford: Stanford University Press (1990), pp. 36-49.   
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authorial intent.249 This would also appear to render Wittgenstein’s linguistic 
mysticism redundant—or simply replace it by a different form of mysticism: one 
in which the competent receiver is an adept, preternaturally endowed with an 
ability to divine the mind of the author/sender from marks on a page.250 
Interestingly, Eco does not appear to rely upon such mysteries. He opts instead 
for an Einsteinian “field of relations”: 
 
The possibilities which the work’s openness makes available 
always work within a given field of relations. As in the 
Einsteinian universe…we may well deny that there is [within the 
artifact-as-sent] a single prescribed point of view. But this does 
not mean complete chaos in its internal relations. What it does 
imply is an organizing rule which governs these relations. 
Therefore, to sum up, we can say that the [artifact] is the 
possibility of numerous different personal interventions, but it is 
not an amorphous invitation to indiscriminate participation. The 
invitation offers the [receiver] the opportunity for an oriented 
insertion into something which always remains the world 
intended by the author.251   
 
     
Eco here hedges on the degree of specificity with which the reader may determine 
authorial intent—not the proposition that authors possess intentions. Indeed, it 
would seem that, for Eco, authorial intent is embodied in a given text’s historical 
composition. 252  Every text is a linguistic artifact. Its facticity—its severe 
                                                   
249 Little wonder, then, that the Structuralists were anxious to announce the author’s demise. 
 
250 Such a “mystical turn” evokes Schleiermacher, the Protestant-Romantic “father” of modern 
hermeneutical thought. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, edited by 
Andrew Bowie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
     
251 Umberto Eco, The Open Work, p. 19. In an intriguing gesture that he does not develop in this 
essay, Eco suggests that the “god” of Einsteinian theory is the “Divinity of Spinoza.” Ibid, pp. 18-
19.    
  
252 A notion that bears a striking resemblance to the medieval rhetorician ‘Abd al-Qahir al-
Jurjani’s theory of nazm. On al-Jurjani, a great favorite of Abu Zayd’s, see Kamal Abu Deeb, Al-
Jurjani’s Theory of Poetic Imagery,Warminster, UK: Aris & Phillips, Ltd. 1979; Margaret Larkin, 
The Theology of Meaning: ‘Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani’s Theory of Discourse, New Haven, Conn: 
American Oriental Society, 1995. 
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particularities—subsist as a nexus of internal constraints (including the 
grammatical, idiomatic, and the impositions of authorial intent). These 
constraints act in concert as a self-governing “organizing rule” and require 
accounting for in the process of interpretation. But beyond that, the text stands as 
an open invitation for Cavellian “orientations”—including transgressive readings 
in the Romantic grain. 
Elite Anxiety Over Custodial Control 
The diminution of the sender’s power becomes a matter of heightened 
interest when, as in the case of Scripture, the sender is affirmed to be God.253 
Consequently, elites in every Scripturalist tradition suffer bouts of dyspepsia 
(and, occasionally, apoplexy) over what they generally perceive to be a threat to 
their monopoly over authorized meaning-making when it comes to the texts they 
hold sacred.254  
There is a fascinating anecdote in the Babylonian Talmud that reflects this 
form of anxiety. The Sages are arguing over a point of halakha when a Voice from 
Heaven interrupts to side with Rabbi Eliezer. This act of Divine intervention fails 
to impress the other Rabbis. Their reason is that the Torah was already given at 
                                                   
253 For the purposes of this discussion, I do not think that it matters whether one believes that the 
“sender” of the Qur’an is God, the Prophet Muhammad, or some person or persons as yet 
unknown to historical investigation. Even so, I note for the record that Eco’s “sender” is 
presumably not Divine. It is perhaps curious that his human sender may strike some readers as 
retaining more semantic power than God (see, e.g., Eco, Open Work, p. 19). I do not read it that 
way, but I am also at a loss as to how one would go about measuring any detectable difference. A 
Divine sender such as the God of traditional Muslim theology is presumed to know in advance the 
value of the cards held by everyone at the table. This raises questions of free will which I am not 
competent to address. On the God of traditional Muslim theology, see Richard J. McCarthy, S. J. 
The Theology of Al-Ash ‘ari, Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1953; Harry A. Wolfson, The 
Philosophy of the Kalam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976; Josef van Ess, The 
Flowering of Muslim Theology, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
  
254 Confirming Eagleton’s assertion that “literature” is constituted by value judgments that 
underwrite claims to power.    
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Sinai and there is therefore no need to heed the Heavenly Voice. It is later 
reported that the “Holy One, blessed be He” reacted to the Rabbis response with 
joyous laughter, saying, “‘My sons have defeated Me!’”255 A similar acceptance of 
the shifting of the hermeneutic burden in the case of Scripture is found in the 
Muslim tradition that attributes to the Caliph ‘Ali the statement that “the Qur’an 
is between the covers of the book and does not speak, it is humans that make it 
speak.”256 While acknowledging the apparent celebration of this shift (in the 
Talmudic story) and the matter-of-fact acceptance of it (in the cited Muslim 
tradition), we ought not to lose sight of the fact that the subtext of the Talmudic 
tale is a confirmation of the investment of hermeneutical power in a select few 
(the Rabbis); the context of the Muslim tradition suggests that the Caliph-Imam 
was contesting an interpretation of the Qur’an put forward by others whom he 
did not consider to be qualified to do so.   
What is particularly revealing about these anecdotes is the way in which 
the elites they feature attempt to manage the semiotic openness of language—
rather than try to deny that it exists. Since both of these stories originate from the 
formative period of their respective traditions, it is likely that the position of 
those emerging elites was not so secure that they could hope to enjoy success by 
stonewalling on this particular issue. This does not appear to be the case today in 
either tradition. For his part, Nasr Abu Zayd is critical of such elite management 
                                                   
255 My re-telling is abbreviated from Richard B. Hays’ re-telling in Hays, Echoes of Scripture in 
the Letters of Paul, New Haven: Yale University Press (1989), pp. 2-3. 
 
256 Cited in Ebrahim Moosa, “The Politics and Poetics of Law after Empire: Reading Women’s 
Rights in the Contestations of Law,” UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 1 (2001-
2002), p. 45 and Nasr Abu Zayd, Re-Thinking the Qur’an: Towards a Humanistic Hermeneutics, 
Utrecht: Humanistics University Press (2004), pp. 12-13. 
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of available meanings where the Qur’an is concerned: he wants to free “religious 
thought from power manipulation, whether political, social, or religious”; 
furthermore, he desires to “empower the community of believers to formulate 
‘meaning’” on their own. Echoing Eco, he describes this project as the 
construction of a “democratic and open hermeneutics.”257   
To summarize: our description of the ways of language in history 
coordinates four cardinal points: (1) the burden of making sense of any text shifts 
from the “sender” to receivers-in-context, (2) that shift represents a unique, 
semantic empowerment of those receivers, (3) among those receivers-in-context 
are sectarian elites who wish to monopolize this power for themselves, and (4) 
elites are therefore threatened by the relatively “open” nature of the described 
semantic shift. Consequently, the path of modern hermeneutics traced out by 
Abu Zayd and others is a road less traveled on account of elite interventions in 
the process of meaning-making. Ironically, those very interventions prove that it 
is not a road un-traveled; for if sectarian elites themselves knew nothing of this 
road, they would not attempt to control the course of its traffic. 
Towards a General Theory of Open Hermeneutics 
The preceding pages have brought us to a place where we may gather 
together what I hope will prove in time to be the rudiments of a General Theory 
of open hermeneutics. As applied to the Qur’an, this theory is built upon the 
transgressive readings pioneered by the Egyptian Renaissance School in the early 
20th century and continues to be developed by Nasr Abu Zayd at the present time. 
Those readings represent a continuation of Romantic philosophy which has not 
                                                   
257 Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought, p. 99.  
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only survived its many obituaries but has become more focused and subtle as it 
has transcended the parochialism of its European provenance. As practiced by 
Abu Zayd, the manhaj of this theory is pluralistic, but it invariably involves an 
acute sensitivity to semiotic referentiality, underscoring the premium Romantic 
thinking places upon making connections through language.  
Unlike its Structuralist rival, Romantic connectivity embraces Vico’s post-
Medieval insight that human beings possess a unique relationship to history (i.e., 
privileged access to it) because they are its authors. As a result, the Romantic 
desire to champion inter-connectivity is not in any way limited to synchronic 
analyses of textual artifacts—indeed, diachronic analysis and exploration are 
considered de rigueur. Moreover, the transgressive nature of open hermeneutics 
does no violence to the sacred texts it studies but only to the elite management of 
available meanings to be made from those texts. Indeed, insofar as its manhaj is 
a species of what the American Romantic philosopher Stanley Cavell terms “deep 
reading,” the virtual unbundling of sacred texts into historically identifiable 
conversations and echoes changes nothing.  
As with any form of literary criticism, transgressive readings in the 
Romantic grain are re-writings, but re-writings that stake no claim to either legal 
or theological authority. They represent instead a means of inquiring into the 
ways of language in history and are “democratic” in the sense that they may be 
practiced competently by any individual who has attained a degree of proficiency 
in their philosophy and technique. Muslim jurists or theologians may, of course, 
find compelling reasons to engage the results of such re-writings but, by the same 
token, they may also find compelling reasons to ignore them. Since engaging the 
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results of Romantic re-writings may entail an admission of semantic openness in 
sacred texts, and semantic openness entails a concomitant loss of custodial 
control, I anticipate that sectarian elites will find the reasons to ignore the results 
of Qur’anic hermeneutics far more attractive than the reasons to engage them.258   
It is with modest expectations, then, that the practitioner of modern 
Qur’anic hermeneutics employs the tools and techniques of her trade, “assessing 
the computations” of the sacred text, “checking its sentences against her 
convictions,” “departing from a given word as from a point of origin, going deep 
as into woods,” attempting “to move in natural paths from any point to any 
other.” The most “natural” pathways in this regard are those cut by the ways of 
language in time—language being a material of human origin. This means, of 
course, attending to the semiotic properties of language; but it also means 
moving beyond the broad sweep of semiotic analysis to referentiality on a more 
intensive scale. 259  
Here we may arrive at a clearer understanding of what Cavell terms 
“assessing the computations” of the text, for here we encounter a logical—or, to 
be more precise, geometrical—structure of meaning-making that literary 
                                                   
258 See also Abu Zayd, Reformation of Islamic Thought, pp. 96-97; Lenn E. Goodman, Islamic 
Humanism, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2003), p. 7. 
 
259 One could argue that the Qur’anic term for a “verse” of the Revelation, ayah, implies a theory 
of semiotics. Bruce Lawrence has recently summarized this point as follows: “… the Arabic word 
for the smallest unit of Qur’anic text means ‘verse’, but ‘verse’ also means ‘sign’ or ‘miracle’. As 
tangible signs, Qur’anic verses are expressive of an inexhaustible truth. They signify meaning 
layered within meaning, light upon light, miracle after miracle.” Lawrence concludes that the 
Qur’an may be understood as “A Book of Signs.” Bruce Lawrence, The Qur’an: A Biography, New 
York: Atlantic Monthly Press (2006), p. 8. 
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investigation discloses.260 The remarked shift of the burden of meaning-making 
on the linguistic level from the “sender” to receivers-in-context establishes a 
semantic pattern that iterates in the functioning of many literary devices, 
including citation, allusion, and echo. We will examine the functioning of these 
devices in the Qur’anic text at some length; the point I wish to make at the 
moment, however, is that the presence of these devices in communicative 
transactions ought not to be regarded as something exceptional. Rather, their 
presence should be expected. They are concrete examples of the ways of language 
in history and are as ubiquitous as they are inevitable. They represent an 
intertextual way in which meaning is transmitted and changes through time.   
The foregoing description of the ways of language in history has found 
programmatic implementation in the work of the literary critic Henry Louis 
Gates, Jr. For Gates, intertextuality is “a process of repetition and revision, by 
definition.”261 Such an assertion corresponds with Eagleton’s observation that 
every reading is a re-writing. Gates insists that a critic must consider how every 
re-writing changes something about the writing that is re-written—even if the 
only obvious change is the context of its reception. That “only” is not to be 
underestimated; for like the “moreso” we considered earlier, it has the power to 
make all the difference in the way something is said to mean.262 This is because, 
                                                   
260 What we might call “semantic geometry” resides in the “repetition of similar patterns at ever-
diminishing scales,” the definition of a fractal. See Ron Eglash, African Fractals: Modern 
Computing and Indigenous Design, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press (1999), p. 4.  
 
261 Henry Louis Gates, Jr. The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary 
Criticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1988), p. 60. Gates’ concept of “Signifyin(g)” 
represents an active exploitation of intertextuality in the African-American community. 
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with the change of context, the semantic burden still shifts away from the sender 
to the receiver(s). As Louis Althusser admonished his readers almost 40 years 
ago: there is no such thing as an innocent reading.263             
Defining intertextuality as a process of repetition and revision takes us to 
the heart of a matter that is very little understood outside the small coterie of 
literary critics who study sacred texts. This lack of understanding is responsible 
for much mischief in the fields of Biblical literature and Qur’anic studies—not the 
least of which is centuries of inter-sectarian polemic involving the integrity of the 
Qur’an as bona fide revelation.264 While no literary critic has access to any tool or 
technique capable of settling arguments over whether a given text is the “Word(s) 
of God,” by approaching intertextuality as an instance of the ways of language in 
history, we can show how the study of intra- and extra-Scriptural citation, 
allusion, and echo furthers the project of “unbundling” the codices which have 
held so many readers “captive” for so long. In the process, we can create the 
opportunity for the experience of texts held sacred by much of the world’s 
population to be experienced as discourse: as conversations carried on outside 
what Foucault called the “little parallelepiped” that contains the text.265  If we may 
accomplish this small but challenging task, we will have taken significant steps 
                                                   
263 Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster, London: 
Verso Classics (1997), p. 14. Originally published 1970. 
 
264 Gates discusses similar polemics involving the integrity of “black letters” in The Signifying 
Monkey, pp. 113-124. The parallels between white racist and non-Muslim anti-Qur’anic polemics 
deserve closer scrutiny. Both employ a condescending attitude concerning what constitutes “real” 
literature/Scripture—an unwarranted essentialism that privileges one’s own tradition over 
another’s.  
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towards the articulation of what I call the special theory of Near Eastern 
prophecy.                   
Towards a Special Theory of Near Eastern Prophecy 
      From the perspective of Romantic philosophy, the project of breaking 
the spell of the solitary, “vertically” activated, text or codex and moving outside 
what the tradition has delivered to us—in order to make connections with the 
discursive “heritage”—is particularly acute. This project applies to the Qur’an, as 
we have noted, but it applies with equal force to the larger tradition in which the 
Qur’an explicitly locates itself: that of Near Eastern prophecy more generally.266 
In the case of the Bible, the process of unbundling the “little parallelepiped” that 
contains the text has been assisted to some extent by the unearthing of the Nag 
Hammadi library of Gnostic Christian scriptures in 1945 and the subsequent 
discovery of the Dead Sea scrolls at Qumran in 1947. Both of these finds have 
created the opportunity for Biblical scholars to re-examine previously held 
notions regarding Scriptural canonicity and its role in the development of 
sectarian communities.267 Nevertheless, the codex is a resilient and refractory 
charm; its spell is not to be underestimated.  
One historical reason that may be offered for the staying power of the 
Bible’s “bookishness”—beyond its consistent presentation as white pages bound 
together by gilt-lettered, blackened cowhide—is the antiquity of its organization 
into discretely authored works. For example, scholars date the organization of a 
                                                   
266 For a remarkably inventive and insightful meditation upon the Qur’an’s place in the history of 
the Near Eastern prophetic tradition, see Norman O. Brown, “The Prophetic Tradition,” 
Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis, Berkeley: University of California Press (1991), pp. 46-68. 
 
267 See, e.g., Helmut Koester, Introduction to the New Testament, 2 vols., New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1995-2000. 
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collection of prophetic texts found in the Hebrew Bible (the so-called “Latter 
Prophets”) into “prophetic books” from about the 6th through 4th century B.C.E.268 
The production of these texts as “books” preceded their collection in the form of 
the earliest Biblical codex by Christians in the 4th century C.E.269 The codex form 
would seem therefore to reinforce the impression of bookishness that had already 
been established in the minds of those familiar with these texts centuries before. 
That impression may well have led to a descriptive discourse about them in which 
their bookishness became reified and passed down through traditional channels 
from one generation to the next.  
The strength of this impression has not been diluted by the findings of 
modern scholarship that the textual inscription of these “books” involved a 
complex history of composition in which oral prophetic declamation and written 
aide-mémoire were redacted by scribal hands over a period of centuries; nor has 
it been diluted by the findings that such scribal activity included, as a matter of 
course, not only transcription but revision in light of changed circumstances—
including some which disconfirmed the original predictions. Michael H. Floyd 
summarizes this process thus: “…prophetic books are by definition reinterpretive 
documents, whose writers reapply patterns of divine-human interaction 
discerned in one particular historical context to another later historical context”—
a remark consonant with Henry Louis Gates’s definition of intertextuality and the 
                                                   
268 Michael H. Floyd, “The Production of Prophetic Books in the Early Second Temple Period,” 
Prophets, Prophecy, and Prophetic Texts in Second Temple Judaism, edited by Michael H. Floyd 
and Robert D. Haak, New York and London: T & T Clark (2006), pp. 276-297.  
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rudiments of the General Theory of Open Hermeneutics articulated in the 
preceding pages.270  
The spell of the solitary, “vertically” activated, text or codex appears to be 
relatively invulnerable to the intricacies of compositional and redaction history. 
In my view, there is at least one very defensible reason why this is so: for the vast 
majority of readers, how a text happened to arrive in its present configuration 
appears to have very little bearing upon what meaning can be made from it now. 
Consequently, for these readers, the final, redacted or canonical form of a sacred 
text is the one that counts—how it came to be that way sustains only antiquarian 
interest. 
In Biblical studies, this position has been championed by Brevard Childs. 
For his part, Childs “…does not deny that the historical-critical method may be 
able to elicit some real (historical) information from the text, or to discover what 
its original authors meant. It is not the possibility or efficacy of historical 
criticism that he calls in question, but its claim to unique validity.”271 Presumably, 
Childs’s objection is a reaction to the attempt, on the part of some Biblical 
scholars, to privilege the historical interrogation of sacred texts over any other 
possible method of study; to that extent, one can hardly fault his scruples. By the 
same token, however, it is difficult to escape the sense that what bothers Childs 
the most about those who advocate a thorough investigation of the “horizontal” 
                                                   
270 Floyd, “Prophetic Books,” p. 290. This process of revision is not limited to any particular book 
or section of books in the Bible. See, e.g., Bart D. Ehrman, The Orthodox Corruption of Scripture: 
The Effect of Early Christological Controversies on the Text of the New Testament, Oxford: 
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271 John Barton, Reading the Old Testament: Method in Biblical Studies, 2nd edition, Louisville, 
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dimension of Scripture is that, from his perspective, it threatens the long 
hegemony that theological verticality has enjoyed in the field of Biblical 
interpretation.272 He has taken it upon himself to offer a defense for elite 
anxieties.  
From the perspective of an open hermeneutics, the most felicitous aspect 
of Childs’s approach is the way in which it exposes the problem of how one makes 
texts mean. By championing the canonical version of any given sacred text, he 
reminds us that there is a canon. Canons, by definition, consist of collections of 
texts. One cannot therefore read a sacred text canonically in isolation from other 
texts of the same class.273 In this way, Childs introduces a form of “horizontality” 
through the back door: by reading sacred texts in pari materia, questions of 
difference inevitably come to the fore. Why does this particular text appear to 
assert something that another (equally canonical) text appears to deny? In the 
attempt to interpretively reconcile sacred texts intra-canonically, appeals to 
context, to chronology, indeed, to the whole panoply of horizontalist concerns 
eventually undermine the isolated splendor with which theological verticality 
tends to endow Scripture. Tactics such as Childs’s may defer these 
considerations, but they cannot do so indefinitely.274  
                                                   
272 Ibid, p. 153. 
  
273 Ibid, pp. 151-153.  
 
274 Rudolf Bultmann formulated the horizontalist principle of research in Biblical studies (on his 
reading of Wellhausen) thus: “…a literary work or fragment of tradition is a primary source for the 
historical situation out of which it arose, and is only a secondary source for the historical details 
concerning which it gives information.”  Bultmann, Existence and Faith, translated by Schubert 
M. Ogden, New York: Meridian Books, Inc. (1960), p. 38. 
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The modern pursuit of intra-canonical intertextuality has led some Biblical            
exegetes to disclose the arbitrary nature of canonicity. Canons, like literature, do 
not subsist in the ether as Platonic forms: they reflect decisions made by 
sectarian elites on the basis of values shared among those elites at a given time 
and place. Moreover, by tugging at the threads of intra-Biblical intertextual 
reference, modern scholarship has discovered that the scribal hand was not the 
only revisionist one at work in the production of the canonical Scriptures. This 
most interesting feature of Near Eastern revealed writ has been examined in the 
course of scholarly investigations into the exegetical tradition. An important 
contribution to such studies is Michael Fishbane’s Biblical Interpretation in 
Ancient Israel. In the course of his research into when the Jewish exegetical 
tradition came to be formed, Fishbane discovered that the roots of Biblical 
interpretation are buried deep “in the biblical past itself,” i.e., much of the 
material that is found in the books of the Bible is itself exegetical in nature.275 In 
ancient Israel, prophetic vision often proceeded by means of revision.  
Fishbane’s work owes much to one of the 19th century’s pre-eminent 
scholars of Judaism, Abraham Geiger.276 In his Urschrift und Übersetzungen der 
Bibel in ihrer Abhängigkeit von der inner Entwicklung des Judenthums,277  
 
Geiger not only demonstrated that the major textual versions 
(the Septuagint, Targumic, and Samaritan recensions) reflect 
                                                   
275 Michael Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation Ancient Israel, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1985), pp. 
2-3.  
 
276 Geiger also wrote a controversial work on the Qur’an, Was hat Mohammed aus dem 
Judenthume aufgenommen? [“What Did Muhammad Borrow From Judaism?”], now available in 
English translation as Judaism and Islam, translated by F. M. Young, New York: Ktav, 1970.   
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reworkings of the Hebrew Bible in the light of post-biblical social 
and theological concerns, but that the Hebrew Bible is itself the 
product (and source) of such reworkings. Despite the acid 
criticisms of some Jewish contemporaries, Geiger’s work 
convincingly shows “that the history of the biblical text is 
interwoven with the history of the people, that the text itself, 
being a response to life, constantly adapted itself to the needs of 
the people, … [and] that what the process of midrash and 
exegesis accomplished in a later age, was achieved through 
textual manipulation in the period before the final stabilization 
of the biblical text.”278   
 
For Fishbane, “the enduring and significant supposition” of Geiger’s pioneering 
effort is that “the content of tradition, the traditum, was not at all monolithic, but 
rather the complex result of a long and varied process of transmission, or 
traditio.”279 Indeed, the neat distinctions which, for centuries, Biblical scholars 
routinely made between original, sacred text and subsequent interpretation of 
that text amounted to a scholarly “re-authoring” of both. This scholarly re-
authoring was inferior to the “inspired” re-authorings of Hebrew prophets and 
scribes insofar as it failed to appreciate how,  
at each stage in the traditio, the traditum was adapted, 
transformed, or reinterpreted—be this by the use of old cult 
legends for retelling the life of a patriarch, or the integration of 
traditions into major literary complexes, like the book of Genesis 
as a whole (with its diverse patriarchal materials and 
prehistorical prologue). Materials were thus detribalized and 
nationalized; depolytheized and monotheized; reorganized and 
reconceptualized…280          
 
By “smoothing over the bumps” in this process, the scholarly version 
disconnected it from the history of the peoples who lived it and, hence, drained 
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from it much of its horizontal richness—typically in the service of a verticalist 
theology.  
In his own scholarship, Fishbane attempts to chart a new course. He 
begins with the “stabilized” text of the Hebrew Bible—the canonical codex—and 
treats it as a composite traditum containing evidence of a form of traditio he 
terms “inner-biblical exegesis.” This internal Biblical traditio consists of “textual 
comments and clarifications, scribal remarks and interpolations, and theological 
reactions and revisions” representing the results of Israelite and, later, Judean 
discursivity as preserved in the text.281 Inner-Biblical exegesis is a form of 
intertextuality, but decidedly circumscribed. Fishbane offers sound scholarly 
reasons for limiting his investigations in this manner but, in the course of 
justifying his method, he makes a most interesting distinction:  
The position of inner-biblical exegesis is unique among the 
foundational documents of the Western religious tradition: 
neither the Gospels nor Pauline writings on the one hand, nor 
the Qur’an on the other, are quite like it. The dominant thrust of 
these documents with respect to the Hebrew Bible is their 
proclamation that they have fulfilled or superseded the ancient 
Israelite traditum. Theirs is an innovative traditio, continuous 
with the Hebrew Bible but decidedly something new…From this 
perspective, the Tannaitic sources (followed by the Rabbis of the 
Talmud), the Gospels and Pauline writings (followed by the 
Church Fathers), and the Qur’an (followed by the Doctors of 
Islam) are three post-biblical streams of tradition which are each 
based on the Hebrew Bible but have each transformed this 
traditum in radically diverse ways.282                       
 
I find this distinction interesting because, reading Fishbane’s discussion of his 
method to this point, I did not anticipate any mention of the Gospels or Pauline 
writings—and certainly not the Qur’an. It strikes me that the compulsion to assert 
                                                   
281 Ibid, p. 10. 
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the uniqueness of the Hebrew Bible in this context betrays a certain anxiety on 
Fishbane’s part: one induced by a recognition that his disclosure of the traditio 
within the little parallelepiped that contains the canonical codex threatens to 
unbundle it.  
From the perspective of a General Theory of open hermeneutics, Fishbane 
is onto something here—possibly to his own chagrin. This is because the theory’s 
semiotic component suggests that meaning-making is a matter of negotiated 
referentiality. The theory expects to encounter intertextual reference consisting of 
repetition and revision and would demand a thorough investigation in its 
absence. This is not to say, however, that every apparent instance of intertextual 
reference necessarily represents what one interpreter or another claims for it. 
Indeed, open hermeneutics must proceed with caution when following up 
Fishbane’s assertions concerning both the New Testament writings and the 
Qur’an. If these latter Scriptures contain traditio for which the Hebrew Bible 
serves in some sense as a traditum, this is a proposition that merits both 
elaboration and proof—whereas Fishbane appears to assume that this relation is 
self-evident. Furthermore, his companion assertion that the traditio he presumes 
to reside in both the New Testament and the Qur’an is innovative in ways that 
differ from inner-Biblical exegesis also requires proof. Even if the evidence 
suggests that this companion assertion is true, it may not exhaust the interpretive 
possibilities.  
These issues will be taken up in the next chapter. The task for the instant 
section of the present chapter has been to assemble the rudiments of a Special 
Theory of Near Eastern prophecy. Such a theory may emerge more fully as 
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Fishbane’s presumed intertextual connections between and among the Hebrew 
Bible, New Testament, and Qur’an (not to mention other texts from the Near 
East’s sacred literary milieu) acquire evidentiary support. To that end, I turn now 
to a deep and transgressive reading of the Qur’an.             
              
Chapter Four: 
Visionary Revisionism 
 
 
… Menschen, denen der Sinn des Lebens nach langen Zweifeln 
klar wurde, warum diese dann nicht sagen konnten, worin 
dieser Sinn bestand.283  
 
     
At any moment in the development of the dialogue there are 
immense, boundless masses of forgotten contextual meanings, 
but at certain moments of the dialogue’s subsequent 
development along the way they are recalled and invigorated in 
renewed form (in a new context). Nothing is absolutely dead: 
every meaning will have its homecoming festival...284     
 
    
A Carnival of Signs 
 
After prolonged wandering in the thickets of language, we arrive at the 
canonical codex of the Qur’an equipped with only the rudiments of theories—and 
these in need of development. All that we have to show for our troubles to this 
point is a concatenation of metaphors, a carnival of signs. Since they function for 
us as our hermeneutical map and compass, they will have to suffice. 
The Qur’an is itself a concatenation of metaphors and a carnival of signs: 
such is the glory of Near Eastern prophetic discourse—and the bane of sectarian 
elites.285 How is one to exercise custodial control over the meanings made 
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284 Mikhail Bakhtin, “Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences,” Speech Genres & Other 
Late Essays, translated by Vern W. McGee, Austin, TX: University of Texas Press (1986), p. 170. 
 
285 I am employing the term “carnival” here in a restricted, Bakhtinian sense. In his Rabelais book, 
Mikhail Bakhtin discusses the medieval feast as “always essentially related to time” in the sense 
that its social function was not to “lead the people out of the existing world order…On the 
  
available by an unruly Scripture? The genius and the genuine creativity of Islamic 
tradition show us how this task has been accomplished through many 
generations. That story, like Scheherazade’s, has been told and re-told countless 
times and will no doubt continue to be told until history’s end. It is a rich story, a 
fascinating and multi-faceted one; but it is not our story. We have chosen to 
return to circumambulate anew the ka’aba of the canonical codex and, in its very 
precincts, “to assess its computations, to check its sentences against our 
convictions, to prove the derivations of its words,” and to savor its “figurations of 
language”—in short, to negotiate meanings through Romantic re-description: a 
set of practices I have collected here under the rubric of modern Qur’anic 
hermeneutics. 
Yet, before taking a single step, the task overwhelms us; the Qur’an’s 
“words already engulf us.” Where, then, to begin? It is instructive to pause and 
remind ourselves of Stanley Cavell’s Romantic admonitions: “Depart from a given 
word as from a point of origin. Go deep as into woods. Understanding is a matter 
of orientation, of bearings, of the ability to keep to a course and to move in 
natural paths from any point to any other. The depths of the book are nothing 
                                                                                                                                                       
contrary, [official feasts] sanctioned the existing pattern of things and reinforced it.” Carnival, on 
the other hand, was the “anti-feast” that celebrated “liberation from the prevailing truth and from 
the established order.” Moreover, it exhibited a peculiar logic—that of the “‘turnabout,’ of a 
continual shifting from top to bottom, from front to rear.” It allowed for the construction of a 
world view that competed with the prevailing one and, as such, threatened cultural elites. Of 
course, medieval carnival involved many other elements that the Qur’an does not, e.g., the liberal 
use of irreverent scatological humor. The analogy is not on all fours. I would argue, however, that 
the Qur’an substitutes apocalypticism and eschatology for the scatological and that it retains 
within its discourse a subversive tenor—despite the fact that it eventually became an emblem of a 
new world order. When that happened, other carnivalesque discourses rose to the occasion (e.g., 
in the writings of Jahiz and Alf Layla wa Layla, etc.). See Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His 
World, translated by Hélène Iswolsky, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press (1984), pp. 5-
15. 
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apart from its surfaces. Figurations of language can be thought of as ways of 
reflecting the surfaces and depths of a word onto one another.”286  But how might 
this advice help us? Are we to read by blindly choosing a word at random? And, if 
so, then what? Such are the anxieties aroused by the Romantic embrace of 
interpretive freedom. One experiences an immediate adrenaline rush, a moment 
of vertigo, and then…for some…a sense of clearing. The place we have been 
searching for, without necessarily knowing that we were searching for anything at 
all, is the place of “clearing”—what Heidegger called Lichtung—that spot among 
the trees where light is permitted to penetrate the foliage and illuminate the 
forest floor.287  
As I suggested in the first chapter, it is my suspicion that—his protests to 
the contrary—Heidegger craved the reassurance of seeing that ground. We, 
however, will choose now to take him at his word, and accept his identification of 
the clearing with Parmenides’ invocation of aletheia—which Heidegger rather 
ingeniously translates as “unconcealment,” but which we will understand by its 
more common usage: truth.288 In searching for the clearing, our quarry has been 
nothing less than “truth”; and insofar as we understand truth Romantically (i.e., 
as something that belongs to language, with language belonging to history, 
history to humankind and, to humankind, the familiar and the alien), it is inter-
subjectivity diachronically mediated by inter-textuality. Placing the Qur’anic 
carnival of signs upon the “horizontal axis” of history, then, we must learn to 
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accept the fact that its “words come to us from a distance.” If we wish to “discover 
what is being said to us,” we must “discover the precise location from which it is 
said; to understand why it is said from just there, and at that time.”289  
The key to answering the “whats” and “whys” of Cavell’s advice lies in the 
“how” of intertextuality. Employing this particular how is, as Wittgenstein would 
say, to “master a technique”—the technique of traditio (Fishbane), of repetition 
and revision (Gates), the technique by which meanings travel and change through 
time. In other words, we must approach the Qur’an expecting to encounter 
intertextual reference, for such are the ways of language in history. Adverting to 
the modern scholarship of a cognate Scripture (the Hebrew Bible), we found 
these expectations confirmed. Indeed, I suggested that it would be surprising if 
such a Sprachspiel were not characteristic of the literary Lebensform which 
produced Near Eastern Scripturalism. Even so, I sounded a cautionary note 
regarding Fishbane’s presumption that the Hebrew Bible is the traditum of New 
Testament and Qur’anic traditio. That is a proposition meriting both elaboration 
and proof—an issue that I will address shortly in the case of the Qur’an.290 
The notion that the Qur’an contains “internal” intertextuality is so well 
established in traditional scholarship as to be practically uncontroversial. As 
early as the 8th century C.E. (and possibly earlier), Muslim scholars set about the 
task of attempting to harmonize “certain passages [of the Qur’an] that bore on 
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290 With respect to the intertextual relations obtaining between the New Testament and the Greek 
translation of the Hebrew Bible (the Septuagint), such elaboration and proof have been amply 
provided by scholars in that field. Recent examples include: Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture 
in the Letters of Paul, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989; Craig A. Evans and James A. 
Sanders, Luke and Scripture: The Function of Sacred Tradition in Luke-Acts, Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 1993. 
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the same issues but that seemed mutually contradictory.” Their attempts to do so 
“marked the rudimentary beginnings of the theory of abrogation (naskh), a 
theory that later stood at the center of legal hermeneutics.”291 This theory 
represents a pre-Modern practice of textual criticism insofar as it involves the 
establishment of a simple “chronological” ordering (revealed before/revealed 
after) for parts of the canonical text. The telos of this practice was not to compose 
history in the post-Medieval sense but, rather, to define the 
… actions through which Muslims could realize obedience to 
their God, in adherence to the Qur’anic command. Thus it was 
felt necessary to determine the Qur’anic stand on particular 
issues. When more than one Qur’anic decree was pertinent to a 
single matter, such a determination was no easy task. To solve 
such difficulties it was essential to determine the chronological 
order in which different verses had been revealed. Generally 
speaking, the provisions of later verses were thought to 
supersede those of earlier, contradictory ones.292      
 
Studies of internal “intertextuality” are no doubt important aspects of Scriptural 
investigation. As we observed, Fishbane’s Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel 
is not only such a study but a major contribution to the field of “inner-Biblical 
exegesis.”293 I would argue that Amin al-Khuli’s dirasa al-Qur’an nafsih 
encompasses a notion of “inner-Qur’anic exegesis” as does the classical exegetical 
principle al-Qur’an yufassiru ba‘duhu ba‘dan (one part of the Qur’an explains 
another).294 But, as al-Khuli’s advocacy of ma hawl al-Qur’an implies, inner-
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293 See Benjamin D. Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40-66, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press (1998), pp. 6-31. 
 
294 Ibn Taymiyya, a 13th century Muslim intellectual, explained this method as follows: “What is 
given in a general way in one place [in the Qur’an] is explained in detail in another place. What is 
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Qur’anic exegesis does not exhaust the possibilities of the Qur’an’s inter-
textuality: the horizontal dimension of the Revelation remains to be accounted 
for.  
I argued above that, given the semiotic nature of linguistic 
communication, horizontal (including diachronic) intertextuality occurs in the 
ordinary course of language use. As the literary critic Robert Alter has remarked, 
“literature as language is intrinsically and densely allusive.”295 The stress here 
belongs on the qualifier “as language” because literature, as we know, has no 
essence. On the semantic level of Qur’anic semiosis, the Revelation’s horizontal 
engagement with its immediate audience may be expected to include the 
negotiation of intertextual meaning as a matter of course. But Qur’anic 
intertextuality does not end there; in terms of the Revelation’s rhetorical 
effectiveness with its audience, it would be most surprising, even peculiar, if 
Qur’anic discourse were not strategically designed to appeal to authoritative texts 
lodged within its immediate audience’s cultural memory. Despite this complex of 
intertextual occasions (semiotic/semantic and rhetorical), Qur’anic studies—from 
the suppression of the Isra’iliyyat to the present—have proceeded as though the 
Qur’an was revealed in an intertextual vacuum. 
                                                                                                                                                       
given briefly in one place is expanded in another.” Imam Shatibi, another 13th century intellectual, 
argued that many Qur’anic verses or passages “can only be properly understood in the light of 
explanations provided in other verses or suras [i.e., chapters of the Qur’an].” M.A.S. Abdel 
Haleem, “Context and Internal Relationships: Keys to Qur’anic Exegesis,” Approaches to the 
Qur’an, edited by G. R. Hawting and Abdul-Kader A. Shareef, New York: Routledge (1993), pp. 
72-73. 
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Re-Thinking Qur’anic Inimitability 
Previous chapters have offered explanations as to why Qur’anic studies 
routinely overlook the Revelation’s horizontal dimension (i.e., waves of 
Arabization among Muslim intellectuals and the demands of theological 
verticalism). Related to these explanations is a doctrine which I touched upon 
briefly in the second chapter: the theological affirmation that the Qur’an is 
“uncreated.” This (formerly) controversial notion—decided, as I mentioned, by 
Caliphal fiat—introduces the theological problem of the Qur’an’s ontological 
status vis à vis the Divine personality (Allah). In Islamic intellectual history and 
polemics, it has also entailed a corollary proposition articulated dogmatically as 
the “inimitability of the Qur’an” (i‘jaz). Essentially, this corollary is a belief that 
the proof of the Qur’an’s Divine provenance resides in the inability of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s detractors—whether among his contemporaries or since—to 
produce a Scripture of comparable excellence.  
The roots of this belief are to be found in Qur’anic discourse itself. The 
Qur’an alludes to skeptical members of the Prophet Muhammad’s audience who 
dismissed his preaching as “mere poetry” or as the sort of oracular speech then 
associated with Arab soothsayers.296 Often left obscure in the commentary 
surrounding such criticisms is what they imply about the Prophet’s detractors: 
they appear to have presumed that poetry, soothsaying, and genuine prophecy 
were clearly distinguishable from one another. Interestingly enough, the Qur’an 
accepts this presumption as valid: it agrees with the Prophet’s antagonists that 
authentic prophecy is a different “kind” of thing from poetry and soothsaying. I 
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will substitute a term from literary criticism here and say that prophecy—whether 
genuine or not (and leaving open for the moment what that adjective might mean 
in this instance)—belongs to a distinct genre of discourse.297  
When the Prophet’s detractors dismissed his preaching as “mere poetry” 
and soothsaying, the Qur’an responded with a challenge: let those who regard it 
as something other than prophecy produce verses like those found within it. This 
very challenge provides the Scriptural basis for the theological doctrine of the 
Qur’an’s inimitability. In attempting to explain precisely what, as a practical 
matter, this test of Scriptural authenticity entails, pre-Modern Muslim 
intellectuals made significant contributions to the development of rhetorical 
theory—contributions that warrant continued reflection today. Indeed, as one 
scholar has recently remarked, rhetoric (balagha) 
was undoubtedly one of the most important subjects for Qur’anic 
exegesis, and began and developed around the central question 
of the appreciation of the style of the Qur’an and its i‘jaz in 
particular…One of the important contributions of scholars of 
balagha was their recognition of the concept of maqam (the 
context of the situation) and its role in determining the utterance 
and providing the criterion for judging it. A central issue…is: 
mutabaqat al-kalam li-muqtada‘i ‘l-hal (the conformity of the 
utterance to the requirements of the situation).298 
 
 By virtue of its crafting of the concept of maqam, pre-Modern Muslim rhetorical 
theory laid a foundation for Amin al-Khuli’s historicist notion of ma hawl al-
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Qur’an.299 It is important to note, however, that the pre-Modern concept did not 
embrace any sense of diachronic intertextuality as I have outlined above. Instead, 
it relied on the production of the asbab al-nuzul literature to supply details 
deemed necessary to establish a juridical rule. As I discussed in Chapter Two, al-
Khuli did not credit such literature as being “historical” in nature because its 
production did not conform to modern standards of evidence.300  
The point of re-thinking the doctrine of Qur’anic inimitability is not to 
arrive at a pre-determined conclusion that the Qur’an either is, or is not, 
“genuine” prophecy; rather, the point is to approach this claim from a direction 
that is more amenable to articulation. For what, after all, does it mean to say that 
the Qur’an is a Scripture of incomparable excellence? Or that it is a Scripture that 
many may try to imitate, but none may replicate? These are surely instances of 
epideictic rhetoric and, as such, will be convincing to those who are disposed to 
being convinced; but they prove nothing.301  And one can well argue that, after 14 
centuries, the Qur’an has nothing left to prove anyway: deferring to the judgment 
of history, the central place of the Qur’an in Islamic tradition and Muslim faith 
and practice is by now secure. In the present moment, what one really wants to 
know is: Where does the Qur’an fit in the historical scheme of Near Eastern 
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prophecy? How does it relate to the Scriptures which preceded it in time and to 
those which post-date its appearance? These are questions that may be 
meaningfully addressed if the scholar proceeds attuned to the lineaments of 
intertextuality.  
Unfortunately, progress along these lines is stymied by several obstacles. 
First, there is the regrettable history of Orientalist approaches to the Qur’an that 
set out to “prove” that the Revelation is not “genuine” Scripture. The modus 
operandi of these approaches has been to categorize instances of Biblical and 
para-Biblical reference in the Qur’an as evidence of Qur’anic “borrowing.” By 
definition, for the Orientalists, the “borrower” is in a dependent (and therefore 
inferior) position relative to the one borrowed from. Since the Qur’an references 
such literary material it is, by definition, dependent upon and therefore inferior 
to the Bible. 302  
I am somewhat reluctant to address this argument (or, rather, 
insinuation—for it is seldom, if ever, constructed clearly as an argument in the 
literature) for the simple reason that, in so doing, I will confer upon it a dignity 
which it does not merit. Nevertheless, for the record: the Qur’an, the Bible, para-
Biblical literatures, indeed, all literature that may be observed to “make sense” 
does so because it is composed in language; language is “intrinsically and 
densely” referential; referentiality is the soul of meaning-making. The assertion 
that one party to a communicative transaction is rendered inferior to another 
                                                   
302 See Carl W. Ernst and Tony K. Stewart, “Syncretism,” South Asian Folklore:  An Encyclopedia, 
edited by Margaret A. Mills, Peter J. Claus and Sarah Diamond, New York: Routledge (2003), pp. 
586-588.   
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party by virtue of the fact that the linguistic commerce between them has proved 
meaningful is, simply put, absurd.  
When Biblical scholars such as Abraham Geiger and Michael Fishbane 
demonstrate that the Hebrew Bible makes use of “old cult legends for retelling 
the life of a patriarch” and integrates independent (i.e., non-Hebraic) traditions 
into major literary complexes “like the book of Genesis as a whole,” no one 
suggests that the Bible is “inferior” to the materials which its writers and 
redactors liberally appropriated—nor should they.303 The picture that is gradually 
emerging from these studies and others like them is that the adherents of Judean 
religion long regarded their Scriptures as living, malleable, open, plastic, and 
eminently revisable texts. Divine communication with humanity was not effected 
simply through ecstatic utterance—indeed, that form of visionary communication 
appears to have given way over time to written “re-vision” or, as I like to say, 
“visionary revision.” It was only when sacred texts began to be regarded as 
possessing fixed content in canonical formation that Near Eastern prophecy 
passed, as Fishbane has shown, into sectarian exegesis.304  
                                                   
303 See Chapter Three, supra. The scholarship of Abraham Geiger is interesting in this regard, 
because his Was hat Mohammed…? is often singled out as the quintessential product of an 
Orientalist, anti-Muslim animus. But, as Fishbane points out, Geiger’s Jewish co-religionists were 
equally threatened by his Biblical scholarship in the Urschrift. Geiger was a 19th century epigone 
of the European Enlightenment. In his eyes, every religion was explicable solely in accordance 
with the horizontal dimension of its phenomenology. He may be guilty of neglecting the rich 
development of his religious imagination in favor of his text-critical skills, but it is unlikely that he 
harbored a specifically anti-Muslim animus. 
          
304 Fishbane, Biblical Interpretation in Ancient Israel. The Christian Church implicitly 
acknowledged the constraints placed upon exegesis by Scriptural reification when it attempted to 
address the problem institutionally via the routinization of charisma under the doctrine of 
Apostolic Succession. Protestantism provides one form of relief for those who find even this 
solution too constraining. Shi’a Muslims arrived at a solution that is similar to the Roman 
Catholic one through the doctrine of the Imamate. These doctrines and movements represent 
medieval and early modern responses to the encroachment upon prophetic revisionism by the 
process of Scriptural reification. 
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Until the relatively late attempts by sectarian canonists and heresiologists 
to assert proprietary rights of ownership over what was previously public 
property, the basic materials of Near Eastern prophetic discourse belonged to 
what we would today call the “public domain”—indeed, there was no other 
domain. From at least the time of Babylon’s rise to regional hegemony, Near 
Eastern prophecy was an international phenomenon of re-visionary 
appropriations of an existing stock of stories, characters, myths, tropes, ecstatic 
utterances, legal prescriptions, poetry, proverbs, etc. In the ancient Near East, 
prophecy came to be, in the generic sense, less about forecasting the future than 
about back-casting new insights (re-visions) and interpretations onto a shared 
heritage by means of commonly accepted methods of editorially selective 
appropriations and literary allusion.305 From the standpoint of modern 
hermeneutics, therefore, I would be most surprised to find a Scripture that was in 
some sense “non-referential.” Indeed, I would be more than surprised; I would be 
stunned and perplexed, because I cannot imagine how anyone could go about 
making meaning from “non-referential” language.306  
The second obstacle an intertextual treatment of the Qur’an must face is 
Muslim opposition to any intellectual inquiry that may be deemed an innovation 
with respect to pre-Modern scholarship. Here we must face the complex and 
imposing edifice that this scholarship has bequeathed to the post-Medieval 
world: theological verticalism, proprietary Arabization, and the twin dogmas of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
305 The essays collected in Prophets, Prophecy, and Prophetic Texts in Second Temple Judaism, 
edited by Michael H. Floyd and Robert D. Haak, New York: T & T Clark, 2006, are definitive in 
this regard.  
 
306 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism, pp. 30-31. 
 148 
the Qur’an’s “uncreatedness” and “inimitability.” In the last three centuries, this 
complex has been endowed with a super-charged aura of legitimacy by the siege 
mentality that has afflicted Muslims individually and as social congeries in the 
wake of European (and, presently, Euro-American) colonialism and imperialism. 
Therefore, by virtue of some magic that I am at a loss to rationally fathom, pre-
Modern scholarship on the Qur’an is presumed to preclude the possibility of 
Qur’anic connections with other Scriptures. Indeed, this presumption is so deeply 
imbedded in the minds of many Muslims that it can cause a gifted scholar such as 
M. A. S. Abdel Haleem to remark that the classical concept of maqal—i.e., intra-
textual comparatism—“may, thus, be viewed within the framework of the modern 
linguistic concept of ‘intertextuality’ which involves the dependence of one text 
upon another.”307 Admittedly, internal textual comparison is a variety of 
intertextuality—but it is a very limited one. The “modern linguistic concept of 
‘intertextuality’” to which he refers is not so limited; indeed, the prefix “inter-” 
typically implies comparisons among texts whose relationships to one another 
are not always immediately obvious—and may well be contested among readers. 
Abdel Haleem’s treatment of Qur’anic “context” never acknowledges the literary 
context within which the Qur’an was revealed and to which it repeatedly refers.  
As a student of the Qur’an, I find the resistance of many Muslim scholars 
to a more inclusive sense of “intertextuality” fraught with irony—for the Qur’an’s 
own intertextuality is both inclusive and unselfconscious. In my view, the reasons 
that have lately legitimized this scholarly reluctance—Orientalist reproach and its 
historical ties to colonial and imperialist initiatives—only compound irony with 
                                                   
307 Abdel Haleem, “Context and Internal Relationships,” p. 73. Emphasis added. 
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tragedy; for by slighting the Qur’an’s active intertextual engagement with extra-
Qur’anic Scripturalist traditions, Muslim scholars play into the hands of the 
colonialist project by isolating the Qur’an from the very prophetic genre to which 
it claims rightful inclusion. Thus isolated, the Qur’an (and those who regard it as 
a Late Ancient iteration of Near Eastern prophecy) are, as a practical matter, 
excluded from fellowship with the adherents of the extra-Qur’anic Scripturalist 
traditions with which the Qur’an itself engaged. Segregation is the result, and 
segregation has long been used as a tool to brand its subjects with the mark of 
inferiority. Why would Muslims wish to bring this fate upon themselves?308  
At the close of the previous chapter, I alluded to what I consider to be the 
third obstacle to progress in this area. There I sounded a cautionary note 
regarding Michael Fishbane’s assertions concerning the Hebrew Bible as 
traditum for New Testament and Qur’anic traditio. As I remarked in the body of 
my text, not every apparent instance of intertextual reference necessarily 
represents what one interpreter or another claims for it. I subsequently 
mentioned in a footnote (contained in the instant chapter) that New Testament 
scholars have amply provided elaboration and proof of the intertextual relations 
obtaining between the Greek New Testament and the Greek translation of the 
Hebrew Bible (the Septuagint) upon which the New Testament writers 
overwhelmingly relied.309 This distinction may represent an excess of 
fastidiousness on my part, but I think such care is an essential ingredient to the 
                                                   
308 Obviously, there are few Muslims today who understand the effects of their Scriptural 
“independence” in quite this way.  
    
309 See, e.g., Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, New Haven: Yale 
University Press (1989) pp. x-xi. 
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maintenance of scholarly standards. The ubiquity of linguistic referentiality and 
the density of intertextual allusion that I have repeatedly remarked ought not to 
persuade us to view the Qur’an or Biblical or para-Biblical literatures as, in Eco’s 
words, “amorphous invitations to indiscriminate participation.” Every text 
presents a nexus of internal constraints that require careful negotiation if readers 
are to do justice to the various parties to a given communicative transaction. 
Open and democratic hermeneutics, yes; egalitarian hermeneutics, yes; chaos 
loosed upon the world—not where readers conduct themselves in a manner that 
is respectful and responsible to text and context—to the ways of language in 
history. 
The Qur’an’s Prophetic Colloquy with the World of its Time 
It is a commonplace that the Qur’an contains narratives and tropes that 
parallel Biblical and Biblically-related materials. As noted, hostile critics construe 
these parallels as evidence of “borrowing” (conferring a “derivative” and 
impliedly inferior status upon the Qur’an as Scripture). They typically explain the 
presence of Biblical and related materials in the Qur’an by reference to Muslim 
traditions which inform us that the Prophet Muhammad was a merchant who 
traveled to Syria and other places where he came into contact with Christians and 
Jews; their claim is that, through these encounters, Muhammad picked up little 
narrative fragments that he incorporated in his preaching. As a consequence, say 
these critics, the Qur’an’s engagement with Biblical and related materials is 
occasional, haphazard, and confused.310  
                                                   
310 See the translator’s Preface and annotations throughout The Koran, translated by J. M. 
Rodwell, London: J. M. Dent, 1909. For a personal anecdote from a Muslim point of view of the 
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Muslims, on the other hand, reject the possibility of borrowing. They do 
not deny that the Prophet was a merchant or that he had contact with Christians 
and Jews; they claim, however, that these facts in themselves do not prove that 
Biblical and Biblically-related parallels are anything but parallels. In fact, 
Muslims frequently insist that it is the Qur’anic “parallels” which contain the 
“authentic” versions of these narratives and tropes—and that what one finds in 
the Bible and related writings are best understood as corrupted versions of the 
“true” Qur’anic story. This position has been articulated in Islamic tradition with 
reference to a somewhat obscure Qur’anic allusion to the “mother of the Book”—
elaborated as a “heavenly codex” said to contain God’s original words.311 While 
such a position admirably accomplishes a polemical goal—the kind of “fair play” 
that turn-about entails—it refuses to entertain the possibility that the earthly 
codex of the Qur’an could possess a horizontal dimension.312  
The traditional retreat to a consistent verticality in Qur’anic studies 
effectively cuts the sacred text loose from its moorings in history, rendering ever 
more epideictic and tautologous (and, ultimately, unpersuasive) the explanations 
offered by Muslim apologists for the Revelation’s conversionary power. As a 
result, scholarship on the Qur’an has ignored opportunities for intertextual 
investigations that could ripen into fruitful inter-sectarian dialogue. Whatever 
the importance such dialogue may possess in the present moment, I argue that—
                                                                                                                                                       
nature of this discourse, see Ebrahim Moosa’s memoir “Inside the Madrasa,” published in the 
Boston Review and available on-line: http://bostonreview.net/BR32.1/moosa.html 
 
311 Qur’an 3:7; 13:39; 43:4. 
 
312 Calling to mind the observation famously attributed to Mahatma Gandhi: “an eye for an eye 
leaves the whole world blind.”  
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historically speaking—it must have constituted a significant proportion of the 
Prophet Muhammad’s twenty-year struggle to establish the poly-confessional 
community one sees reflected in the Constitution of Medina.313 
 A reading of the Qur’an that theologically excludes it from participation in 
the Prophet’s struggles is no doubt a transgressive reading—but not the kind 
which I have been advocating in these pages. Such a reading ignores the nexus of 
internal constraints that, as we shall see, the Qur’an’s own discursive practices 
invite us to observe. This is not meaning the text as negotiated with its immediate 
(i.e., 7th century) audience; it is meaning the text as negotiated with a much later 
audience—an audience composed exclusively of Muslims who, several 
generations after the death of the Prophet, were embroiled in theologico-political 
controversies unknown to the time and place of the Revelation.314  
The semiotic openness of language empowered the Qur’an’s verticalist 
readers to “author” for themselves the Revelation appropriate to their historical 
situation. Likewise, it has empowered the book’s Orientalist and sectarian 
detractors to author for themselves a codex appropriate to their own needs and 
desires. The result is two different and opposing Qur’ans—two incommensurable 
interpretations—which have shaped the history of the Revelation’s semantic 
empowerment of its readers. It is my intention to challenge this bifurcated 
paradigm. To accomplish this objective, I have engaged in a close study of the 
controverted parallels, on the one hand, and of the specific form of literary 
reference or “intertextuality” that, I argue, these parallels represent, on the other. 
                                                   
313 A document generally accepted by scholars as authentic. See Fred M. Donner, “From Believers 
to Muslims,” Al-Abhath 50-51 (2002-3), pp. 9-53.  
 
314 Discussed in Chapter Three, supra. 
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I make this argument on the theory that the Qur’an, as language, is subject to 
intertextuality in all of its forms. To be consistent with this position, I believe that 
I am obliged to avoid engaging in special pleading—theologically motivated or 
otherwise—that would a priori exempt the Qur’an from a thorough investigation 
of its linguistic properties. In other words, I intend to employ my own readerly 
empowerment to “author” a third Qur’an to rival the other two. My Qur’an is the 
Revelation disclosed by transgressive reading in the Romantic grain; it is a 
Qur’an read with the horizontal dimension intact.  
The specific form of intertextuality that characterizes Qur’anic discourse, 
in my view, is allusion. Allusion is a complex linguistic and literary phenomenon 
and one of the few forms of intertextuality that is, by definition, diachronic in 
nature: an allusion looks back in time to an earlier text. It therefore confounds 
the Structuralist romance with synchrony, making the study of intertextuality 
congenial to post-Structuralist theory and practice. Within this species of 
intertextuality are sub-species including citation, “allusion proper” and echo. I 
will introduce an example of a passage from the Qur’an that exhibits all three of 
these forms to support my contention that the identification of such 
intertextuality in the Qur’an reveals it to be engaged in what we might today term 
“robust religious pluralism.”315 
But first: a brief digression. I have repeatedly asserted that the shift in the 
burden of linguistic meaning-making results in the empowerment of the receiver-
in-context at the expense of the sender. This is true of all linguistic 
                                                   
315 Benjamin D. Sommer, A Prophet Reads Scripture: Allusion in Isaiah 40-66, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998; Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul; Joseph Pucci, 
The Full-Knowing Reader: Allusion and the Power of the Reader in the Western Literary 
Tradition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.  
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communication, and especially true in the case of allusion which is a technique 
specifically designed for those receivers that the Classicist and literary critic 
Joseph Pucci has named “full-knowing readers.” As Pucci has shown, the use of 
allusion is never haphazard; it is an overt and intentional gesture—an invitation—
to engage a specifically identifiable audience in intertextual dialogue. That 
audience consists of those individuals who possess the requisite knowledge base 
to enable them to recognize a textual passage as an allusion. Such recognition is a 
form of readerly empowerment that only the alluding text is capable of 
conferring. The “scene of allusive recognition” occasions a creative interruption 
in the course of textual reception yielding a “fuller engagement” of the receiver 
with both the alluding text and the prior text to which it alludes. It is by means of 
this feat of textual association that an allusion is made to “fully mean.”316 This is 
why I qualify my notion of Qur’anic “religious pluralism” with the adjective 
“robust.” The Qur’an reaches out allusively not simply for the purposes of shaking 
hands with members of its audience, but to activate the power of a prior 
knowledge it recognizes as resident among them. The Qur’an names the full-
knowing readers it allusively empowers “people of the Book.”317  
Of the many instances of allusiveness with which the Qur’an reaches out 
towards the full-knowing readers in its audience, one of the more intriguing is the 
complex allusion to the Bible, Mishna, and Babylonian Talmud found in Surah 
al-Ma’idah (the “feast-table”), ayat 27-34. Easily recognizable in this passage is 
the reference to the Biblical tale of Cain and Abel—so easy to recognize, I suggest, 
                                                   
316 Pucci, The Full-Knowing Reader, pp. 41-44. 
 
317 Qur’an 3: 64-75. 
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that the Qur’an does not trouble to include their names. This is a case of “allusion 
proper.” It is not a citation, because the Qur’an does not recite verbatim the story 
found in the book of Genesis; indeed, the Qur’an supplies some intriguing twists 
in the details of this story which are absent from the Biblical version. These twists 
will figure significantly in what is to follow, so we should pause to consider them 
now. In the Qur’anic version of this story, Cain threatens to kill Abel after 
learning that his brother's sacrifice was accepted by God and his (Cain's) was 
rejected.318  Abel replies to this threat as follows: "God accepts [sacrifice] from 
those who are careful to obey; [therefore] if you raise your hand to strike me 
dead, I will not raise my hand against you to kill you; for I fear God, the Lord of 
the Worlds" (Q 5:27-28). Obedience to God is here presented as a willingness to 
submit to oppression—to the point of death. The following ayah (29) supplies 
Abel’s rationale: Cain will be punished for his crimes in the Hereafter.  
As noted above, recognition of an allusion requires background 
knowledge. In the present case, one needs to know more than simply the Genesis 
version(s) of this tale. A passage in the Babylonian Talmud quotes a section from 
the Mishnah in which the method of preparing a witness in the case of a capital 
offense is discussed. According to the Mishnah, when preparing the witness, the 
court is obligated to impress upon him the seriousness of the matter at hand. 
“Capital cases are not like monetary cases,” the Mishnah intones. There is much 
more at stake in a capital case than mere money. The Court must advise the 
                                                   
318 In all known textual traditions of Genesis, this threat is absent—although there is a peculiar 
ellipsis in some texts at Gen. 4:8 which begins “Cain said to his brother Abel…” and the words are 
missing. Other versions, including the Targum, supply an innocuous sounding “Come, let us go 
out into the field.” See JPS Hebrew-English TANAKH, 2nd edition, Philadelphia: Jewish 
Publication Society (1999), p. 7, note d, and LXX Genesis 4:8 (which contains the invitation to go 
eis to pedion or “onto the level-ground”).    
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witness that he will be held responsible for the life of the accused and the lives of 
his [presumably unborn] descendants until the end of time. Moral of the story: 
one had best tell the court the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but. The 
authority that the Mishnah invokes for its assertion of extended witness liability 
in capital cases is the Biblical story of Cain and Abel. The Mishnaic argument 
turns on the wording of the Hebrew manuscript of the book of Genesis to which 
its author or authors were referring. “Thus we find in the case of Cain, who killed 
his brother, that it is written: ‘The bloods [plural] of thy brother cry unto Me.’” In 
its effort to explain the presence of an otherwise unwarranted plural in the text, 
the Mishnah concludes that one’s guilt for the execution of an innocent defendant 
extends to his or her potential progeny.  
The discussion which this passage occasions among the Babylonian Rabbis 
takes off in that wonderfully, meandering, Talmudic way that seems to cover all 
manner of unrelated topics. But a careful reading of the Rabbinic gemara reveals 
common themes including the appropriate evidentiary standards at law and 
acceptable modes of execution. I am not a Talmudist, but my reading of this 
material suggests to me that the Rabbis were deeply concerned that, in the effort 
to do justice at law, injustice may result. One way that the Rabbis chose to 
safeguard the integrity of their efforts was to raise the bar of evidence sufficient to 
convict to such an extraordinarily high level that capital convictions became a 
very difficult proposition. Another way was to leave to Heaven the responsibility 
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for carrying out a death sentence319 —the very reason that the Qur’anic Abel gave 
for refusing to resist Cain’s assault.  
This interesting parallel returns us from the Talmud to the passage in al-
Ma’ida. Pucci points out that the desire to interrupt one’s reading and refer back 
and forth between the alluding text and the text alluded to for purposes of 
comparison is a strong indication that one has entered “allusive space”—the 
mental place where new meanings can be made from the engagement with 
allusion and where new texts are “authored” by full-knowing readers.320 Abel’s 
rationale for refusing to resist Cain’s assault is a type of allusion that literary 
critics term “echo.” Detecting the presence of echo in a text is rarely easy because 
it is in the nature of allusive echo to be more shadowy by several degrees than 
either “allusion proper” or citation. What echo thereby loses in definition, it gains 
through profound suggestiveness.321 In the passage from al-Ma’ida, we find that 
the Qur’an, like both Mishnah and Talmud before it, follows its recitation of the 
Cain and Abel story with legal reflection: it prescribes the penalties appropriate 
for “those who war [against] God and His Messenger and who spread viciousness 
in the land” (5:33).322  
But there are differences among these texts as well. In allusion, there are 
always differences. Unlike its precursor texts, the Qur’an’s attention in this 
matter is focused explicitly upon the punishment phase of a capital case: it does 
                                                   
319 Making, at that point in history, a virtue from a necessity. The Babylonian Talmud, edited by 
Isadore Epstein, vol. 27, London: Soncino Press (1935), pp. 233 ff. 
   
320 Pucci, Full-Knowing Reader, pp. 41-44.  
 
321 See John Hollander, The Figure of Echo, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.  
 
322 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from the Qur’an in this chapter are my own. 
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not address the problem of evidence that the Rabbis discussed. Or does it? Here 
is where the full-knowing reader of the Qur’an has a palpable advantage over her 
fellow readers among the mufassirun and the Jurists who interpret the Scripture 
oblivious to the presence of echo in the text—and here is where elite anxieties 
become acute. In the presence of echo, the mere fact that the Qur’an does not 
explicitly mention evidentiary issues in the context of the Cain and Abel story 
ought not to lead a reader to the conclusion that such issues are unimportant in 
this context. In the presence of echo, the importance of such issues is assumed. In 
the absence of echo, silence is silence; but in the presence of echo and other 
forms of allusion, silence presumes a prior understanding that may speak 
volumes. 323 
I would not be so confident of the presence of echo in this instance except 
that a remarkable allusion to, and citation from, the Mishnah is embedded in the 
Qur’anic text just prior to the discussion of penalties. At 5:32, immediately 
following its recitation of the story, the Qur’an continues: “On account of this 
[min ajli thalik], We prescribed for the Children of Israel [katabna (the Divine 
authorial voice of the Qur’an is acknowledging a past accomplishment) ‘ala bani 
Isra’iyla] that he who takes the life of an individual soul”—then comes an 
ambiguous qualification, bi-ghayr nafsin, which I will leave untranslated324—“or 
                                                   
323 Likewise, the mere fact that the Qur’an does not explicitly mention the names “Cain” and 
“Abel” in its telling of the story of the “two brothers” ought not to lead a reader to conclude that 
this story is not allusive. 
 
324 I choose to leave this phrase untranslated because it is not at all clear what it means. 
Employing the Classical technique of Qur’anic intra-textual interpretation (al-Qur’an yufassiru 
ba‘duhu ba‘dan) sheds little light on the phrase. Comparative philological investigation may bring 
to light a Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac, Ethiopic, Greek or Persian cognate idiom, but would distract 
from the issue at hand. The phrase is usually taken to mean something like “without the 
justification of lex talionis.”   
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for spreading viciousness in the land, it is as if he had killed the whole of 
humanity; and whoever grants it [an individual soul] life, it is as if he grants life 
to the whole of humanity.” Parallel to this, the Mishnah follows its exegetical 
paraphrase of the same Biblical story with the words: “For this reason was man 
created alone, to teach thee that whosoever destroys a single soul of Israel, 
Scripture imputes [guilt] to him as though he had destroyed a complete world; 
and whosoever preserves a single soul of Israel, Scripture ascribes [merit] to him 
as though he had preserved a complete world.”325 I consider this allusion to be a 
citation and not a direct quotation (which is not allusive at all)—a distinction 
intended to reflect what I would argue is a periphrastic translation into Arabic 
from the Hebrew text of the Mishnah with an Arabic editorial gloss inserted into 
the middle of the translated portions of the cited phrase.  
This is a complex appropriation of a prior text if ever there was one; but 
regardless of its complexity, it is also a semiosis sent out to a full-knowing reader 
to pause and reflect upon the text in which it originally occurs (the Mishnah), the 
texts in which it later recurs (the Babylonian Talmud and the Qur’an), and the 
meaning that can be made in allusive space from such labor. I will only add that 
one meaning that allusive space makes available to the full-knowing reader of 
these texts is that the Qur’an may well be engaged in offering ways to limit the 
opportunities to impose capital sanctions upon specific crimes. The alternative 
sanction of exile included by the Qur’an (5:33—also discussed by the Rabbis and 
                                                                                                                                                       
   
325 Babylonian Talmud, p. 233 ff. 
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also the sanction imposed upon Cain in the Genesis story) and the promise of 
clemency for timely repentance (5:34) support my reading. 
Further Complications 
The complexity of the foregoing example should serve as fair warning of 
the careful explication required if a reader should desire to move beyond the 
commonplace that the Qur’an “contains Biblical and para-Biblical materials”—
and do so in a way that avoids beating a retreat to the “dueling” Qur’ans of 
Orientalist and inter-sectarian polemic. As my reading of the example seeks to 
show, “contains” is not an adequate metaphor for what takes place in the 
discursive clearing that the Qur’an discloses. The Qur’an is no more a “bucket” in 
which someone has tossed scraps of Scripture and Scriptural exegesis than the 
New Testament or Hebrew Bible or extra-canonical para-Biblical literatures are 
or were passive receptacles of the heritage of Near Eastern prophecy. “Engages” 
would be a better word for what all of these texts are up to; “allusively 
appropriates and transforms,” better still.  
In a recent paper, “Lukan and Johannine Tradition in the Qur’an: A Story 
of Auslegungsgeschichte and Wirkungsgeschichte,” New Testament scholar 
Vernon Robbins painstakingly traces the textual record of the “modifications and 
elaborations” (or, as I would say, “repetitions and revisions” or, simply, 
“intertextuality”) that traditions about Jesus underwent “from the second 
through sixth centuries in the world east of Palestine and Western Syria.”326 He 
                                                   
326 Vernon K. Robbins, “Lukan and Johannine Tradition in the Qur’an: A Story of 
Auslegungsgeschichte and Wirkungsgeschichte,” p. 2. This essay is scheduled for publication in 
Prospects for a Story and a Programme: Essays on Räisänen’s Beyond New Testament Theology, 
edited by Todd C. Penner, Helsinki: Finnish Exegetical Society, 2004. As of this writing, the 
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identifies these traditions as “Lukan” and “Johannine” because, by the second 
century C.E., the distinctive “voices” of these two gospel writers (and their 
distinctive versions of the Jesus story) were identifiable as traditum—though, as 
we have seen with all Biblical and para-Biblical traditum, they were themselves 
the products of traditio. Robbins demonstrates how, over a discreet time period, 
the Lukan and Johannine voices of the canonical New Testament came to inflect 
one another in interesting ways as they were appropriated in the course of their 
interpretation. The evidence for this mutual inflection is preserved in a variety of 
extra-canonical works whose geographical provenance moves steadily eastward 
in response to the hardening of the See of Rome’s heresiological rhetoric 
(enforced, with Constantine’s rise to power in the 4th century, by the Imperial 
State apparatus).327  
Beginning in the second century, “a busy time in early Christian Gospel 
traditions,” Marcion, the son of a Bishop from Pontus, “a harbor-city on the Black 
Sea…founded his own church and established a hierarchy of bishops, priests, and 
deacons…There were many Marcionite communities especially in Syria through 
the fifth century, and some were still in existence at the beginning of the Medieval 
period.” After a “careful reading of the epistles of Paul, Marcion decided that 
Christians should have only two documents of faith, which he called the Gospel 
and the Apostle. The Gospel was a version of the [canonical] Gospel of Luke with 
Old Testament passages eliminated from it, which he was convinced was the ‘my 
                                                                                                                                                       
edited volume has yet to appear; page numbers appearing herein reference a copy of the paper 
kindly supplied for my use by the author. 
     
327 A succinct account of this history may be found in J. N. D. Kelly, Jerome, London: Gerald 
Duckworth & Co. Ltd (1975), pp. 1-2. 
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gospel’ to which Paul referred in his letters.” According to Robbins, Marcion’s 
privileging of Luke’s gospel over its canonical (and non-canonical) competitors  
set in motion a “process of subtracting from, adding to, interpreting, and 
reconfiguring Lukan tradition about Jesus” that persisted for the next several 
centuries among intellectuals located in the eastern reaches of the Byzantine 
Empire.328  
Robbins identifies the Infancy Gospel of Thomas, probably “written during 
or shortly after Marcion’s activity in the second century CE,” as a significant site 
of Scriptural inflection of Luke. “The earliest existing manuscript for this Gospel 
is a sixth century Syriac manuscript in the British Museum. The existence of this 
manuscript exhibits the popularity of this Gospel in eastern Christianity during 
the time of the emergence of Qur’anic tradition about Jesus.” From a comparative 
perspective, the Infancy Gospel of Thomas is particularly intriguing because, like 
the Qur’an, it accords “special prominence” to Mary, Jesus’ mother.329 Moreover, 
“topoi central to the Gospel of John energize and ‘theologize’ Lukan tradition 
throughout the Infancy Gospel of Thomas.”  
The Infancy Gospel opens with a depiction of Jesus as a child, busying 
himself on the Sabbath by molding sparrows from clay. “When Jesus is 
confronted with violation of the Sabbath, he claps his hands and brings the 
sparrows to life and to flight through a command to them.”330 Robbins regards 
this act as “an extension of [the canonical Gospel of] John 1:1-4 into the 
                                                   
328 Robbins, “Lukan and Johannine Tradition in the Qur’an,” pp. 1-12. 
 
329 The mother of Jesus figures prominently in parts of the Qur’an, e.g., 19:16-34. 
 
330 Cp. Qur’an 3:49; 5:110. 
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childhood of Jesus. In John, Jesus, who is the Word (logos), caused all things to 
‘become’ (egeneto), because life (zoe) is in him.” The Infancy Gospel calls such 
miracles of Jesus “signs (semeia) in the mode of Johannine tradition, rather than 
powers (dynameis) in the mode of Synoptic Gospel tradition.” Indeed, Johannine 
vocabulary is fairly conspicuous throughout the Infancy Gospel on Robbins’ 
reading, endowing it with what he calls “Johannine dynamics.” Summarizing his 
readings, Robbins remarks that “from the perspective of the Infancy Gospel of 
Thomas,” it appears that “Marcion’s omission of material at the beginning of the 
Gospel of Luke” created an opportunity for the writer of the Infancy Gospel to 
supply Johannine elements to fill the vacuum. “During the second century, then, 
both the editing of the Gospel of Luke by Marcion and the backfilling of the 
Gospel of Luke by the Infancy Gospel of Thomas move Lukan tradition in the 
direction of Johannine tradition.”331  
Robbins continues to trace this Johannine-inflected-Lukan Jesus narrative 
through the Mesopotamian Tatian’s 2nd century Diatessaron or “harmony of the 
four gospels,” which was popular enough to appear, by the 4th century, in an 
Arabic edition: 
This Arabic Harmony exists in full, and in it we see a place of 
privilege for the Gospel of Luke at the beginning of the 
Diatessaron. After John 1:1-5, the Arabic Harmony recites Luke 
1:5-80, which contains not only the opening scenes of promise of 
the births of John and Jesus (1:5-56) but also the birth, 
circumcision, and blessing of John the Baptist (1:57-80) before it 
inserts the story of the birth of Jesus from Matthew 1:18-25. 
After inserting the Matthew birth story in the Lukan context, it 
continues further with Luke 2:1-39 (the birth, circumcision, and 
purification of Jesus, plus the accounts of Simeon and Anna) 
before inserting Matthew 2:1-23. Immediately it returns again to 
Luke 2:40-3:6, then to John 1:7-28 and Matthew 2:4-6 which 
                                                   
331 Ibid, pp. 7-12. 
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links to Matt 2:7-10/Luke 3:7-9 before continuing with Luke 
3:10-18:39.332 
 
 Robbins adds, “Clearly, then, the principle of organization in the opening parts of 
Tatian's Diatessaron privileges the Gospel of Luke over the Gospel of Matthew at 
the beginning,” and concludes from this that  
 
not only [do] Marcion's Luke and Infancy Thomas establish a 
dynamic relation between the opening chapters of the Gospel of 
Luke and the Gospel of John. The opening chapter of Tatian's 
Diatessaron embeds the first chapter of Luke in a context 
established by the first five verses of the Gospel of John.333 
 
Robbins then moves on to yet another infancy Gospel, the Protevangelium 
of James “for which there are multiple manuscripts in Syriac, Ethiopic, Georgian, 
Sahidic, Old Church Slavonic, Armenian, and Arabic in Syriac script, as well as 
Greek and Latin. While Infancy Thomas backfills the Lukan miracle activity of 
Jesus, the Infancy Gospel of James backfills the Lukan birth stories by telling the 
birth of Mary, the mother of Jesus.” In his essay, Robbins elaborates on the ways 
in which he sees this “backfilling” take place, but the crucial point for the literary 
history he constructs seems to be the role played by the canonical Gospel of Luke 
as a template for further revisions of the Jesus tradition. Each of these revisions 
represents a literary elaboration and partial stabilization of the canonized Lukan 
traditio-turned-traditum-returned to-traditio and, in the canonical codex of the 
Qur’an, to traditum once again. Reading that codex in light of this tradition-
history, Robbins finds a remarkable incidence of agreement between the way in 
which ‘Isa ibn Maryam (Jesus, son of Mary) is portrayed in Qur’anic discourse 
                                                   
332 Ibid, p. 15. 
 
333 Ibid. 
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and the way in which this figure was portrayed among participants in a 
Johannine-inflected thread of Lukan tradition.334  
Beginning with the 3rd surah, al-‘Imran, Robbins observes how the Qur’an 
presumes a Lukan, rather than a Matthean, genealogy for Jesus—tracing his 
lineage through Mary back to Adam.335 Moreover,  
 
When the angel Gabriel comes to Mary in Luke, he tells Mary 
that her "relative" (sungenis: kinswoman) Elizabeth "has  
also conceived a son" (1:36). Qur'anic tradition accepts the 
assertion by the angel Gabriel that Mary and Elizabeth are part 
of the same extended family, and it follows the logic of  
Gabriel's assertion. If Mary is part of the family of Elizabeth, 
then she shares in the priestly lineage of Elizabeth, who is "a 
daughter of Aaron" (Luke 1:5), back to Aaron, whom Moses 
appointed, along with his family, as priests (Exod 28:1).336 
 
In other words, the Qur’anic account parallels the Lukan one in remarkable 
particulars. These parallels shift, however, from the canonical Luke to the non-
canonical Infancy Gospel of James and Tatian’s Harmony: 
 
Qur'an 3 moves from the ancestry of Jesus (Q 3:33-34; Luke 
3:23-38) to the prayer of Anna (Hannah), when she vows to 
name the child in her womb Mary and to consecrate her child as 
an offering to God to protect her from Satan (Q 3:35-36; InfJas  
4:2). The Lord accepts Anna's gift of her child Mary and assigns 
Mary to Zechariah, the priest in the Temple, as her guardian (Q 
3:37; InfJas 7:7). When Zechariah comes to the Temple and asks 
Mary from where the food which is continually before her comes, 
Mary answers: "It is from God. God gives without measure to 
whom He wills" (Q 3:37; InfJas 8:2). When Zechariah sees the 
generous goodness of God to Mary, he prays to his Lord,  
"the Hearer of Prayer," to give him a child out His bounteous 
goodness (Q 3:38). The angels call to Zechariah as he is praying 
in the sanctuary and report to him the "good news" of a son to be 
named John (Yahya). It is emphasized that John will come as a  
                                                   
334 Ibid, pp. 16-30. 
    
335 Of the four canonical Gospels, only Matthew and Luke provide a genealogy for Jesus. The two 
genealogies do not agree. 
   
336 Robbins, “Lukan and Johannine Tradition in the Qur’an,” pp. 19. 
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"lordly, chaste, prophet of the righteous" (cf. Luke 1:15, 76) to 
"confirm a word from God." In Q 3:38-39, one sees Qur'anic 
tradition related to the Lukan scene where the angel Gabriel 
comes to Zechariah in the Temple (1:8-20). The last part of Q 
3:39 is worded in such a manner, however, that it seems not only 
to refer to the birth of John the Baptist as confirmation of the 
word that Gabriel brings from God to Zechariah (Luke 1:19-20), 
but it points toward the function of John the Baptist in John 1:6-
15 as a witness who testifies that Jesus is the "word" from God 
who comes as light that gives people life in the world.337    
 
Robbins then rehearses the interesting manner in which the Qur’an (3:39) 
appears, in his terms, to “merge” the “Word” of the canonical Gospel of John 1:1 
(“In the beginning was the Word”) 
with the ‘word’ which Gabriel brings to Mary in Luke 1:35-38 and 
makes her pregnant with Jesus. The key verse occurs in Luke 
1:38, where Mary says, “Let it be according to your word.” After 
Mary says this, the angel Gabriel departs from her and Mary is 
pregnant with Jesus in her womb (1:38-45)  
 
adding that “a thesis of this essay is that this merger of ‘Word’ in John with ‘word’ 
in Luke has been encouraged in Christian and Muslim tradition both through 
Tatian's Diatessaron and the Infancy Gospel of James.”338  
This focused study of parallels between the Qur’anic Isa and the Jesus of 
Johannine-inflected Lukan tradition continues for another ten pages as Robbins 
builds a case for what he regards as the documented presence of a “remarkable 
interest in, energizing of, reconfiguration of, and supplementing of the Gospel of 
Luke through the centuries”—an energizing, reconfiguration, and 
supplementation to which, in his view, the Qur’an was both party and active 
participant.339 Indeed, Robbins nowhere suggests that he views the Qur’an as a 
                                                   
337 Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
 
338 Ibid, p. 20.  
 
339 Ibid, p. 30. My copy of Robbins’ essay is thirty-one pages; I hope that my reduction of his 
argument to a few paragraphs has managed to do it no serious injustice.  
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passive receptacle of a Scriptural tradition that rightfully belongs to someone 
else. To the contrary, he has publicly expressed an interest in seeing the 
development of  
 
a new direction for qur’anic study that places the Qur’an within 
the same discourse environment as Hebrew and Christian 
Scriptures. Through the use of social and rhetorical analysis, the 
three scriptures and their related interpretive writings can be 
treated as commensurable without being reductionist or 
assuming a discourse of “borrowing/lending,” which always 
privileges the antecedent tradition…it is our hope that other 
scholars will see the utility of the method we have outlined here 
and help us with our project of analyzing just how the Qur’an is 
the third partner in this conversation about God’s Word.340         
 
In my view, Robbins’ research is exemplary of a “good faith” approach to 
the literary historical study of sacred texts. By “good faith” I mean an approach 
that is free from the unwarranted belief that articulating the horizontal elements 
of Scriptural discourse proves anything (one way or another) about the Divine 
provenance that the adherents of a given tradition claim for their own canonical 
writings. The mere fact that a transmission history can be traced for a given 
Scripture has no more bearing on whether or not God has communicated with 
humankind in this particular fashion than any scientific fact adduced about the 
natural world has upon God’s very existence.341 All such polemics amount to 
nothing more (or less) than attempts on the part of one convictional community 
to gain a rhetorical (if not political) advantage over another. Considering the fact 
that scholars have been developing transmission histories for the various books 
                                                   
340 Vernon K. Robbins and Gordon D. Newby, “A Prolegomenon to the Relation of the Qur’an and 
the Bible,” Bible and Qur’an: Essays in Scriptural Intertextuality, edited by John C. Reeves, 
Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature (2003), pp. 23-42. 
 
341 Absent a scientific test capable of detecting the presence of the Divine, all attempts to prove or 
disprove God’s existence or attributes by appeals to natural science are specious. 
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of the Bible over the last three centuries, one might have assumed that Jews and 
Christians would have abandoned such polemical strategies long ago. This does 
not appear to be the case—at least where the Qur’an and the personality of the 
Prophet Muhammad are concerned.342 I regard this situation to be quite 
regrettable, but not one that justifies retaliatory polemics returned from the 
Muslim side, nor one that could justify the suppression of scholarly attempts—
like those of the Egyptian School—to move beyond verticalist theologized polemic 
and to claim a horizontal dimension for the Qur’an. 
Full-Knowing Reading  
In the essay which was the focus of the previous section, Vernon Robbins 
described his methodology as one of viewing the history of Lukan tradition 
“backwards” from Jesus tradition in the Qur’an.343 Another way to put it would be 
to say that he brought to the Qur’an the background knowledge necessary to 
recognize the discursive traces that he, as a “full-knowing” reader, is expected to 
disclose in the course of studying the sacred text. This re-wording raises an 
important question: expected by whom? According to Joseph Pucci’s account, 
this expectation resides in the alluding text’s original “author.”344 Authors employ 
allusion as an economical way to freight or charge their utterances (Robbins 
speaks of an “energizing” discourse) with multiple meanings.345 In the case of 
                                                   
342 See Carl Ernst’s discussions in his book Following Muhammad, Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press (2003), pp. 13-18; 97-102. 
 
343 Robbins, “Lukan and Johannine Tradition in the Qur’an,” p. 7. 
 
344 Nevertheless, as Pucci stresses, authorial expectations do not diminish the role of the reader; 
allusions are co-created by author and reader. See Pucci, pp. 40-41.   
 
345 Robbins, “Lukan and Johannine Tradition in the Qur’an,” p. 30. 
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Scripture, adverting to the “author” of the text creates special problems insofar as 
it often involves the invocation of the e mente auctoris principle—and the 
bramble bush of theological speculation. This is not the case, however, with 
modern Qur’anic hermeneutics. Consider, for example, J. J. G. Jansen’s 
discussion of Amin al-Khuli’s prerequisite of historical research for Qur’anic 
study: 
…al-Khuli’s emphasis on the importance of the historical 
background for the true appreciation of the literal meaning of the 
Koran [sic], would lead us to expect a reference to something like 
the e mente auctoris principle. According to this exegetical rule, 
it is illegitimate to read into the text implications that could not 
have been envisaged by its author. However, Moslems [sic] 
believe that what the Koran says about its own nature is true, viz. 
that the Koran is not the inspired work of a prophet or apostle, 
but that God himself is directly its author. Hence, the e mente 
auctoris principle has little meaning as an instrument to purge 
commentaries from far-fetched interpretations, since it is not 
humanly possible to decide whether anything can or cannot be 
the hidden intention of the Almighty. A near approach, however, 
to the e mente auctoris principle is Amin al-Khuli’s much 
stressed tenet that the Koran ought to be comprehended in the 
way its first hearers comprehended it.346 
 
Jansen appears to have been disappointed by the Islamic exegetical tradition to 
the extent that it does not hand him an “instrument” with which to “purge” what 
he considers to be “far-fetched interpretations” from the commentaries—a rather 
dry, one might say “Protestant,” expectation that does no justice to the history of 
Muslim exegesis of the Qur’an or, for that matter, certain schools of Christian and 
Jewish exegesis of the Bible.347 Be that as it may, Jansen does suggest an 
important insight with regard to the exegetical procedures of modern Qur’anic 
                                                   
346 J. J. G. Jansen, The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt, Leiden: E. J. Brill (1974), p. 
66. 
 
347 See, e.g., Raymond B. Blakney, Meister Eckhart, New York: Harper & Row, 1941; Zohar, the 
Book of Splendor, edited by Gershom G. Scholem, New York: Schocken Books, 1949; Both Literal 
and Allegorical: Studies in Philo of Alexandria’s Questions and Answers on Genesis and Exodus, 
edited by David M. Hay, Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991. 
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hermeneutics: in principle, there is no reason for Muslims to believe that Allah 
did not intend His (or Her or Its) readers to engage in precisely the kind of full-
knowing “reading backwards” that I have illustrated in this chapter. Indeed, since 
(for the believer) Allah evidently chose to communicate with humankind by 
means of language, one has to presume that He knew what She was getting Itself 
into: a semantically “open” relationship with the Revelation’s readers and/or 
auditors, from the 7th century C.E. until the end of time.  
Jansen offers a valuable follow-up insight as well: “That Amin al-Khuli’s 
view does indeed come close to the e mente auctoris principle … when we realize 
that in the Islamic system the first hearer of the message of the Koran is the 
Prophet Mohammed, whom skeptical minds sometimes suppose to have been the 
author of the Koran.”348 Open hermeneutics is not a semantic “free-for-all” 
whether one views the Muslim sacred text from within the “Islamic system” or 
from without. As Robbins’s meticulous literary history of the Johannine-inflected 
Lukan Jesus tradition exemplifies, full-knowing reading may involve the 
interpreter in a complex weave of text-based evidence. That very complexity 
raises interesting questions about aspects of traditional Muslim prophetology 
that, in light of Jansen’s remarks, strike one as irrelevant rather than incorrect. 
What I have in mind is the traditional assertion of Muhammad’s illiteracy, 
an interpretation of the Qur’anic phrase nabiyyun ummi which, presumably, 
applies to the Prophet himself.349 As with much of the Classical commentary 
tradition, this reading of the phrase is reactive—i.e., it arose from a context of 
                                                   
348 Jansen, The Interpretation of the Koran, pp. 66-67. 
  
349 Qur’an 7:157-158. 
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inter-sectarian polemic, where the “authenticity” of the Qur’an was called into 
question precisely because the Revelation is highly allusive. The accusation is that 
the Prophet’s allusive Recitation suggests that he himself was a “full-knowing 
reader” of ancient traditions. As we have seen, in the Near Eastern prophetic 
tradition that the Prophet’s detractors presumed to be authentic, vision came by 
way of re-vision. The prerequisite of re-vision was an insightful grasp of the 
precursor Scripturalist tradition.350 Therefore, those among the Prophet’s 
detractors who pointed to the Qur’an’s highly allusive nature as “proof” that the 
Revelation was not genuine were, in fact, unwittingly providing evidence to 
contradict their claim. 351 Ironically, the Prophet’s defenders were just as ignorant 
of the “mechanics” of Near Eastern prophecy and, consequently, were not in a 
position to deal this particular criticism a mortal blow. Instead, they 
unnecessarily placed in circulation a belief that the Prophet, a successful 
merchant, was illiterate—not inconceivable in his day and age but, rather, beside 
the point. Indeed, even if one accepts the theory that the Prophet was simply a 
passive vessel of Divine speech (alluded to by Jansen, supra), it really ought not 
to matter whether he was literate since he would have had no input whatsoever in 
the contents of the Qur’an anyway.352  
                                                   
350 The title of Benjamin Sommer’s book on Deutero-Isaiah, A Prophet Reads Scripture, says it all.  
 
351 The Qur’an depicts the Prophet’s detractors as characterizing his preaching with phrases such 
as asatir al-awwalin or “tales of the ancients” (83:13; 46:17) and ifkun qadim or “hoary 
falsehoods” (46:11). 
 
352 On this issue I would again refer the reader to Fazlur Rahman’s discussion in Islam, 2nd 
edition, pp. 30-33. Moreover, it should be noted that the belief that the Prophet was illiterate has 
never achieved universal acceptance among Muslims. See, e.g., Mawlana Rumi’s take on this issue 
as discussed in Annemarie Schimmel, “Reason and Mystical Experience in Sufism,” Intellectual 
Traditions in Islam, edited by Farhad Daftary, London: I. B. Tauris (2000), p. 140. 
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Jansen’s observation that Amin al-Khuli’s view approaches “the e mente 
auctoris principle” may prove most productive if we allow it to take us back to the 
implications of open hermeneutics, rather than to where this phrase traditionally 
leads—an attempt by sectarian elites to “close down” the spectrum of potential 
available meaning to something they can manage. According to the version of 
open hermeneutics articulated in these pages, the author of any given text, sacred 
or secular, human or Divine, “means” what He/he, She/she, or It has uttered. 
Where a human author is concerned, an utterance may, of course, be a 
“misstatement.”353 Such linguistic events do occur in the normal course of 
communication and, where noticed, are amenable to correction. But it would be 
highly problematic to suggest that any sustained discourse consisted entirely, or 
even largely, of misstatements. Sustained discourse may consist of statements 
based upon mistaken assumptions, or incorrect information, etc., but the 
intention of the utterer is, presumptively, to say what is said—or something very 
nearly approaching what is said.  
Beyond this general intention, what must also be presumed is that the 
receiver(s)-in-context of a given communication are at liberty to do whatever they 
like in terms of making that communication meaningful. That said, they are 
constrained by the formal elements of the communication as uttered if they wish 
to “divine” what connects it to the time and place of its original utterance—for, as 
Nasr Abu Zayd argues, language-as-uttered encodes such information.354  If one 
                                                   
353 Presumably, this is not a fault to which Divinity is prone. 
 
354 In addition to Abu Zayd, I am here re-reading Eco through Schleiermacher, though Bakhtin 
takes a similar position in the essay “Discourse in the Novel” published in M. M. Bakhtin, The 
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presumes an omniscient Divine author for the Qur’an (like Amin al-Khuli and 
Abu Zayd), one must likewise presume that Allah meant this communication with 
humankind to be subject to the “frailties” to which language is itself subject—
most notably, that it is semiotically and semantically “open.” The only way to 
avoid making this presumption is to claim that the language of the Qur’an is 
miraculously unlike any other language—reflecting a desire not so much to 
“divine” something about the text but, instead, to “divinize” it. 355  As we have 
seen, however, when such a strategy is applied, one returns full-circle to 
theological verticality and is faced with the embarrassment of the tradition’s use 
of pre-Islamic poetry to shed light on Qur’anic locutions.  
Despite this embarrassment, many believing Muslims choose this option 
because it seems to them to be the “safer” route to take. Certainly it is a choice 
that will earn them the approbation of sectarian elites and, as one might expect, 
there is much in the tradition designed to reinforce such choices. Only a few 
believing Muslims (such as those in the Egyptian School we have been studying) 
make a hermeneutical choice and admit, with Stanley Fish, that “like it or not, 
interpretation is the only game in town.”356 For those Muslims—and others who 
would read the sacred text sensitive to historical context—there are plenty more 
embarrassments to go around. Among the more interesting of these for the “full-
                                                                                                                                                       
Dialogic Imagination, translated by Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, Austin: University of 
Texas Press (1981), 259-422 (see especially his discussion of “actual meaning” on p. 401).  
 
355 This claim is made in a variety of ways and for a plethora of reasons but without, in my view, 
thinking through their logical entailments.  
 
356 Stanley Fish, Is There A Text In This Class?, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1980), 
p. 355. 
 
 174 
knowing” readers who engage the text is the problem of allusion’s elusiveness. It 
is to this problem that I will now briefly turn. 
Mihrab and Echo 
As noted earlier in this chapter, the specific form of intertextuality that 
characterizes Qur’anic discourse is allusion: a complex linguistic and literary 
phenomenon that is also one of the few forms of intertextuality that is, by 
definition, diachronic in nature. Allusions look back in time to an earlier text (or, 
as we saw with Robbins, texts). They are also, by definition, intentional: 
accidental allusions cannot be considered “allusion proper.”357 Allusions may be 
periphrastic or involve fragments of quotation; but full, direct quotation is not 
ordinarily considered to be allusive. I included these various forms of 
intertextuality under the rubrics of citation, “allusion proper,” and echo, and 
introduced a passage from the Qur’an that exhibits all three of these forms as an 
illustration.358 In addition to the foregoing, I discussed Vernon Robbins’s essay 
on Johannine-inflected Lukan Jesus tradition to illustrate the sort of textu
detective work that may be employed to develop a literary history of a specific 
Scriptural allusion or allusive pattern or cluster—particularly one that appears to 
have undergone some sort of transformation between the alluding text and the 
text(s) alluded to—a transformation that begs for an accounting.  
al 
                                                  
Of the three rubrics of intertextuality I have reviewed, Robbins’s would 
appear to fit best with “echo.” Although he does not himself employ this term, his 
 
357 John Hollander distinguishes echo from “allusion proper” in this way: “echo is a metaphor of, 
and for, alluding, and does not depend on conscious intention” on the part of the author. 
Hollander, Figure of Echo, p. 64.   
 
358 Supra pp. 155-160. 
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argument for a Johannine-inflected Lukan Jesus as the ‘Isa of the Qur’an tends to 
employ metaphors that relate to auditory experience.359 Robbins “listens” to the 
texts he studies; his attunement to them positions him, like Stanley Cavell, to 
discover in reading “what is being said to us,” “what we are saying,” and to 
thereby disclose “the precise location from which it is said.”360 Deep reading is the 
“sounding out” of a text that does not itself speak but that, like the mihrab in the 
wall of a mosque, serves the dual function of reflecting the recitation of the Imam 
to the congregation standing behind, while indicating the direction of the ka’aba 
which the worshippers ritually face.361 What is heard is not direct speech—like 
quotation—but speech deflected: a form of echo. Moreover, every mihrab echoes 
differently—depending upon the individual characteristics of its construction and 
of the space into which it deflects sound. The difficulties of the textus receptus 
are met again in this metaphor: there is no getting around them.   
Much allusive communication takes place in this fashion; as mentioned, 
echo is a tenuous, elusive mode: one requiring a trained ear.362 Even so, no 
amount of training can make any reader an infallible judge of every allusive echo:  
Allusive echo functions to suggest to the reader that text B 
should be understood in light of a broad interplay with text A, 
                                                   
359 E.g., his study of “recitation” as a compositional technique (Robbins, p.2); his employment of 
“strategies of socio-rhetorical interpretation” (ibid.); his description of canonical Luke “telling 
about important births” (ibid, p. 7); recitation as a compositional technique in Justin Martyr and 
reference to what early Christians “say” about Tatian’s Diatessaron (ibid, p.13); verses from 
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Arabic Harmony “recites” Luke (ibid, p. 15); al-‘Imran “narrates” the story of Jesus (ibid, p.19); 
his reference to the repeated ways in which “again the reader hears Qur’anic statement that is a 
merger of ‘Lukan’ tradition dynamically interacting with Johannine tradition,” (ibid, p. 29). 
           
360 Cavell, Senses of Walden, p. 64. 
 
361 A mihrab is a recessed acoustical niche located in the mosque wall facing Mecca. 
 
362 See Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics and Criticism. 
 
 176 
encompassing aspects of A beyond those explicitly echoed. This 
sort of metaleptic figuration is the antithesis of the metaphysical 
conceit, in which the poet’s imagination seizes a metaphor and 
explicitly wrings out of it all manner of unforeseeable 
significations.363                                                                    
 
Metalepsis (also referred to as “transumption”) is a diachronic trope where the 
“figurative effect” of a given echo subsists in the “unstated or suppressed 
(transumed) points of resonance” between two or more texts.364 Suggestiveness is 
the reigning metaphor here, because metalepsis “places the reader within a field 
of whispered or unstated correspondences.”365 “The interpretation of a metalepsis 
entails the recovery of the transumed material”—a “recovery” that may or may 
not have been intended by its author, but which cannot, in any case, be 
guaranteed:366  
The volume of intertextual echo varies in accordance with the 
semantic distance between the source and the reflecting surface. 
Quotation, allusion, and echo may be seen as points along a 
spectrum of intertextual reference, moving from the explicit to 
the subliminal. As we move farther away from overt citation, the 
source recedes into the discursive distance, the intertextual 
relations become less determinate, and the demand placed on 
the reader’s listening powers grows greater. As we near the 
vanishing point of the echo, it inevitably becomes difficult to 
decide whether we are really hearing an echo at all, or whether 
we are only conjuring things out of the murmurings of our own 
imaginations.367  
 
                                                   
363 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, New Haven: Yale University Press 
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meaning-making with language. See Ming Dong Gu, Chinese Theories of Reading and Writing: A 
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Consequently, it is important to acknowledge that hermeneutics is an art, not an 
exact science. It is, as Wittgenstein might say, a language-game. And, like every 
game (or art for that matter), hermeneutics makes use of rules—but “rules of 
thumb” or “guiding principles” rather than strict directives. As a general 
proposition, then, the deep reader of texts proceeds along the following lines 
(adopted by Richard Hays):  
 
The hermeneutical event occurs in my reading of the text, but my 
reading always proceeds within a community of interpretation, 
whose hermeneutical conventions inform my reading. Prominent 
among those conventions are the convictions that a proposed 
interpretation must be justified with reference to evidence 
provided both by the text’s rhetorical structure and by what can 
be known through critical investigation about the author and 
original readers. Any interpretation must respect these 
constraints in order to be persuasive within my reading 
community. Claims about intertextual meaning effects are 
strongest where it can credibly be demonstrated that they occur 
within the literary structure of the text and that they can 
plausibly be ascribed to the intention of the author and the 
competence of the original readers.368     
 
In the specific instance where the reader feels that she is in the presence of 
allusive echo—Pucci’s “allusive space”—Hays has developed seven “tests” to keep 
in mind: 
1. Availability: It is important to consider if the “proposed source 
of the echo” was “available to the author and/or original readers” 
or auditors of the alluding text.369  
 
Is it probable that the “literary environment” or horizontal dimension of the 
alluding text accommodated the text(s) alluded to in some form? Recall how 
Robbins made a point to locate the authors of the texts in his chain of 
transmission in the general vicinity of the Hijaz.  
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2. Volume: What Hays terms the “volume of an echo” is a 
function of the “degree of explicit repetition of words or 
syntactical patterns” that a comparison of the alluding text and 
the text alluded to may disclose.370  
 
The volume of an echo may be one factor to take into consideration when 
determining the likelihood of availability. For example, as we have seen, the 
Qur’anic ‘Isa struck Vernon Robbins as echoing the Lukan Jesus, but in a 
Johannine-inflected way. In order to account for the precise manner in which 
this echo struck him, Robbins felt obligated to construct a literary history for this 
distinctive Scriptural figure.  
3. Recurrence: How often does a trope or passage alluded to 
recur in an alluding text?  
 
Hays suggests that repetition of this sort may be an indication that the author of 
the alluding text places particular importance upon such tropes or passages and, 
therefore, “proposed echoes from the same context should be given additional 
credence.”371  
4. Thematic Coherence: Is the meaning that one can make by 
identifying an instance of allusive echo “consonant” with the 
general meaning one can make from the text absent recourse to 
allusion?  
 
Here, Hays rightly observes, the reader “begins to move beyond simple 
identification of echoes to the problem of how to interpret them.”372 In the case of 
Qur’an interpretation, there is a long history of neglect where Biblical and para-
Biblical allusion is concerned. An important question to ask, then, in the case of 
Qur’anic interpretation is: does the identification of a particular allusion help to 
resolve persistent puzzles with the inherited interpretation of the sacred text? Is 
                                                   
370 Ibid, p. 30. 
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new light shed on an old problem? Does the recognition of allusion offer a more 
satisfying exegesis than its neglect ever did? “Satisfaction” is, in fact, Hays’s 
seventh test (see infra).   
5. Historical Plausibility: Could the author have “intended the 
alleged meaning effect? Could his readers have understood it?”  
 
We are reminded that not everything which appears in a given communication is 
“readily intelligible” to its actual readers—whether those readers are 
contemporaneous with the utterance of the communication or removed in time 
and/or place from the original receivers-in-context. “This test,” Hays observes, 
“historical in character, necessarily requires hypothetical constructs of what 
might have been intended and grasped by particular” members of its original 
audience.373  Of course, deciding whether or not a Divine author intended 
His/Her/Its audience to develop a particular interpretation is a matter best left to 
theologians; what a given audience in the past might well have understood, 
however, is a historical question and, as such, is fair game for the practitioner of 
modern hermeneutics.   
6. History of Interpretation:  “Have other readers, both critical 
and pre-critical, heard the same echoes?” 
 
This is a particularly interesting test in light of the relative neglect of Biblical and 
para-Biblical allusion in the Qur’an by the mufassirun. Hays notes that while the 
“readings of our predecessors can both check and stimulate our perception of 
scriptural echoes” and represent “a possible restraint against arbitrariness,” they 
are “also one of the least reliable guides for interpretation.” He understands this 
problem first-hand because, as a scholar of the New Testament, he must cope 
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with the fact that “Gentile Christian readers at a very early date lost Paul’s sense 
of urgency about relating the gospel to God’s dealings with Israel and, slightly 
later, began reading Paul’s letters within the interpretive matrix of the New 
Testament canon.”374  
As we have seen in the case of Islamic history, the rise of a distinctive and 
successful Muslim empire set in motion waves of re-Arabization and the eventual 
suppression of the Isra’iliyyat, with the resulting exegetical “amnesia” designed 
to conform with the new place in the world assigned to non-Muslim “peoples of 
the Book.” Hence, what Hays calls “a historically sensitive exegesis can recover 
echoes previously dampened or drowned out.”375 He then quotes Hollander at 
some length: 
The reader of texts, in order to overhear echoes, must have some 
kind of access to an earlier voice, and to its cave of resonant 
signification, analogous to that of the author of the later text. 
When such access is lost in a community of reading, what may 
have been an allusion may fade in prominence; and yet a 
scholarly recovery of the context would restore the allusion, by 
revealing intent as well as by showing means.376   
 
Hollander and Hays both recommend the development of this hermeneutical art 
as a “process of reclamation” that ought not to be held hostage to what the 
literary critic Frank Kermode deems “the interpretive inadequacy of our 
predecessors.” Hays argues that “an investigation of the history of interpretation 
can extend the range of possible readings” of a given Scripture, “but it can also 
lead us to a narrowing of the hermeneutical potential” that allusions coined in the 
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ordinary course of linguistic communication are designed to exploit. He 
concludes: “this criterion should rarely be used as a negative test to exclude 
proposed echoes that commend themselves on other grounds.”377  
7. Satisfaction: “With or without clear confirmation from the 
other criteria listed [above], does the proposed reading make 
sense? Does it illuminate the surrounding discourse? Does it 
produce for the reader a satisfying account of the effect of the 
intertextual relation?”378  
 
For Hays, this seventh “canon” of echo identification presents the most important 
“test” of all; for, as a deep reader of sacred texts, he values above all else the 
ability to address them with “a critical penetration” that could not have been 
achieved otherwise.379  
It merits repeating that critical penetration—whether of this or any 
variety—is not tantamount to readerly infallibility. “There are always only shades 
of certainty when these criteria are applied to particular texts. The more of them 
that fall clearly into place, the more confident we can be in rendering an 
interpretation of the echo effect in a given passage.” Not only that, but “there will 
be exceptional occasions when the tests fail to account for the spontaneous power 
of particular intertextual conjunctions. Despite all the careful hedges that we 
plant around texts, meaning has a way of leaping over, like sparks.” Hays 
therefore appends to these canons a caveat which I wish to re-word only for the 
sake of making it apply more clearly to the case of the Qur’an: we must be careful 
to avoid falling into the trap of thinking that the search for and identification of 
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Scriptural allusions in the Qur’an exhausts the meanings the sacred text makes 
available. Modern Qur’anic hermeneutics, as a meditation upon time, does not 
come to a resting place so long as time itself continues. We as readers, wandering 
in the forest of the text, may well find ourselves exhausted; but the hermeneutical 
task remains self-renewing and vigorous long after this reader, or any reader, has 
passed from the scene.380 
Further Prospects 
In order to avoid setting up a kind of “cook-book” approach to Qur’anic 
hermeneutics, I chose to defer the discussion of Richard Hays’s criteria for 
judging the likelihood that one has entered “allusive space” until after I had 
offered two examples of “full-knowing” readings (my own and that of Vernon 
Robbins). Hays himself cautions his readers that he does “not use these criteria 
explicitly in [his] readings of the texts, but they implicitly undergird the 
exegetical judgments that [he has] made.”381  Wishing to follow in his footsteps in 
this respect, I am tempted to conclude this study without further ado. However, I 
think that the reader who is new to this kind of inquiry deserves a little further 
consideration before being sent out into the world and instructed to “go thou and 
do likewise.” Consequently, I offer one final, brief example of the kinds of 
interpretive satisfaction that modern Qur’anic hermeneutics, conducted as I have 
indicated here, can provide. 
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Beginning in 2001, Brill began publication of the Encyclopaedia of the 
Qur’an (EQ)—a milestone in modern Anglophone scholarship on the sacred text 
and a profoundly valuable contribution to its genre (comparable to the Anchor 
Bible Dictionary). As with any production of its kind, the EQ presents a 
“snapshot” of the state of Qur’an scholarship at the close of the 20th century: a 
scholarship largely innocent of the hermeneutical approach I have outlined in the 
foregoing pages. An example of what I mean can be found in Andrew Rippin’s 
article “Isaiah,” in the 2nd volume. Rippin opens his article with the observation 
that Isaiah was the “Son of Amos and a prophet who was sent to Israel. Isaiah (in 
Arabic, Sha‘ya or Asha‘ya) is not mentioned by name in the Qur’an, although 
exegetical works” (Tabari, Mawardi) do mention him in connection with a 
particular verse of the Qur’an (17:4). He is mentioned in those works because the 
mufassirun regarded his life story “as an illustration of how the acts of 
‘corruption’…” referenced in Qur’an 17:4 “demanded the coming of the 
prophet.”382 Rippin then moves quickly away from the Qur’an to post-Qur’anic 
Muslim literature presumably because the Revelation itself has nothing more to 
tell us about the prophet Isaiah—if it had anything to tell us about him at all.  
Yet, if one returns to the ayat that Rippin cites (indeed quotes in 
translation), one encounters what appears to be itself a citation to previous 
Scripture. Qur’an 17:4 reads: “And We revealed [qada + ila] to the Children of 
Israel in the Scripture [fi al-kitab] that you [plural] will spread corruption in the 
land twice…” The remaining phrase [wa lata‘lunna ‘uluwwan kabiran] admits of 
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alternative renderings. Rippin’s translation reads: “and you shall ascend 
exceeding high.”383 John Penrice argues in his A Dictionary and Glossary of the 
Koran that the phrase should be rendered “and you will be ‘elated with great 
insolence.’” Penrice suggests that ta‘alunna “is here put for ta‘aluwnna, the 
radical waw being suppressed because of the quiescent nun contained in the 
teshdeed [sic]; it being contrary to the rule to have two quiescent letters together 
after the same vowel….”384 At least one modern translator of the Qur’an, 
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, agrees with Penrice or has adopted his rendering.385  
One way to attempt to resolve this ambiguity would be to engage in a 
“battle of the grammarians”—a method favored both by Muslim tradition and, 
somewhat ironically, by Orientalists. Another way would be to listen to what the 
text is saying in the portion of the phrase that appears relatively unambiguous: 
“We [Allah] revealed” (Rippin renders qada “decreed”) “in the Scripture that…” 
and to recognize what follows as a citation of some kind. Admittedly, the 
remainder of the phrase is ambiguous, fragmentary, and rather general. And, as I 
showed above, Qur’anic citation involves a broad range of possible 
appropriations including interpolated quotations and paraphrase. Nevertheless, 
the text is pointing the reader to a previous Divine communication; it may well 
presume enough familiarity with this prior speech act that such a reference was 
deemed sufficient to trigger recognition in a full-knowing reader from the past. 
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385 See The Qur’an, trans. by Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, New York: Olive Branch Press (2003), p. 
264.  
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That “full-knowledge” is evidently lost to us; but it is not out of the realm of 
possibility that it may be, to some extent, recovered.  
It is entirely possible that the reference is to a portion of Israel’s Scripture 
no longer extant. It is intriguing, however, that the Muslim exegetical tradition 
associated this ayah with the prophet Isaiah. Therefore, the canonical book of 
Isaiah would seem to be a reasonable place to undertake a search. The matching 
of a similar phrase to the one found in the Qur’an could conceivably shift the 
burden of proof in favor of one particular rendering. The happy coincidence of a 
Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac, or LXX Greek cognate with ta‘alunna (for, in 
searching, we must not neglect the targum) would make the task that much 
easier. 
The foregoing investigation represents one of the possibilities that a 
hermeneutical deep reading of the sacred text affords; but even if the trail from 
Qur’an 17:4 fails to lead us convincingly to Isaiah, son of Amos, our options are 
not exhausted. For one thing, Biblical scholarship knows not one Isaiah (the 
aforementioned son of Amos) but two—and, depending upon the scholar—
possibly three. In this respect, Rippin’s approach strikes me as Biblical-literalist—
a posture that, as a self-identifying disciple of John Wansbrough’s, I truly doubt 
he would consciously assume.386  
The first 39 chapters of the canonical book of Isaiah are, indeed, generally 
ascribed to the authorship of the son of Amos. Chapters 40-66, however, betray 
evidence of composition by at least a 2nd hand (known in Biblical scholarship as 
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Deutero-Isaiah/II Isaiah/Second Isaiah). In the view of some scholars, chapters 
56-66 are the work of a “3rd” or “Trito-” Isaiah.387 Without entering into the 
technical details mustered to support one argument or the other—as an 
Islamicist, I have no dog in this fight—it is generally acknowledged in the 
literature that the first 39 chapters of canonical Isaiah were composed by 
someone (presumably the son of Amos) who lived in Palestine prior to the 
Babylonian exile in 587/6 B.C.E. The remainder of the text is usually dated—on 
the basis of internal evidence—to the final years of the exile or just after (roughly 
early 540’s/late 530’s B.C.E.).388 This places the authorship of Deutero-Isaiah in 
the area of Mesopotamia where, as a consequence of the exile, a large and 
eventually influential Jewish community developed and prospered.389 Indeed, one 
result of the exile was that, from this time forward, more Jews would live outside 
of Palestine than within.390 It should not be too surprising, then, that by the early 
7th century C.E. (when the Qur’an is traditionally believed to have been revealed), 
the Rabbis of Mesopotamia were putting the final editorial touches upon one of 
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the most important collections of Rabbinical literature: the Babylonian 
Talmud.391  
At some point in time subsequent to the exile, the material that is now 
chapters 40-66 of Isaiah was combined with what are now chapters 1-39 of the 
same book and copies of this combined work circulated in Palestine. The 
manufacture of this “book” has created the illusion of “unity” that so scandalized 
Foucault. In recent years, however, Biblical scholars have begun to produce 
studies and exegetical works devoted to Deutero-Isaiah as a distinct author and 
codex. Were Foucault still among us, I presume he would be unimpressed by this 
development but, in Scripturalist circles, such a move is nigh revolutionary.  
Among the consequences to follow from this change is the opportunity for 
scholars to regard Deutero-Isaiah as a “book” with its own distinctive 
“personality” and characteristic concerns. One of the theories to emerge about its 
“personality” is its identification as a “liturgical drama”—a genre of cultic 
performance known throughout the Ancient world.392 If this theory is correct, it 
opens up new horizons of possibility for the ongoing oral transmission of this 
work long after its textual reification through inscription and Scriptural 
canonization was complete.393  
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392 This notion tends to undermine the sense of Deutero-Isaiah as a “codex” even though, 
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393 Nielsen prefaces her book with a remark by historian of drama T. P. Wiseman: “If one starts 
from the assumption that anything not directly attested in a literary source cannot have 
happened, without asking whether such attestation can be expected anyway…, then one’s range of 
possibilities is automatically restricted.” Nielsen, Cultic Theatres, p. 9.  
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As for its characteristic concerns, Deutero-Isaiah stands out from the rest 
of Hebrew Scripture on a number of grounds. One is the universalism of its 
message. Deutero-Isaiah re-envisions the role of Israel upon the world’s stage. 
Jerusalem is to become a place of pilgrimage not only for Judean monotheists, 
but for the peoples of all nations. Baltzer writes: 
I think it possible that the play [Deutero-Isaiah] was not written 
in Babylon but was performed for the gola [diasporic Jewry] 
there. For the work is also “publicity” for Jerusalem as a place of 
pilgrimage. This publicity could have had its place not only in 
Babylon but in other places in the Diaspora as well. It is Israelites 
and sympathizers to whom [Deutero-Isaiah] addresses his work. 
“The islands and their inhabitants…the desert and its towns” are 
to join in raising a new song (42:10-13). That includes Greeks 
and Arabs.394         
                                    
Baltzer singles out “Greeks and Arabs” because Biblical scholars have come to 
understand textual references to “the islands” as indicating Greece in the West 
and to “the desert and its towns” as indicating the Arabs to the East and South.395 
Deutero-Isaiah’s “internationalism” and its relationship to the historical 
figure of the Persian king Cyrus have been well documented.396 The fact that 
Isaiah 45:1 mentions Cyrus by name and identifies him as a “messiah” comes as a 
surprise only to those who are unfamiliar with the role that this Persian 
conqueror of Babylon came to play in the religio-political imaginary of the 
Ancient Near East.397 The significance of his personality and rule for the sudden 
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396 See, e.g., Diana Edelman, The Origins of the “Second Temple”: Persian Imperial Policy and the 
Rebuilding of Jerusalem, London: Equinox (2006), pp. 163-165.  
 
397 Cyrus had admirers even among the Greeks whose fledgling democracy was threatened by his 
imperial ambitions. Xenophon, a student of Socrates, authored the utopian Cyropaedia or 
“Education of Cyrus” to offer the Persian king as the model of an ideal ruler. Xenophon’s fellow 
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appearance of a universalistic strain in Near Eastern prophecy cannot be 
accommodated in a brief excursus. An assertion that their impact was 
considerable will have to suffice for now. The point I wish to make is that the 
more one knows about the Biblical Isaiahs, the more one has reason to expect 
Isaianic elements to make an appearance in the Qur’an. This reasonable 
expectation makes one less willing to settle for seeing the potential Qur’anic 
presence of such a significant prophetic figure as Isaiah given short shrift. While 
it is true, as Professor Rippin notes, that “Isaiah … is not mentioned by name in 
the Qur’an,” it is equally true that no mention is made of Cain and Abel either. 398 
Yet few (if any) readers would argue that the fratricide discussed in Surah al-
Maida is not part of a complex allusion to those Biblical figures. 
As discussed above, in the absence of an explicit reference, one can engage 
in careful textual comparisons to see whether a phrase from Scripture X has been 
quoted or paraphrased in Scripture Z. But, again, this technique does not exhaust 
the possibilities for hermeneutical inquiry. The presence of echo in Scripturalist 
intertextuality is far more pervasive—if not always more persuasive—than explicit 
citation. In the final pages of this chapter, then, I will present preliminary 
evidence from echo that, I believe, justifies further pursuit of Isaianic presence in 
the Qur’an.  
                                                                                                                                                       
disciple, Plato, argued in his Republic for rule by “philosopher-king”—a probable allusion to 
Cyrus. I. F. Stone’s The Trial of Socrates, Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1988, provides a compelling 
account of the fate of the pro-Cyrus party among the ancient Athenians. 
           
398 Rippin, “Isaiah,” p. 562. 
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Deutero-Isaiah and the Prophetic Genre of Satirical Iconoclasm 
    In an article that is too seldom mentioned in Qur’anic scholarship, 
Mustansir Mir broached a number of important issues in the “literary” approach 
to the Qur’an. Among these is the presence within it of “humor, satire, and 
irony”—what I would term “carnivalistic” aspects of the sacred text.399 Mir wrote:  
Some of the satire in the Qur’an is blunt. The affluent wicked, 
when they receive punishment in the hereafter, will be told: 
“Taste it [boiling water]! It is you who were the noble dignitary 
[in the world]!” (44:49). On other occasions, the satire is 
moderate in tone, but no less pungent for that. Abraham, finding 
his opportunity, is about to smash the idols in the temple. But, 
upon noticing the offering of food laid out before them, he 
decides to take his time. “Won’t you eat?” he asks them in mock 
seriousness (37:91). Receiving no response, he pretends to be 
angry: “What is the matter with you that you are not speaking?” 
(verse 92). Humor and satire blend when, after destroying all but 
one of the idols in the temple, Abraham, questioned by the 
temple custodians, denies that he destroyed the idols, saying, “O 
no, it is their chief god over here [the one Abraham had spared] 
who did that; ask them [idols] if they can speak” (21:63). The 
point is driven home and the idolators are put to shame.400         
 
The mockery of idols and idol-worship is a recurrent theme in the Qur’an. 
It is also a theme that appears repeatedly in the course of Deutero-Isaiah’s 
liturgical drama. In the section of the “book” that Baltzer identifies as Act I, the 
audience witnesses the smiths hard at work, fashioning idols that will not 
“shake/totter” (Isaiah 41:5b-7). Baltzer explains that this is an important aspect 
of idol manufacture: “a frequent topos in polemic against idols is that the idols 
‘fall’ or ‘topple over’; so we are then immediately told that they are pinned or 
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pegged, so as to make them firm.” An infirm idol was no doubt an 
embarrassment to the worshipper and the manufacturer as well. 401   
Interestingly, this scene gives way immediately to Divine address, in which 
Israel’s God refers to His people as the “seed/offspring of Abraham, my friend” 
(41:8)—“friend” being an epithet applied to Abraham by God in the Qur’an as 
well.402 The reference to Abraham in Deutero-Isaiah is particularly remarkable in 
light of the fact that “only a few passages in the prophetic books [narrowly 
defined] mention [him]…”403 Given the Qur’anic passage cited by Mir, Abraham’s 
mention in close proximity to idol manufacture ought to give the reader pause: 
are we entering “allusive space”? If so, what kind of allusion may be at work 
here?404 
The Divine speech continues at length; towards the end of it, Yahweh 
asserts that He does not share His glory and praise with idols (Isaiah 42:8). At 
42:14, Act II commences with Yahweh again speaking. He announces, “They are 
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402 See, e.g., Qur’an 4:125. The word appearing in the Hebrew text (root: a-h-b) and translated as 
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noun khallatun signifying “true or sincere, friendship, love, or affection.” See E. W. Lane, Arabic-
English Lexicon, Vol. 1, Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 1984 (1st pub. 1863), p. 780. The 
Qur’anic epithet is enriched when read with these echoes in mind.      
   
403 Baltzer, p. 100. 
 
404 The passage cited by Mir is one of several Qur’anic references to Abraham and the rejection of 
idolatry. See also Qur’an 21:51-70; 26: 69-89; 29: 16-18. 
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ignominiously put to shame who trust in a statue, who say to a cast image: ‘You 
are our gods!’” (42:17). According to Baltzer, these references announce “what are 
to be essential scenes in this act: the description of the manufacture of idols in 
44:9-20. This is in fact the most extensive piece of polemic against idols in 
[Deutero-Isaiah].”405   
The anti-idol polemic is contained in more direct Divine address (although 
some of it seems to be apportioned among other speakers as well),406 and follows 
on the heels of a Court Scene in which Yahweh famously rejects sacrificial 
worship (instituted in the Pentateuch). Baltzer argues that this abrogation of 
Mosaic ordinance is based upon a complex exegesis of patriarchal traditions 
(Isaiah 43:22-28).407 Yahweh moves directly from proscribing Israel’s cult of 
sacrifice to the condemnation of idol worship. Here Scriptural exegesis gives way 
to withering satire:  
The makers of images, they are all nothing, and their darlings do 
not help, and their witnesses <…> do not see and do not 
perceive, so that they may be shamed. Who has fashioned a god 
and cast an image that is of no use? See, all its comrades will be 
ashamed, and <its> fashioners too, they (are descended from) a 
human being. Let them assemble all of them! Let them all come 
forward! Let them be terrified! Let them all be ashamed!—
Together! A specialist for iron—he cuts off/hammers (?), and 
works with charcoal, and forms it with hammers, and forges it 
with his strong arm. He also becomes hungry and (has) no 
(more) strength. He has drunk no water and has become tired. A 
specialist for wood—he has stretched a measuring line. He traces 
it out with a stylus, fashions it with carving tools, with the 
rounding tool he makes its contours, <so as to make it> like the 
(ideal) image of a man, like a splendid example of a human 
being—to dwell in a house…(A man has come ) to fell cedars and 
he took a durmast oak and an oak tree and he made himself 
strong under the trees of the wood…A man has planted a laurel, 
                                                   
405 Ibid, pp. 124-146. 
 
406 See ibid, pp. 190-191. 
 
407 An example of Divine interpretation undertaken to revise existing cult practices. Ibid, pp. 176-
183.      
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and the rain makes it big, and it can serve someone for a fire. 
Then he took part of them and warmed himself: in part he 
kindles (it) and bakes bread, in part he makes (of it) a god <and 
bows down (before it) in worship>. He has made an image and 
thrown himself down in front of it…His (one) half he took to 
burn in the fire, in part he eats meat, he roasts the meat so as to 
eat his fill. In part he warms himself too and says, “Ah! Now I am 
warm! I have seen firelight!” And the remainder he has made 
into a god, into its image. He throws himself down before it <and 
worships it> and prays to it and says: “Save me, for you are my 
god!”…They have not perceived and do not understand that their 
eyes are sealed so that they cannot see, their hearts (are sealed) 
so that they cannot understand…And he does not take it to heart, 
and has not the perception and not the insight to say: “His half I 
have burnt in the fire.”… “And on the embers of part of it I have 
baked bread.” … “I roast meat and eat.” … “And the remainder I 
turn into an abomination/a horror.” … “Do I throw myself down 
in front of a block of wood?” … He grazes on ashes. A deluded 
heart has led him astray. But he will not save his life, and will not 
say: “Is it not a lie (which is) in my right hand?!” 408     
 
I have quoted this sustained anti-idolatry polemic of Deutero-Isaiah’s in full 
because it echoes broadly throughout the anti-idolatry polemic one finds in 
Qur’anic discourse. The Qur’an mocks those who would worship the product of 
their own hands instead of the God who created all things; it argues that idols are 
helpless to fulfill the requests of those who call upon them; that they are 
incapable of speech and cannot even help themselves.409 Moreover, Deutero-
Isaiah’s image of idolators as those whose eyes and heart are “sealed” appears 
repeatedly in Qur’anic discourse.410  
These examples are, again, but echoes and, taken in isolation, they may 
well be regarded as “mere” parallels; but placed in the contexts of (1) the Qur’anic 
kerygma as a whole and (2) the historical epoch in which and to which that 
                                                   
408 Isaiah 44:9-20 in Baltzer, pp. 190-191. 
 
409 Qur’an 21:51-70; 22:73; 26:69-89; 29:16-18; 37:83-111; 43:18. 
   
410 E.g., Qur’an 30:60; 40:36; 42:25; 63:4. 
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kerygma was pitched, they strike me as intentional references to an ancient and, 
for the Qur’an’s original audience, potentially compelling message. That message 
was the universalistic one that Deutero-Isaiah had spread by means of the 
liturgical drama performed for the peoples of the islands and the desert in the 
wake of Cyrus’ unifying conquest of the Ancient Near East. It was a message of 
hope for downtrodden communities that previous Empires had divided for the 
purpose of increasing political control.411 
Hermeneutics and the Historicization of the Qur’anic Kerygma 
The notion of a Qur’anic kerygma is not one that I have broached before in 
these pages and, as it is a concept that I am borrowing from New Testament 
scholarship, may be objected to as inappropriate. The Qur’an itself uses an Arabic 
term (bushra) that, I would argue, may be taken as a synonym insofar as kerygma 
and bushra are both proclamations of glad tidings.412 I would argue further (as I 
have done throughout) that both proclamations are to be understood against the 
shared historical background of the Ancient Near East. Crucial to the exposition 
of that background is the rise of political figures with universalistic ambitions and 
the role that new missionary forms of monotheism were to play in the execution 
of their political designs. I have already mentioned Deutero-Isaiah’s fascination 
with Cyrus who, as noted by Garth Fowden, “created the European and southwest 
Asian world’s first political world empire.”413 Cyrus was followed in the 4th 
century B.C.E. by Alexander the Great—who appears to have exceeded the 
                                                   
411 See Baltzer, Deutero-Isaiah, pp. 28-30. 
 
412 See, e.g., Qur’an 57:12. 
 
413 Garth Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth: Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity, 
Princeton: Princeton University Press (1993), p. 6.  
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Persian conqueror in territorial ambition, but whose early death resulted in the 
division of his Empire by his generals. Nevertheless, the dream of a unified world 
did not pass with the deaths of these ancient heroes and “when Rome adopted 
monotheism it became [what Fowden terms] an aspiring politico-cultural world 
empire.”414  
In distinguishing between a “political world empire” and a “politico-
cultural world empire,” Fowden underestimates the potential influence of 
Zarathustran preaching upon Cyrus.415 But this is a small quibble. In my view, 
Fowden’s most significant contribution to the notion of a Qur’anic kerygma is his 
correlation of late antique political universalism with the rise of new missionary 
monotheisms and their strenuous anti-idol/anti-polytheism rhetoric. Pre-
modern proponents of “world” unification objected to idol worship because, in 
the presence of a pantheon, loyalties are divided. Ironically, as Fowden points 
out, monotheistic attempts to enforce their hegemonic aims generated heresy 
which, in turn, served to increase social fragmentation.416 Sensitivity to this ironic 
state of affairs is evident in Qur’anic discourse.    
The 6th “chapter” of the Qur’an, Surah al-An‘am,417 presents something of 
an epitome of the Qur’anic kerygma: it rehearses the planks of a prophetic 
                                                   
414 Ibid.  
 
415 Olmstead notes that Iranian royalty began giving their children Zoroastrian names no later 
than 550 BCE—a significant benchmark of Zarathustran influence in elite circles. Cyrus 
conquered Babylon in 538 BCE. See A. T. Olmstead, History of the Persian Empire, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press (1948), p. 103, n. 19. 
 
416 Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth, p. 6. 
  
417 A phrase which translates as “the cattle”—animals revered in ancient Persian religion (see  
Mary Boyce’s magisterial A History of Zoroastrianism, Vol. I, Leiden: Brill, 1975).  
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tradition that eschews idol worship in favor of Scripturalist monotheism418 and 
then remarks, tellingly, that “those who divide up their religion” (alladhina 
farraqu dinahum) will have to answer to God for their actions (amruhum ila 
Allahi)—implying that it is the prophetic role of Scripturalist monotheism to 
unite peoples rather than divide them.419 The notion that such a mission might be 
appropriately accomplished through political means was modeled for the ancient 
Near East by the Zarathustran Cyrus, celebrated by the Hebrew prophet Deutero-
Isaiah, appropriated by the Roman emperor Constantine and, tradition informs 
us, was implemented with astounding success by the Prophet Muhammad and 
the first generation of his followers.420  
This history reflects an interpretive trajectory that raises profound 
questions in our present moment, beset as it is by wars in which antagonists on 
all sides—even those affiliated with ostensibly secular regimes—claim Divine 
sanction for their violent actions. While such matters are largely outside the 
scope of the present study, I think it appropriate to consider, in closing, the 
recent remarks of the Finnish theologian Heikki Räisänen on the potential role of 
hermeneutics in our rapidly shrinking “global village”: 
Historical exegesis employs … texts as guides to lost worlds. As 
Wayne Meeks puts it, it belongs to the job of an historian “to try 
to protect the integrity of the past, and that often has the effect of 
emphasizing its strangeness.” The exegete may be needed in the 
                                                   
418 The Qur’an shares these planks not only with the Hebrew prophets but also the Iranian 
visionary Zarathustra/Zoroaster. Indeed, potential Zoroastrian connections with the Qur’an 
deserve further investigation. One place to start may be a structural comparison of the Qur’an 
with the Gathas which are arranged according to the length of their metres. See Textual Sources 
for the Study of Zoroastrianism, edited and translated by Mary Boyce, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press (1984), p. 2.     
 
419 See Qur’an 6: 155-161. 
 
420 Fowden, Empire to Commonwealth, pp. 6-8. 
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global village as the “historical conscience” in the dialogue, as 
one who warns of attempts to make too direct a use of the texts 
[we inherit]….421     
 
Modern Qur’anic hermeneutics cultivates an understanding of the sacred text 
which tries to “protect the integrity of the past” by foregrounding the differences 
between ourselves as its present readers and auditors and those readers and 
auditors who received it from prophetic lips and scribal hands. Bakhtin’s 
assurance that every past meaning will have its homecoming festival should be 
taken as an admonition that the historical conscience bequeathed to humankind 
by the rise of technicalism must remain ever vigilant. If past meanings are 
potentially part of our own future, we must prepare ourselves to receive them 
when they arrive again. Such preparation includes learning to recognize what is 
past about them. Only then will we know how to accommodate them properly 
when they meet us upon their return.        
    
 
 
 
                                                   
421 Heikki Räisänen, Marcion, Muhammad and the Mahatma, London: SCM Press Ltd. (1997), p. 
15.  
Conclusion 
If I have tried to point out … the occasions where Plotinus is 
quoting, borrowing, paraphrasing, or alluding to Plato, it is in 
the hope of calling attention to the subtle interplay of 
traditionalism and originality that constituted Plotinus’ 
greatness. Far from being an exception for his time … Plotinus 
was, in this sense at least, supremely representative of [it]. He 
lived and wrote in a highly literate atmosphere, where the 
slightest allusion was likely to call to mind masses of Platonic, 
poetic, and other texts, by virtue of powers of memory of which 
we today can scarcely conceive.422  
 
Centuries of theologized polemic have delivered to the world two 
Qur’ans—the Borrowed and the Unborrowed. These Qur’ans have been 
constructed upon the internalized anxieties of competing sectarian elites without 
regard to the semiotic properties of the language of Revelation. In my view, this is 
a Hobson’s choice. The way out of this dilemma is to recognize the Qur’an for the 
highly allusive text that it is. By means of this very allusiveness, the Qur’an 
empowers the full-knowing readers in its audience, converting them into 
affiliated communities of interpretation it calls “peoples of the Book.” Such 
communities are equipped through the activation of their respective knowledge 
bases to initiate one another into a fuller engagement with the Qur’an itself and 
with the precursor Scriptures that the Qur’an repeatedly claims to have been 
revealed to confirm (musaddiq).423 Thus I find myself in agreement with Israeli 
scholar Hava Lazarus-Yafeh’s assertion that a full appreciation of early Islamic 
                                                   
422 Michael Chase, translator’s preface to Pierre Hadot, Plotinus or The Simplicity of Vision, trans. 
by Michael Chase, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1993), p. xi. 
 
423 Q 2:42, 2:89, 2:91, 2:97, 2:101, 3:3, 3:81, 4:47, 5:48, 6:92, 35:31, 46:12, 46:30. 
  
  
literature requires one to pay “serious attention to its various predecessors” with 
the understanding that   
… the Near East resembles a palimpsest, layer upon layer, 
tradition upon tradition, intertwined to the extent that one 
cannot really grasp one without the other, certainly not the later 
without the earlier, but often also not the earlier without 
considering the shapes it took later.424  
 
I would, however, amend the latter portion of Lazarus-Yafeh’s observation to 
read: “certainly not the later without the earlier nor the earlier without the shapes 
it took later” because it is only through studying the ongoing negotiations of 
meaning among a given text’s full-knowing readers that one can hope to mine the 
depths of its interpretive possibilities. To arbitrarily fore-shorten this 
hermeneutical process adds nothing to the conversation of humankind; rather, it 
represents one more exercise of the will-to-power over texts. As we have seen in 
the case of Scripture, sectarian elites historically reserve to themselves a 
monopoly over the ways in which sacred writ is allowed to mean. The assertion of 
this exclusive authority produces a hardening of sectarian boundaries that inures 
to the benefit of those elites and their heirs; at the same time, it deprives 
generations of potential full-knowing readers of the interpretive empowerment 
literary allusiveness bestows.  
This raises the question: are scholars of the Qur’an and of Biblical and 
related literatures called to attend only to the needs of sectarian elites? In the 
past, this has been, by far, the typical scenario. If the present world-historical 
context is identical with that past, then scholars need not alter their interpretive 
protocols one iota: they are eminently well-prepared to “fight the last war.” But if, 
                                                   
424 Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, Intertwined Worlds: Medieval Islam and Bible Criticism, Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press (1992), p. 4.  
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perchance, the present context and the past are not identical, then certain 
adjustments need to be made. The most critical point that I wish to make at this 
juncture is that the authority to perform this kind of hermeneutics on Muslim 
Scripture comes from the Qur’an itself. As Nasr Abu Zayd would put it, it is the 
very structure of Qur’anic discourse that compels hermeneutical reflection.  
In a post-Medieval (but aspirantly modern) present, hermeneutics 
necessarily includes meditations upon history. Such meditations have led this 
author to conclude that Qur’anic discourse is heavily-laden with citations, 
allusions proper, and echoes. These literary devices have, in a sense, lain dormant 
for more than 10 centuries; they await activation and negotiation by the kinds of 
readers and auditors that populated the Qur’an’s first audience—the full-knowing 
readers which the sacred text invites (da‘a) to al-Ma’ida, the robust religious 
pluralism of its hermeneutic feast-table.425 If there is a solid, scholarly 
justification for turning this audience-in-waiting away empty-handed, I would 
like to know what that justification could be—for it truly escapes my grasp. 
Indeed, the present moment in world history strikes me as a most propitious time 
to encourage readers of the Qur’an (Muslim and non-Muslim) to re-discover the 
many ways (and means) by which this Arabic collection of prophetic discourses 
connects with the larger and more ancient Near Eastern prophetic tradition as a 
whole. In an age of conflict, it is all too easy to emphasize how we differ from one 
another; if there were ever a time to re-learn the many things we share, it would 
seem to be now. 
                                                   
425 I am tempted to pun here in a Derridean way with the Arabic word dawa, meaning to echo. 
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In the previous chapter, I reviewed three points of contact between the 
Qur’an and Biblical and parabiblical literatures; in the process, I illustrated the 
Qur’anic employment of citation, allusion proper, and echo. As discussed, all of 
these devices were operative in Surah al-Ma’ida’s complex reference to the Cain 
and Abel story found in Genesis and its appropriations in the Mishna and 
Babylonian Talmud. Nevertheless, I emphasized the phenomenon of echo, since 
echo is the most elusive of allusive literary devices. Echo’s very elusiveness is part 
of what makes it rhetorically effective: the less specific the allusion, the greater its 
suggestiveness. The virtue of suggestion is that it helps to lead an audience to 
reach new conclusions with an open-hand; suggestion is compatible with the 
“rhetoric of invitation” that, I argue, underlies much Qur’anic discourse.   
Vernon Robbins’s recent work on the Johannine-inflected Lukan Jesus 
demonstrates one method of following the textual traces of literary echoes from 
canon to canon. In his article, Robbins does not address the Qur’anic treatment 
of the crucifixion, vis., that it was illusory; this is an added twist to Islamic 
tradition’s depiction of the figure of ‘Isa ibn Maryam and one that obligates us to 
consider ways in which to further inflect his literary history with the writings of 
Gnostic Christians.426  
My own discussion of the Qur’an’s anti-idolatry rhetoric as it parallels 
Deutero-Isaiah’s suggests that scholars of the Qur’an could benefit from 
attending to cues within the text itself. Words like “katabna” and phrases like 
“qada ila” flag the reader that allusive space may be opening up before her. A 
                                                   
426 See Qur’an 4:157-158. 
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review of such linguistic signals as these is, in fact, a practical way to continue the 
hermeneutical process that I have initiated in these pages.  
But there are other ways as well. One is to systematically mine the 
established scholarship on Biblical and Qur’anic parallels. Some of this may be 
found in the works of 19th and early 20th century Orientalists. An edition of J. M. 
Rodwell’s English rendering of the Qur’an which contains his annotations may be 
used as a handy introduction to this body of work. Unfortunately, those who 
pursue allusive space at the direction of Rodwell and many of his ilk must be 
prepared to subject themselves to a scholarly discourse that is often deeply 
offensive to Muslims—and to anyone else who has a fair grasp upon the issues 
involved in comparative religion.427 This is the scholarship of the Borrowed 
Qur’an and, insofar as it represents itself as “proving” the Arabic Revelation’s 
inferiority to the Bible or Judaism’s or Christianity’s inherent superiority to 
Islam, it is not credible. Nevertheless, the Orientalists did know their ancient and 
late ancient Near Eastern literature and, no matter how polemical their motives 
may have been, they could be relied upon to recognize literary parallels.  
A more neutral (and far more exhaustive) presentation of Qur’an/Bible 
parallels is available in German: Johann-Dietrich Thyen’s Bibel und Koran, 
Köhn: Böhlau, 2000. Thyen’s collection is thorough (roughly 300 pages in the 
present edition) and systematic; it also has the virtue of taking into account para-
biblical writings. I would emphasize, however, that it is a collection of parallels 
(the subtitle of the book is Eine Synopse gemeinsamer Überlieferungen or “A 
                                                   
427 See Carl W. Ernst, Following Muhammad: Re-Thinking Islam in the Contemporary World, 
Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press (2003), pp. 38-57. 
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Synopsis of Traditions Held in Common”) and does not undertake the crucial 
task of attempting to distinguish between a “mere” parallel and forms of allusion. 
As I hope to have adequately conveyed in previous chapters, allusions are not 
given or self-evident. In the absence of explicit authorial admission, they are 
“established” (to whatever extent they can be “established”) by means of scholarly 
argument.  
Although Thyen’s collection is quite thorough, it is not exhaustive. This is 
because his focus was on Bible-Qur’an parallels. Where parabiblical literature 
such as the Mishnah provides a third prong to support allusions between this pair 
of texts, Thyen acknowledges it. But there are other instances when the Qur’an 
appears to allude to parabiblical literature without involving the canonical codex 
of the Bible. One brief example that may be cited is the Qur’anic method for 
determining the arrival of fajr, or the hour in which to commence a day’s fasting 
in the month of Ramadan: “Eat and drink until the white thread becomes distinct 
to you from the black thread of dawn.”428 There is no Biblical parallel for this 
trope, but there is a Mishnaic one: the method for determining the arrival of 
dawn and, hence, the hour in which to recite the Shema’ each morning. In 
Mishnah Berakoth 1:2 we find: “From what time in the morning may the Shema’ 
be recited? So soon as one can distinguish between blue and white. R. Eliezer 
says: Between blue and green. And it should be finished before sunrise …”429 
While the Qur’anic and Mishnaic tropes are not identical, they bear what might 
                                                   
428 Qur’an 2:187. 
 
429 The Mishnah, translated by Herbert Danby, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1933), p. 2. Several 
remarks about reciting while standing and reclining follow this line; these remarks represent a 
citation from Deuteronomy 6:7. But this is also a Qur’anic refrain. See, e.g., Qur’an 3: 191.  
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be termed a family resemblance to one another suggesting, at the least, echo. This 
possibility becomes more credible when one considers how little this pair of 
tropes resembles another found in the ancient world, the Homeric 
“rhododaktulos Eos” or “rosy-fingered” Dawn.430 Moreover, the Qur’an and 
Mishnah are not only troping, they are offering a methodology for determining 
the appropriate time to perform a sacred act. Homer, on the other hand, is just 
troping.     
Of course, it is entirely possible that the Qur’an is not alluding to the 
Mishnah here: both texts may be alluding to a third of which I am not aware; it is 
also possible that they are referencing a trope for the arrival of dawn once 
generally understood in the Near East. However, if this was a common trope at 
one time, there should be no difficulty in finding independent contemporaneous 
attestation of its use. I am not aware of the existence of such independent 
evidence; moreover, given the fact that there is at least one hadith (a post-
Qur’anic Prophetic tradition) which purports to explain the meaning of this 
trope, I infer that the early Muslim community was unfamiliar with it.431  
Since I have now broached the subject of the hadith literature, I am 
obligated to acknowledge that Thyen’s study almost completely neglects it. 
Logically, the focus of his book would seem to preclude any substantial 
consideration of extra-Qur’anic traditional lore and I wish to emphasize that I do 
not intend to cast aspersions upon his scholarship by mentioning this omission.  
                                                   
430 See, e.g., Homer, The Odyssey, book 2, line 1.  
 
431 See the discussion of the Qur’anic ayat and the exegetical hadith in As-Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh us-
Sunnah, Vol. 3, translated by ‘Abdul-Majid Khokhar, Muhammad Sa’eed Dabas, Jamal al-Din M. 
Zarabozo, Indianapolis, IN: American Trust Publications (1991), p. 113. 
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He does advert occasionally to that genre of Muslim tradition literature known as 
the sira (or biography of the Prophet Muhammad) but, in so doing, only 
scratches the surface of a vast body of literature.432  
In previous chapters, I myself have excluded consideration of the ahadith 
on the ground that, from a historicist perspective, it cannot be relied upon to 
provide incontrovertible evidence of what the Prophet and/or his companions 
may have actually said or done. Pre-modern tradition literature is, first and 
foremost, a form of didactic cultural memory; as such, it is an invaluable method 
of initiating the members of the Muslim community into an earlier generation’s 
understanding of how to acquire a Prophetic consciousness and, hopefully, to 
lead a life that is commensurate with it. Personally, I cannot begin to measure the 
extent to which my own reading and meditation upon the hadith literature has 
enriched and expanded my notions of piety. But I do not ask of the ahadith 
something which they were not designed to do: live up to post-Medieval 
expectations of historicity. This is not to say, however, that no historical use can 
be made of this material. For, as I have just acknowledged, the ahadith provide 
us with a window upon an earlier generation’s understanding of how to acquire a 
Prophetic consciousness; in other words, it is part of the reception history of the 
life and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his circle or at least the life and 
teachings of the primitive community of Believers (what the Qur’an calls 
mu’minun).433  
                                                   
432 See references listed in Thyen, Bibel und Koran, p. 324. 
 
433 I am using this designation to purposefully allude to Fred M. Donner’s “From Believers to 
Muslims,” an account of the early Islamic movement that I find largely persuasive. 
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This reception history may have important implications for our study of 
the allusive Qur’an. As I stated at the beginning of this concluding chapter, “it is 
only through studying the ongoing negotiations of meaning among a given text’s 
full-knowing readers that one can hope to mine the depths of its interpretive 
possibilities.” Approached with such a goal in mind, the hadith literature 
promises to contain some unforeseen riches. For example, there is an extremely 
interesting tradition (found in Sahih al-Bukhari) which suggests that the early 
community of mu’minun were cognizant of the open nature of Near Eastern 
prophetic revisionism.434 An apparent paraphrase of sacred writ did not disturb 
them. But in this particular instance, there seems to be more than just semantic 
approximation involved.   
In Imam al-Bukhari’s Kitab al-Tafsir or “The Book of Qur’anic Exegesis,” 
we find a pair of traditions in which the Prophet Muhammad quotes Allah (qala 
Allahu) as follows: “I have prepared (a‘adatu) for My righteous servants what no 
eye has seen, and no ear has heard, and has not entered the heart of man.” The 
words I have here translated are identical in both traditions. Both narrations then 
pair this extra-Qur’anic quotation with an ayah from the Qur’an: “No soul knows 
what is hidden [‘ukhfia] for them [actual pronoun] of joy [qurrati a‘aunin, 
literally, ‘delight of the eye,’ a variation of the idiomatic qurrat al-‘ayn], a reward 
for what they used to do.”435 The two narrations differ in that one has the 
Qur’anic ayah recited by a companion of the Prophet (Abu Huraira) and the 
other has the ayah recited by the Prophet Muhammad himself. The latter 
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435 Qur’an 32:17. 
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narration also appends to the Prophet’s extra-Qur’anic quotation from Allah th
elaborative words “a treasure compared to what has been shown to you 
e 
[plural
nce 
g 
 
t 
f allusion—not to mention Abu Huraira 
and th
is 
ited 
                                                  
].”436  
The hadith’s pairing of the extra-Qur’anic quotation from Allah with the 
Qur’anic ayah—also, presumably, a quotation from Allah—implies that the two 
quotations are to be understood as semantically equivalent despite the differe
in their wording. Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from this is that God is not 
particularly fastidious about how Divine communication is accomplished, so lon
as the Prophet gets the point across. From the perspective of the present study,
however, what is most intriguing is that the Prophet’s statement, qala Allahu, 
should alert the reader that she may well be standing on the threshold of allusive 
space—indeed, the inclusion of the Qur’anic ayah within the hadith implies tha
al-Bukhari was aware of the presence o
e Prophet Muhammad himself.  
But one should not rest content with the Traditionist’s pairing of th
extra-Qur’anic statement with the Qur’anic ayah alone. I make this latter 
assertion as a full-knowing reader who, when he first encountered the Qur’anic 
ayah, was immediately reminded of a verse from a Pauline epistle. I was exc
to discover an editorial annotation in the edition of the Qur’an which I was 
reading at the time directing me to the hadith cited above. When I read the 
hadith, however, I became even more excited, for I discovered that the extra-
Qur’anic statement “I have prepared for My righteous servants what no eye has 
 
436 The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari: Arabic-English, Vol. vi, translated by 
Muhammad Muhsin Khan, Medina, SA: Islamic University (1976), pp. 288-289. The translations 
appearing in this chapter are my own.  
 208 
seen, and no ear has heard, and has not entered the heart of man” was actually 
more similar in its wording to the Pauline passage I had in mind (1 Corinthians 
2:9) th
l 
en 
 
 
” 
ouk an   
l 
Qur’anic ayah shares with this set of sayings. All agree that the treasure that God 
                                                  
an it was to the Qur’anic ayah!  
When I revisited 1 Corinthians 2:9, I was reminded of the fact that Pau
presents it as a quotation from an authoritative written source—presumably 
Jewish Scripture. The verse is preceded by Paul’s assertion that “We speak the 
wisdom of God in secret (en musterio) [as one would speak of] a thing hidd
away (ten apokekrummenen) which God spoke forth from eternity for our 
glorification (hen proorisen ho Theos pro ton aionon eis doxan hemon).”437 He 
explains that the rulers of the present time—i.e., the first century of the Common
Era—were not privy to this wisdom for, had they known it, they would not have
crucified Christ.438 Then, in order to emphasize the secret nature of this Divine 
Wisdom, Paul quotes an unnamed authority; we presume that it is Scripture for 
he begins with the formulaic phrase “but as it is written (alla kathos gegraptai).
The words which follow this allusive signal are: “What eye has not seen and ear 
has not heard and has not entered the heart of man (kai epi kardian anthropou 
ebe) is what God has prepared (hepoimasen) for those who love Him.”439
In comparing these various texts, I noticed not only the near identica
wording of Paul’s unnamed authority and the Prophet Muhammad’s extra-
Qur’anic Divine statement, but also the theme of hiddenness or secrecy which the 
 
437 1 Corinthians 2:7. 
 
438 1 Corinthians 2:8. 
 
439 1 Corinthians 2:9. 
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has in store for his righteous servants (hadith) or those who love Him (Paul’s 
authority) is wrapped in mystery.  
Researching the matter further, I discovered that Biblical scholars, 
following up Paul’s flagging of this Scriptural allusion, cite to three texts: two 
from Deutero-Isaiah (Isaiah 64:4 [LXX] and 52:15) and one from the apocryphal 
Wisdom of Ben Sira (1:10). None of these texts provides an exact match with 
Paul’s Greek, although Septuagint Isaiah 64:4 shares much of the vocabulary in 
common and may be fairly described as semantically similar to the Pauline 
passage.440 When the three candidates for Paul’s original reference are read in 
pari materia with 1 Corinthians 2:6-16, one can conclude that Paul may have 
been drawing freely on all of this material and, perhaps, on other material no 
longer extant, in order to bring to the Church in Corinth a new prophetic Word of 
Divine Wisdom. Indeed, the gist of the passage taken as a whole is that God was 
then revealing, through the spirit (dia tou pneumatos—verse 10), what had been 
kept secret through the long ages past. 
A host of interesting questions flow from these observations. If the hadith 
reflects actual Prophetic exegesis, to which passage was the Prophet alluding? 
Was it 1 Corinthians? Deutero-Isaiah? Perhaps the allusion was to more than one 
precursor saying or text. If so, does the hadith accurately reflect a Prophetic 
allusion but omit a portion of his remarks? If the Prophet was alluding to 1 
                                                   
440 Richard B. Hayes notes that Paul’s “citations characteristically follow the Septuagint (LXX), a 
Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible dating from the second or third century B.C.E., which was 
in common use in Hellenistic synagogues during Paul’s lifetime. Rarely do Paul’s quotations agree 
with the Masoretic Hebrew text (MT) against the LXX; even the few cases of apparent agreement 
with the Hebrew can be explained as evidence of variant LXX text forms that have been subjected 
to ‘hebraizing revisions,’ a tendency well attested elsewhere by Greek versions of Aquila, 
Symmachus, and Theodotion.” Hayes, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul, pp. x-xi. 
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Corinthians—as his language suggests—what might this tell us about his attitude 
towards Paul’s self-ascribed prophetic office?441 Was the Qur’an itself alluding? If 
so, was the allusion to 1 Corinthians, to Deutero-Isaiah, to some other saying or 
text? Dogmatic considerations may lead sectarians to one conclusion or another, 
but scholarship must assert its allegiance to its own methods or be discredited in 
the eyes of independent inquirers. 
In my view, the possibility that Deutero-Isaiah is being alluded to here is 
significant. In history—though not in Jewish, Christian, or Muslim dogmatics—
Deutero-Isaiah is the strong precursor of the Perso-Judean prophetic tradition to 
which Paul and Muhammad belong. This tradition is also the matrix from which 
emerged the Judaisms, Christianities, and Islams that, today, collectively claim 
the largest share of adherents among the religions of the world. It is the tradition 
that distinguished itself from the Israelite vision that had preceded the 
Babylonian exile. Richard Foltz summarizes the most salient of these differences 
succinctly:  
The Israelites seemed to have had little clear notion of the 
afterlife, assuming that souls merely went to reside in a murky 
underworld known as Sheol. They lacked the elaborate 
angelology and demonology of the Iranians, and they had no 
notion of the “devil,” only the gods of others whom the Israelites 
were forbidden to worship (but who, as the Israelite prophets 
endlessly complain, they often did anyway). The Israelites’ 
conception of time, like most ancient peoples, was cyclical, based 
on the seasons and the agricultural year. The linear time and 
apocalyptic eschatology described in Zoroaster’s cosmos is 
absent from the pre-Babylonian Israelite worldview. The Israelite 
sense of ethics was based on the community, rather than on the 
individual. Whereas the Hebrew biblical tradition speaks of 
Yahweh’s covenant with a people and collective guilt and 
                                                   
441 See Bart D. Ehrman, Peter, Paul, & Mary Magdalene: The Followers of Jesus in History and 
Legend, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), pp. 122-129.  
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punishment, Zoroaster’s vision focuses on personal 
responsibility for choosing good over evil.442                       
 
And the notion of a Messiah or “anointed one” that we meet with in the pages of 
Deutero-Isaiah, identified there as the Persian king Cyrus, may well owe its 
inspiration to the Zoroastrian savior-figure “Saoshyant.”443  
While I cannot begin, in the space of these concluding remarks, to trace 
the threads which bind the Qur’an to the Perso-Judean religion first attested in 
Deutero-Isaiah, I can say with confidence that even a casual reader of the sacred 
Scriptures of Islam has recognized allusions to the tropes Foltz sketched above. 
What we have, then, in the Qur’an and related literatures is precisely what the 
words of the previously cited Prophetic hadith announce: “a delight of the eye … a 
treasure compared to what has been shown to you.” The key to disclosing this 
treasure lies in our ability, as readers of Scripture, to discard the sectarian 
blinders with which we are fitted from childhood, and to re-imagine the Near 
Eastern prophetic tradition as one that includes, at minimum, those Scriptures 
produced in the Near East from at least the 12th century B.C.E. (to include 
Zarathustra) to the 7th century of our own era, and from the Iranian plateau in the 
East to the Nile Valley in the West. The yield of this transgressive, border-
crossing activity would be a new prophetic syllabus—or an “anti-canonical canon” 
if you will—drawn up by scholarly mapping of evidence of intertextual 
engagements between and among Scriptural traditions.  
                                                   
442 Foltz, Spirituality in the Land of the Noble, p. 49. See also Geo Widengren, “Iran and Israel in 
Parthian Times with Special Regard to the Ethiopian Book of Enoch,” Temenos 2 (1966), pp. 139-
177. 
 
443 Ibid. 
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Why should we do this? As I have noted previously, language operates by 
means of thick systems of referentiality; when approached with post-Medieval 
hermeneutical techniques, the very structure of Qur’anic discourse compels an 
investigation into its rich allusiveness—as does all Near Eastern Scriptural 
discourse. Also, as previously acknowledged, there is the need for inter-
communal communication in this time of inter-sectarian conflict. But even 
beyond these considerations is the moral challenge leveled by the late Norman O. 
Brown:  
It is time to discard the time-honored prejudice that treats 
Koranic [sic] theology as a confused echo of half-understood 
Jewish or Christian traditions, selected and polemically distorted 
to concoct a new-fangled monotheism to supply “backward” 
Arabs with a “cultural identity.”444    
 
My argument for a “third” or Allusive Qur’an—a tertium quid beyond the 
Borrowed and the Unborrowed—is, at the end of the day, a moral argument. 
Moreover, it is not a selective moral argument but one directed to all readers of 
sacred texts regardless of sectarian affiliation. Let the scholarly community 
abandon the double-standard that permits to the Biblical canon a creative 
appropriation of images and tropes drawn from a variety of precursor 
literatures—without undermining its status as Divine communication—while 
denying this same privilege to the Qur’an. Let us do this even if the vast majority 
of the readers of these Scriptures are satisfied with the present polemical 
stalemate.  
                                                   
444 Norman O. Brown, “The Prophetic Tradition,” Apocalypse and/or Metamorphosis, Berkeley: 
University of California Press (1991), p. 48.  
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My personal egalitarian sympathies notwithstanding, the course of 
intellectual history compels me to concede that the masses never proposed an 
alternative to the Ptolemaic model of the solar system or to Bishop Ussher’s 
dating of the creation of the world. Come to think of it, neither did the majority of 
scholars or sectarian elites. In any event, the continued approval of the 
aforementioned social groups is not a valid reason for maintaining the prevailing 
discourse of the two Qur’ans. If there is a moral obligation that attaches, without 
exception, to scholarly labor, it is that one’s allegiance does not belong to this or 
that constituency, but always to the weight of the evidence.   
By employing allusion in the manner in which it did, the Qur’an itself 
negotiated the terms of its own belatedness vis à vis its prophetic precursors. 
Scholars should recognize and honor this ancient achievement. In so doing, we 
may augment it through the formation of new interpretative communities and 
enact, by its example, a robust intellectual and religious pluralism built upon a 
foundation of intercultural translation.  
To realize such a research protocol will require liberal cooperation among 
specialists. The Qur’an stands on the shoulders of two thousand years of 
prophetic activity in the Near East—declaimed and commented upon in a half 
dozen Classical languages. Despite the continuing prejudice which seeks to 
hermetically seal the borders of cultures, religions, and even civilizations in that 
geographical region, the surviving textual evidence—read allusively—discloses a 
pattern of intimate Persian and Arab involvement in shaping the religious milieu 
of the Ancient World. Buried “between the lines” of texts that we have been 
trained to read in particular ways and in isolation from one another are histories 
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waiting to be welcomed back into the light of day. If, as Bakhtin has taught us, 
every meaning will have its homecoming festival, modern Qur’anic hermeneutics 
promises that we may look forward to a future filled with much to celebrate.               
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